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n the past few decades the university has increasingly exploited the 
commercial potential of select experimental data generated in its 
molecular biology research laboratories.  The university protects such 
data with intellectual property (IP) rights, and licenses the use of this IP, or sells it 
outright, to the pharmaceutical industry.  Such IP often details the discovery of a 
novel drug candidate that has potential to treat or cure human disease.  Through my 
eyes as a university lab educator, I argue in this dissertation that the contemporary 
cultural trend of the university’s sale of its research data to industry was catalyzed by 
two key concurrent events of late 20
th
 century: a knowledge economy and 
neoliberalism.  Utilizing technology as an analytical lens, I show that key hard and 
soft technologies gave rise to a knowledge economy; this provided the university with 
the prime technological platform for the heightened exposure, and conveyance, of its 
research data to industry.  I argue that the contemporary political doctrine of 
neoliberalism is a control technology because it molds the public sector – including 
the university – into the competitive free market tendencies of the private sector; this 
I 
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provided the university with the prime economic platform for the sale of its research 
data to industry.  Moreover, I demonstrate that the university’s sale of its select 
research data to industry has resulted in stronger alliances between the university and 
industry.  Crucially, such alliances, I argue, have a profound impact on American 
higher education, on two levels: 1) the evolution of the university from a historic to a 
postmodern institution; and 2) fundamental changes in the nature of learning in the 
university research lab associated with the rise of the postmodern university.  The 
dissertation concludes by considering various measures that may be used by the lab 
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he starting point for the dissertation is my employment in a research 
lab in a large hospital located in the American city of Boston.  The 
hospital is a teaching hospital affiliated with the medical school of a 
major Boston university that, aside from serving patients from the greater New 
England area, functions as a practical teaching center for students attending the 
hospital’s respective medical school.  As is the case with many university medical 
school-affiliated teaching hospitals, the one in which I work has a large number of in-
house research labs dedicated to understanding the underlying molecular mechanisms, 
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A brief biography 
My professional responsibilities in the research lab embody the dual role of 
‘lab researcher’ and, in an entirely unofficial yet comprehensive capacity, ‘lab 
educator’1 (see later); the latter is the focus of the dissertation.  During my tenure in 
the lab, our research funding was secured by the award of several substantial federal 
research grants, which enabled our lab to recruit more researchers.  I was the one 
chosen to train these newcomers to our lab because of my desire – known at the time 
by my peers and my manager – to eventually make a transition from lab work, and to 
marry my passions for theoretical (as opposed to bench) science and education in a 
career that entails teaching science to undergraduate students in higher education, or 
perhaps training new scientists in industry.  Coincident with this intensification of my 
pedagogical responsibilities in the lab, and in order to strengthen my teaching 
credentials to better market myself as an ‘educator’ proper to potential future 
employers in education, I applied to, and was subsequently successfully accepted to, 
Glasgow University’s professional EdD programme.   
Embarking on Glasgow’s EdD programme in the fall of 2005 finally began to 
fill a troubling void in my resume: my lack of formal teaching accreditation or degree.  
Glasgow’s EdD is a part-time professional degree program for working professionals 
engaged in all forms of education or training in all sectors.  The EdD’s almost 
exclusive online learning format, I quickly realized, freed me from what I perceive to 
be the burden, and even the artificialness, of on-campus lecture-theater-style teaching.  
My literal detachment of myself as a student from the physical school better enabled 
me to simultaneously integrate theory from the EdD programme into my professional 
practice, with the former providing rich insight, and in many ways informing, the 
latter.  For example, various aspects of the EdD coursework raised my consciousness 
of, and consequently forced me to interrogate, the many taken-for-granted 
assumptions in my profession
2
.  Many of these assumptions, some of which we will 
unpeel later in the dissertation, seem on the surface to erode the historically liberal 
and democratic ideals on which education has been built, and imbued in 
contemporary circles by the likes of John Dewey ([1916] 1997).  The EdD 
programme and my complementary role as ‘lab educator’, coupled to my undertaking 
                                                 
1
 It is ‘unofficial’ in the sense that my responsibilities as a ‘lab educator’ are not included in my job 
description for ‘Research Associate’. 
2
 As inspired by Brookfield’s ‘hunting assumptions’ in his book Becoming a Critically Reflective 
Teacher (1995). 
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a second job in 2009 as a part-time instructor in microbiology at Cambridge College 
(in Massachusetts), cemented my role as a science educator ‘proper’.  I was finally on 
a trajectory to one day depart the lab bench and embark on a full-time career as a 
science educator.    
My professional responsibilities as a ‘lab educator’ entail my training 
newcomers to the lab on the theory of, as well the various practical techniques and 
methodology required to execute, our lab’s research focus3.  In this role, I guide my 
students into an ‘adult-centered learning’ experience that loosely reflects the theories 
originally developed, according to O’Sullivan (2004; cited in O’Neil & McMahon, 
online resource
4
), by Hayward in 1905 and Dewey in 1956.  Nowadays, Carl Rogers 
(1983) is credited with expanding his theory of client-centered counseling into a 
theory of education, which was subsequently theoretically built upon by the works by 
Malcolm Knowles and Jean Piaget (O’Neil & McMahon).  In this sense – as an 
educational observer more than a doer – the dissertation is not so much a report on 
my teachings as a lab educator as it is a report on my experiences of the learning 
dynamics among my students (or peers) in the university research lab, within the 
wider context of the contemporary university.  I say ‘learning’, as opposed to 
‘teaching’, because it best reflects the unstructured and often networked nature of 
informal knowledge exchange that typically occurs among my peers in the university 
research lab.  ‘Knowledge exchange’ refers to the exposure of the lab researcher5 to 
scientific research data, which I propose is of two primary types: internal and external 
research data.  Crucially, internal research data lies at the heart of the many 
contentious issues explored in the dissertation.  Therefore, characterization, including 
an introduction to ownership, of internal research data – and how it is distinct from 




                                                 
3
 The research focus concerns the molecular characterization of a family of human cell surface receptors 
that are hijacked by certain viruses for entry into (and subsequent replication in) human host target cells.  
Advancing our understanding of these human cell surface receptors enables scientists to better understand how to 
block their hijacking by viruses, and thereby halt viral replication and consequent disease in infected humans.   
4
 Available at: http://www.aishe.org/readings/2005-1/oneill-mcmahon-Tues_19th_Oct_SCL.html (last 
accessed 7/29/2012. 
5
 Used here to refer to postdoctoral research fellows – the primary researchers of the university research 
lab – but extended to include PhD students, summer students, and research technicians, who are all potentially 
capable of independently executing lab research.  
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At the heart of the matter: internal research data 
First, external research data is so-called because it is produced by all other 
universities and other academic institutions external to (and perhaps in competition 
with) the university in question
6
.  External research data is primarily acquired by the 
university lab researcher from reading scholarly, often peer-reviewed, research 
articles published in journals that are centrally downloadable from online journal 
databases
7
.  Access to these research articles, which contain invaluable research data, 
as well as accompanying experimental methodologies, scientific hypotheses and 
academic discussion, is crucial for helping the lab researcher – working in the context 
of the current competitive internet-driven pace of scientific research – to keep apace, 
understand, and even provide inspiration for, their own (and in turn, that of their 
lab’s) ongoing research endeavors.  This is especially so when one considers that 
research articles become instantaneously available to a global academic audience in 
light of the rapidity of the internet
8
 – a quality that is magnified by the frequent 
publishing turnaround of research journals; the multiplicity of scientific topics and 
sub-topics that they encompass; and the large number of articles published in each 
issue of a research journal.   
External research data is ultimately and unequivocally ‘private’9 because the 
journals in which it is published are often owned and controlled by publishing 
companies (see Goldacre, 2011; Monbiot, 2011
10
).  However, it is important to realize 
                                                 
6
 For example, in the current professional context my lab publishes its research articles with its 
corresponding university affiliation on every article.  So in the eyes of my employer, external research data is that 
which is published by any school other than itself.  
7
 The primary online bibliographic database of scholarly articles published in life sciences and 
biomedical journals and used globally by researchers like myself, as well as medics, is PubMed 
(http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/PubMed/ - last accessed 7/29/2012).  PubMed, which is ultimately maintained by 
the Unites States National Institute of Health (NIH), allows users to search specific articles by author, journal, 
volume number, keywords, etc.  Despite the highly privatized nature of the articles archived by PubMed, users can 
freely obtain unlimited article publication details (title, date, volume, issue number, etc.) and almost always an 
abstract for all articles.  Upon finding a specific article in PubMed, a user can click a link for redirection to the 
journal website of the article in order to purchase the article, or to access it for free by logging on with an 
institutional username and password.  An equivalent and common bibliographic database of scholarly articles 
published in social science and philosophy journals, with similar functionality to PubMed, is ERIC – the Education 
Resources Information Center, which is ultimately maintained by the United States Department of Education. 
8
 Aside from a potential several month delay in publication of a research article in a journal as a result of 
the peer review process (assuming a given article is accepted for publication, either conditionally or 
unconditionally, by the editor of the journal in question).  Articles become instantly available to a global scientific 
audience assuming that: 1) the audience has unrestricted institutional access to journals as provided by their 
university, which tends to be the case, at least in contemporary academic institutions; and 2) there is no internet 
congestion issue associated with downloading articles.  
9
 Aside from Open Access journals, the online content of which is unequivocally free for everyone; see: 
http://www.biomedcentral.com/info/about/charter/ (last accessed 7/29/2012).     
10
 On the highly privatized nature of scholarly research journals and their tight control by the publishing 
companies that own them, see these brief articles in the Guardian, available online at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/ 
commentisfree/2011/sep/02/bad-science-academic-publishing and http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/ 
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that access to the vast majority of these journals, in the current professional context, is 
generally ‘public’ to the university lab researcher (but not the university per se) 
insofar as the university grants to its staff, for research and learning purposes, 
unrestricted public access to these journals via institutional subscription to them. 
 
In contrast, and more relevant to the dissertation, internal research data is so-
called because it is produced internally – ‘in house’ – by the lab in question11.  
Internal research data is primarily acquired by attendance of the lab researcher at 
mandatory meetings arranged by their own lab.  ‘Lab meeting’ is often a weekly or bi-
monthly event that entails one lab researcher, on a rotating schedule, reporting her 
most recent research findings to the entire lab
12
.  Lab meeting, and the internal 
research data presented therein, is a rich educational process for all parties involved: 
the researcher presenting gains invaluable feedback from peers and the lab principal 
investigator on experimental troubleshooting and future directions for their project; 
her peers listening to the talk, because they work in the same lab and within the same 
specialized research focus as the person presenting, often gain fresh ideas for their 
own research directions.   
With this in mind, internal research data is invariably ‘public’ to the members 
of the lab that produced it
13
, and continues to be after publication
14
, because it is 
produced by the lab, and is intended for the lab’s ongoing research purposes.  At the 
point of publication, internal research data flows into the external research data 
pool.  As external research data, which is technically private, it becomes public to all 
those lab researchers whose academic institution grants to them free access to it.  
                                                                                                                                            
2011/aug/29/academic-publishers-murdoch-socialist (last accessed 7/29/2012). 
11 In the current professional context, I consider any data generated by myself or my peers, or by any 
other lab in our university hospital, as internal research data. 
12
 Internal research data can also be acquired by the informal sharing of research data among peers from 
a given lab. 
13
 Invariably, internal research data is public, until publication, to just the lab that produced it (unless it 
is a collaborative research effort involving two or more labs) as to avoid competitors (academic or corporate) 
gaining intellectual foothold on a particular common research project, goal, or discovery, that all parties are 
competing towards.  However, this statement is a generalization as many researchers break from this rule when 
they openly present their data at global conferences or at other venues.  This often occurs, for example, when the 
lab researcher’s data is close to the point of being rendered ‘open knowledge’ because its publication is imminent, 
or when a lab researcher wants to gain fresh intellectual insights into their research from a broader audience.  
14
 Publishing research data in scholarly journals, it is fair to say, is a primary academic goal of the lab (in 
distinction from humanitarian motives to find cures that treat human disease, e.g.).  The promotion of the lab 
principal investigator up the professorial ladder is highly dependent on the quantity and quality of published 
research articles (often their name appears last as senior author on the author list).  Likewise, a primary goal of the 
lab researcher is to publish as many research articles as possible (with their name ranking first on the author list, or 
somewhere in between first and last names, depending on their intellectual and/or practical contribution to the 
study in question).   
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Unless, that is, a given piece of internal research data is privatized by the university 
as intellectual property (IP)
15
, prior to its publication, then the data and use of it 
comes under the exclusive private ownership of those that own the patent rights to it.   
In the eyes of the university, internal research data has potentially greater 
commercial value over external research data for two reasons.  First, internal 
research data represents knowledge that is entirely novel and, as a consequence, has 
likely not been subject to prior commercialization.  Second, internal research data is 
usually only known by the university research lab that generated it.  Such exclusivity 
helps assign IP ownership of a given internal research data to the lab that generated 
it, more so than if the data were external research data, because ownership of the 
latter, which is available to a global audience in online journals, is likely highly 
contestable.  The university, in the past few decades in particular, has increasingly 
exploited the commercial potential of select internal research data by protecting it 
with IP rights, and subsequently licensing the resulting IP to industry.  The university 
sells to industry lucrative internal research data that, for example, demonstrates the 
discovery of (or technology required to develop) a novel drug that has potential to 
treat or cure human disease
16
.  This practice by the university sets the scene for the 
central argument of the dissertation.   
Utilizing a lens of technology, the central argument of the dissertation is that 
the contemporary cultural trend of the university’s sale of its internal research data to 
industry was catalyzed by two key concurrent events of late 20
th
 century: a knowledge 
economy and the political doctrine of neoliberalism.  I show that the university sale of 
its select internal research data to industry has resulted in stronger alliances between 
the university and industry.  Crucially, such alliances, I will argue, have a profound 
impact on American higher education on two levels: 1) the evolution of the university 
from a historic to a postmodern institution; and 2) fundamental changes in the nature 
of learning in the university research lab associated with the rise of the postmodern 
university.  The next and last section of this chapter outlines how I will make these 
arguments.   
                                                 
15
 IP is a legal field granting proprietorship to a person or people of knowledge intangibles.  For the time 
being, IP may be mediated by copyrights, which protect literary and artistic works; trademarks, which protect 
names and logos; and patents, which protect discoveries and inventions.  Patents invariably protect internal 
research data generated in the university research lab.   
16
 The ultimate goal of industry is the commercialization of novel pharmaceuticals – a multitrillion-
dollar business; see interest group Public Citizen’s publication 2002 Drug Industry Profits: Heft Pharmaceutical 
Company Margins Dwarf Other Industries at: http://www.citizen.org/documents/Pharma_Report.pdf (last accessed 
7/29/2012).   




Chapter 2 – The Hard, the soft, and the ugly: the multiple faces of technology 
– provides the conceptual backbone for the dissertation.  Here, I delineate three 
common types of technology that characterize today’s contemporary society: hard, 
which have a physical manifestation (e.g., the personal computer); soft, which do not 
have a physical manifestation (e.g., wireless internet); and control
17
, which also do 
not have a physical manifestation, are ultimately mediated by social psyche, and are 
designed to implicitly control the individual to perform in a particular way (e.g., an 
online advertisement enticing the consumer to purchase a university degree program).   
Chapter 3 – Hard and soft technologies: birth of a knowledge economy – 
borrows from my technology concepts in Chapter 2 to argue that the emergence of 
certain key hard and soft technologies in the latter half of the 20
th
 century provided 
the university with the prime technological platform for the heightened electronic 
conveyance of its internal research data to industry.  This (and other forces) 
contributed to the emergence of a knowledge economy that, for the time being, may be 
defined as a prominent economic order characterized by the abundant global 
production and sale of knowledge.   
Chapter 4 – Neoliberalism as a control technology – borrows from my 
technology concepts in Chapter 2 to argue that the contemporary political doctrine of 
neoliberalism is, relative to its predecessor classical liberalism, a control technology.  
It is a control technology because it controls, to the strategic advantage of the state, 
the individual and the public sector to conform to a free market order that is the 
embodiment of capitalism.  Crucially, I show how neoliberalism provided for the 
university a prime economic platform for the sale of its internal research data to 
industry.   
Chapter 5 – Hard, soft, control: the ‘technological triumvirate’ of university-
industry alliances – argues that the hard and soft technologies of a knowledge 
economy, and the control technology of neoliberalism, collectively catalyzed the 
necessary conditions for the university to forge novel business ties with industry.  The 
prototypic example of this, in a neoliberal era of university entrepreneurialism, is the 
university seeking alternative revenue through the patenting of its internal research 
                                                 
17
 Throughout the dissertation, for the sake of simplicity, I say that ‘neoliberalism is a control 
technology’, which I realize inaccurately grants moral agency to an otherwise amoral entity (see Poole, 2005).  
When I say that ‘neoliberalism is a control technology’ I ultimately refer to the politicians and policymakers of 
neoliberalism who are the ultimate control technology.     
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data, and the subsequent licensing of this IP to industry by a process called 
technology transfer.   
Chapter 6 – Local to the global: the changing face of the ‘university’ – 
explores the rapidly evolving nature of the university as shaped by technology transfer 
and the attendant forces of neoliberalism and globalization.  I explore the concept of 
the corporate university that refers to the radical quasi-corporate business practices 
employed by many universities in order to remain competitively cutting-edge in a 
neoliberal free market economy.  I show that technology transfer – ultimately born 
from the hard and soft technologies of a knowledge economy, and the control 
technology of neoliberalism – erodes the public sphere of the university; this 
encroachment, I will argue, is key to conversion of the university from a historic to a 
postmodern institution.   
Chapter 7 – Global to the local: learning in the postmodern university 
research lab – explores the epistemological nature of my students’ learning 
concerning internal research data generated in the lab.  Crucially, I assess how this 
learning is impacted by the broader switch in the university from a historic to a 
postmodern institution.  Next, I present empirical data showing that the technological 
triumvirate of university-industry alliances is responsible for the rise in ‘cultural 
changes’ in the university research lab – namely, heighted secrecy among lab 
researchers, and industry-imposed university publication delays.  The impact of such 
cultural changes on learning in the university research lab is assessed.  
   Lastly, Chapter 8 – Back to the future – begins with a summary of the central 
arguments of the dissertation.  From this summary, we extract and deconstruct a 
central theme of the dissertation in order to tackle a troubling contradiction that 
characterizes learning and research in the postmodern university research lab.  That is, 
the clash of free and open science that exemplified lab research as conducted under 
classical liberalism with the more controlled research conditions that arise under 
neoliberalism.  We close this chapter, and indeed the dissertation, with a look at some 
of the possible ways I can reconcile this contradiction in the current professional 
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By the late twentieth century, our time, a mythic time, we are all chimeras, theorized 
and fabricated hybrids of machine and organism; in short we are cyborgs. (Haraway, 
1996: 465) 
                                 
onna Haraway succinctly highlights the extreme social 
pervasiveness of modern technology in contemporary society.  Not 
only have humans become increasingly immersed in technology 
(e.g., cars, computers), but also literally fused to various forms of technology (e.g., 
pills, prosthetics), creating what some scholars refer to as the ‘cyborg’ – a 
portmanteau of cybernetic organism
18.  Couple technology’s social pervasiveness to 
                                                 
18
 Aside from this somewhat superficial (albeit correct) definition, ‘cyborg’ is a more sophisticated 
metaphorical tool coined by Haraway (1996) that she uses to reconcile many dualisms she blames for disparities 
D 
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its seemingly magic ability to manipulate, as in virtual technology, time and space 
dimensions, and one may start to appreciate that the implications of technology for 
humanity – education included – are profound.  But before we begin to explore the 
actual implications of technology for education in the current professional context, the 
term needs some delineation.  
 
 
Technology: a historical whirlwind   
Franssen et al (2009) trace the history of the philosophy of technology to 
ancient Greece where they highlight four major themes at play during that era:   
First, is the theme that technology is inspired by nature (Plato, Laws X 899a 
ff.), such as Democritus’s example of house building that was thought to be modeled 
on birds building their nests.   
Second, is the ontological distinction between natural and human-made things, 
with the former being dynamic, self-replicating entities that are formed from within, 
in contrast to the latter being static, non-replicating entities that are formed by 
external means.   
Third, is Aristotle’s doctrine of the four causes – material, formal, efficient, 
and final (Physics II.3).  Aristotle’s four causes form the backbone of Martin 
Heidegger’s essay The Question Concerning Technology (1977), which I shall probe 
shortly.   
And fourth, is the comprehensive utilization of technological imagery drawn 
from the arts and crafts used by both Plato and Aristotle in their philosophical works.   
Moving on from ancient Greece, Franssen et al (2009) note that despite 
significant technological advance in the Roman empire and during the Middles Ages, 
more attention was given to the practical, rather than the philosophical, aspects of 
technology.  It was not until the Renaissance that a philosophy of technology gained a 
greater appreciation, spurred by Francis Bacon’s utopian novel of technological 
reflection called New Atlantis ([1627] 2009).  The book garnered a positive response 
lasting well into the 19
th
 century and the first half-century of the industrial revolution.  
It was not until the publication of Samuel Butler’s book Erewhon ([1827] 2008), a 
story about a country in which machines are banned in order to avoid a potentially 
                                                                                                                                            
among traditional feminists, as well as to assist in her feminist critique of capitalism.  In addition, Haraway looks 
to technology as a means of reduction of gender differentiation.   
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machine-dominated society, when technology was cast, for the first time, in a more 
sociocultural light (Franssen et al, 2009).   
Finally, the authors note that toward the end of the 19
th
 century and in most of 
the 20
th
 century, a critical turn in philosophy arose that was shaped by scholars largely 
from the humanities and social sciences, notably Heidegger (1962, 1977, e.g.), Jonas 
(1985, e.g.), Feenberg (1999, e.g.), and Latour (1996, e.g.), in the context of 
technology research.  This field is what Carl Mitcham (1994) refers to as ‘humanities 
philosophy of technology’.  However, since the 1960s it has largely been surpassed by 
a more analytic philosophy of technology that is concerned with technology itself, as 
opposed to the social interplay between technology and society.  It is the latter kind of 
philosophy of technology that I remain with to now probe what is regarded as one of 
the more significant and contemporary contributions to the field of philosophy of 
technology: Heidegger’s The Question Concerning Technology (1977)19.      
 
 
Heidegger on technology 
 It seems that any theoretical inquiry on technology should not be undertaken 
without some prior acknowledgement of Heidegger’s (1977)  contribution to the 
philosophy of technology.  Indeed, Godzinski (2005; online resource
20
) states that 
‘with few possible exceptions, Heidegger is arguably one of the first philosophers to 
explicitly discuss the implications of a philosophy of technology’21.  Heidegger’s The 
Question Concerning Technology (1977) is a phenomenological inquiry that 
fundamentally centers on the human state of ‘being’ and how, in the context of the 
current inquiry (Heidegger, 1977), this state comports with technology.  For 
Heidegger, the human state of ‘being’ is the state when things reveal to us their 
(otherwise) concealed truth, or ‘essence’22:   
 
                                                 
19
 The following online resources assisted me with some of my interpretive analysis of Heidegger’s The 
Question Concerning Technology (1977): http://www.english.hawaii.edu/criticalink/heidegger/index.html (last 
accessed 10/4/2009); and http://www.optdesign.com/Philosophy/Heidegger2.htm (last accessed 7/29/2012). 
20
 Available at: http://commons.pacificu.edu/eip/vol6/iss1/9 (last accessed 7/29/2012).  
21
 Godzinski (2005) believes that The Question Concerning Technology (1977) and The Turning (1977) 
represent the embodiment of Heidegger’s work on the philosophy of technology, despite noting that some scholars 
believe that Heidegger’s critique of modern technology may be found in a more rudimentary form in his magnum 
opus Being and Time (1962).   
22
 Later in his inquiry, Heidegger (1977: 29) explains to the reader that essence means ‘what something 
is; cited in Latin, quid.  Quidditas, whatness’ (original emphasis). 
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we shall be questioning concerning technology, and in doing so we should like to 
prepare a free relationship to it.  The relationship will be free if it opens our human 
existence to the essence of technology.  (Heidegger, 1977: 3)  
 
Heidegger (1977) employs an etymological approach to dissect the meaning of 
several terms from Greek philosophy in order to build an ontological argument that 
concerns, not so much the existence of technology per se, but rather humans’ 
fundamental attitude towards it.  In doing so, Heidegger (1977) challenges, and in the 
course of his inquiry transcends, what he sees as the inadequate definition of 
technology as merely a means/end, and notes that this ‘instrumental definition of 
technology [albeit correct] still does not show us technology’s essence’ (Heidegger, 
1977: 6).  Such inadequacy leads Heidegger to a discussion on ‘causality’.  Heidegger 
(1977) uses the example of a silver chalice to demonstrate how it, and premodern 
technology in general, derives from the four Aristotelian causes: material (silver); 
formal (shape of the chalice); final (the specific intended purpose of the finished 
chalice as a sacrificial vessel, which together with the material and formal causes, is 
responsible for the chalice being a chalice); and efficient (the silversmith).  Each of 
the four causes, according to Heidegger (1977), is coresponsible for ‘bringing-forth’ 
the chalice, which is already ‘on its way’, into being.  Indeed, Heidegger’s repeated 
reference to the chalice as a ‘sacrificial vessel’ could not be a more poignant pointer 
to, not just the sacrifice of Christ, but to the four causes that ‘sacrifice themselves’ to 
bring-forth the chalice into existence.  Waddington (2005: 569) notes that  
 
bringing-forth is not merely a descriptive genus under which the four causes are 
subsumed – rather, it is a unified process, “a single leading-forth to which [each of 
the causes] is indebted” (Lovitt, 1972: 46).   
 
So the four causes do not so much create the chalice than to collectively assist the 
potential chalice ‘on its way’ to being, or as Heidegger (1977: 11) puts it, ‘bringing-
forth brings hither out of concealment into unconcealment’.  Heidegger (1977) 
highlights that such bringing-forth, or ‘poiēsis’ in Greek, is a form of ‘revealing’, the 
process of which he intimately ties to the four modes of causality.  He then ties the 
notion of ‘poiēsis’ as a mode of revealing to the literal Greek word for ‘revealing’ that 
is ‘alētheia’, which means ‘truth’.   
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With this foundation in place, Heidegger then moves on to examine the 
etymological lineage of the word ‘technology’, which he explains is derived from the 
Greek word ‘technikon’ that in turn is derived from ‘techne’.  Heidegger shows us 
that ‘techne’ may refer to: 1) the skills of a craftsperson (such as the silversmith) as 
well as those for the arts of the mind; or 2) more importantly, from Plato onwards, 
techne was often used in conjunction with the word ‘episteme’ – the branch of 
philosophy concerned with the nature and scope of knowledge.  As both expressions 
of techne essentially convey a mode of ‘revealing’ – the bringing-forth of the silver 
chalice by the silversmith, and the bringing-forth of knowledge in the case of 
episteme – the actual essence of technology in the context of ‘techne’, Heidegger 
argues, may be conceived as a mode of ‘revealing’, and not the instrumental 
definition given earlier.  As such, technology, according to Heidegger (1977), may be 
conceived as an expression of ‘truth’, as captured by the Greek word ‘alētheia’: 
 
Technology is a mode of revealing.  Technology comes to presence in the realm 
where revealing and unconcealment take place, where alētheia, truth, happens.  
(Heidegger, 1977: 13) 
 
But, according to Heidegger (1977), poiēsis as a mode of revealing is only applicable 
to premodern technology: modern technology, by contrast, has its own mode of 
revealing that Heidegger calls ‘challenging-forth’.  He juxtaposes an example each of 
premodern and modern technology – the windmill in the Black Forest and the 
hydroelectric power plant on the River Rhine, respectively – to show how they 
fundamentally differ: 
 
That revealing that rules in modern technology is a challenging, which puts to nature 
the unreasonable demand that it supply energy that can be extracted and stored as 
such [in reference to the example of the hydroelectric power plant].  But does this 
not hold true for the old windmill as well?  No.  Its sails do indeed turn in the wind; 
they are left entirely to the winds blowing.  But the windmill does not unlock energy 
from the air currents in order to store it.  (Heidegger, 1977: 14) 
   
‘Challenging-forth’ as the mode of revealing for modern technology, then, suggests a 
phenomenon that is preceded by a greater and more strategic level of proactivity (e.g., 
proposition, planning, and/or production of the modern technology in question) by the 
craftsperson(s), over and above that for bringing-forth.  Accordingly, I alternatively 
interpret ‘challenging-forth’ as a proactive bringing-forth.  I further interpret that such 
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proactivity is by driven by a central premeditation
23
 on the part of the craftsperson(s) 
that provokes them to actively seek (or ‘set-upon’; Heidegger, 1977) and ‘control the 
productive processes’ (Waddington, 2005: 569; original emphasis).  Furthermore, 
‘proactive’ in ‘proactive bringing-forth’ suggests that the ‘efficient’ cause (i.e., the 
craftsperson) is no longer a co-player in bringing-forth, but rather the key player, and, 
as such, a given craft is apparently not granted sufficient time to artistically 
materialize, or ‘bring-forth’.  Heidegger perceives objects in challenging-forth as a 
‘standing-reserve’ – an endless source of raw material ‘on call’ and at the 
predetermined mercy of humans: ‘the machine [an airliner] is completely 
unautonomous, for it has its standing only from the ordering of the orderable’ 
(Heidegger, 1977: 17).  Waddington (2005) highlights that objects rendered a 
standing-reserve are reduced to ‘disposability’ both in the ‘technical sense’ of the 
term – such as trees in a forest marked and quantified by humans for subsequent 
felling, transit, and sale – and in the ‘conventional sense’ of the term – as in trees in 
the forest being endlessly replenished by humans, and hence having little spiritual 
value.   
 
 
 ‘Technology’: towards a definition  
Hanson and Froelich (2005) state that philosophers, anthropologists, 
sociologists, historians, and teacher educators, nowadays all engage in the study of 
technology but a widely accepted definition for the field remains obscure.  Similarly, 
Kroes (1998) states that the philosophy of technology as a coherent field of research 
does not exist yet and that technology’s multidisciplinary nature, which draws from 
many diverse schools of philosophical thought, obfuscates a primary definition for the 
field.  Nevertheless, Heidegger (1977: 4) provides a definition for technology, albeit 
‘concealed’, as ‘the manufacture and utilization of equipment, tools, and machines, 
                                                 
23
 Crucially, this premeditation lies at the heart of Heidegger’s (1977) concept of ‘challenging-forth’ and 
is inextricably tied to monetary motives on the part of the planners of the modern technology in question, given 
Heidegger’s (1977) repeated connotative references to consumerism and/or economic efficiency – inextricably tied 
to examples of ‘challenging-forth’ – throughout his essay.  For example: ‘Agriculture is now the mechanized food 
industry’ (p15); ‘toward driving on to the maximum yield at the minimum expense’ (p15), in reference to 
‘challenging-forth’, which uncannily sounds like Lyotard’s (1984) ‘performativity’ thesis of knowledge 
legitimation in postmodern society; ‘The Rhine … an object on call for inspection by a tour group ordered there by 
the vacation industry’ (p16); and, ‘The forester … is today commanded by profit-making’ (p18).  Indeed, 
Heidegger (1973) in an earlier work criticizes consumerism: ‘The circularity of consumption for the sake of 
consumption is the sole procedure which distinctively characterizes the history of a world which has become an 
unworld.’ (Heidegger, 1973: 107; cited in Dreyfus & Spinosa, 2003: 340).    
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the manufactured and used things themselves, and the needs and ends that they serve’.  
Similarly, Kroes (1998, online resource) gives what seems like the nowadays 
common conception of technology as a 
 
transformation or manipulation of nature (the existing physical (material) and 
biological environments) to satisfy human needs and goals.  Technology is thus 
conceived to be a specific form of purposeful (teleological) action that may result in 
a technological artifact: a human-made object or state of affairs that fulfills a 
utilitarian or practical function
24
.        
 
This conception of technology, Kroes notes (1998), is not without its shortcomings.  
Namely, on the one hand, the definition may be too broad as it potentially renders any 
object or state of affairs that fulfills a practical or utilitarian function a ‘technological 
artifact’ (with the example given of a tree planted in a specific location to provide 
shade).  On the other hand, the definition may be too narrow to encompass 
technologies that are essentially immaterial, such as software engineering.  
Nevertheless, Schoffner et al (2000: e-journal) conceptualize the notion of technology 
to include immaterial technologies that they collectively term ‘soft technologies’, and 
which they define as ‘having no hardware at all ... and focus [in the context of 
education] on theories of learning’.  These contrast with technologies that actually 
have some form of material existence, which Schoffner et al (2000: e-journal) 
collectively term ‘hard technologies’, and which they define as being ‘made of matter 
or, more recently, things that plug in’25.   
 
I neither side with nor contest any one of the above definitions because that 
would seem to pigeonhole ‘technology’, and thereby sever this complex concept from 
my further discourse and debate.  Indeed, Enslin (2010: 1), on the role of definitions 
in the philosophy of education, notes that  
 
a short definition will inevitably be contestable: so complex are many issues in 
education and other fields that, while a working definition or initial characterization 
may, sometimes, serve to get a discussion going – probably for later reformulation  – 
                                                 
24
 Indeed, the notion of technology as a potentially social and immaterial entity is neither a new notion, 
nor is it exclusive to Kroes (1998).  For example, Finn says that ‘in addition to machinery, technology includes 
processes, systems, management and control mechanisms both human and non-human’ (1960: 10), whilst Olssen 
(2001: 37) states that ‘neo-liberal technologies’ effect is a new form of power which systematically undoes and 
reconstructs the spaces of classical liberalism’.     
25
 See also Burgess and Gules (1998) who present a likeminded ‘hard/soft technology’ nomenclature in 
their paper about advanced manufacturing materials. 
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a considered account that grapples with conceptual and other complexities is likely 
to be required.  
 
Accordingly, I draw on elements of the above definitions of ‘technology’ and use 
them together with my preceding discussion on Heidegger in order to formulate my 
technology concepts framework that will serve as the conceptual backbone of the 
dissertation.  However, consistent with Enslin (2010), these are not closed concepts; 
rather, they are fluid concepts – what I like to call ‘offerings’ – that are open for 
further contestation, deliberation, and modification.  It is these offerings that we now 
turn to.  
 
 
‘Technology’: conceptual offerings  
My use of the gerund ‘technologizing’ later in the dissertation is intended to 
evoke in the reader a twofold meaning: 1) a sense of ‘technological permeance’ in 
advanced contemporary society, as exemplified, for example, by the notion of the 
‘cyborg’ (see, e.g., Haraway, 1996); and 2) a continual state of ‘technological 
advance’ in advanced contemporary society that is more dynamic sounding – past, 
present, future – than the adjective ‘technological’, which sounds stuck in time.  
Moreover, the chronologically-dynamic sound to this second meaning of 
‘technologizing’ enables my use of both historical and futurist research lenses in the 
dissertation.  But as I have yet to deploy my historical lens to retrospectively probe 
the concepts of a knowledge economy and neoliberalism, my notion of 
‘technologizing’ will probably only become appreciated by the reader upon reading 
the dissertation in its entirety.  For the meantime, I now set out to build the case that 
advanced contemporary society is ‘technological’: 
   
First, consistent with the common definition of technology provided by Kroes 
(1998), and borrowing from and building upon the technology concepts of Schoffner 
et al (2000), technology may be conceived as hard.  I further propose that ‘hard 
technologies’ are ‘inorganic’ in the sense that they consist solely of non-human 
parts
26
.  Fundamentally, hard technologies exhibit an immediate physical 
manifestation and include, in the context of learning in the lab, the personal computer 
                                                 
26
 But may, nevertheless, be fused to them, such as, for example, dental amalgam fused to the cavity of a 
decayed human tooth, or a prosthetic hip joint fused to a human femur bone in the case of a hip replacement. 
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(PC) and the Geiger counter (an instrument, with a distinctive ‘croaking’ sound that 
measures ionizing radiation in the immediate environment).  Finally, and contrary to 
Schoffner et al (2000), not all hard technologies necessarily ‘plug in’: some hard 
technologies, like the Geiger counter, may be powered by mobile electrical sources 
like batteries, while other hard technologies, like the solar-powered scientific 
calculator, may be powered self-sufficiently so by the sun’s light energy.      
 
Second, consistent with the common definition of technology provided by 
Kroes (1998), and borrowing from and building upon the technology concepts of 
Schoffner et al (2000), technology may be conceived as soft.  I further conceive that 
‘soft technologies’ are ‘inorganic’ in the sense that they, too, comprise solely non-
human parts.  Fundamentally, soft technologies do not apparently exhibit any 
immediate physical manifestation in the way that hard technologies do and, I 
conceive, are the ‘signal’ that hard technologies send and/or receive that is 
fundamental to their functioning
27
.  Soft technologies include, in the context of 
learning in the lab, and as the cognate soft technologies of the two hard technology 
examples given above, the internet that is sent and received, and processed, by the PC, 
and radioactivity that is received – or detected – and processed by the Geiger counter.  
The internet (and its cognate hard technology that is the PC) impacts learning in the 
lab because it has the potential to convey copious quantities of beneficial knowledge 
to the researcher that may assist her learning.  Meanwhile, radiation impacts learning 
in the lab because its intentional and controlled use by researchers allows them to 
visualize otherwise invisible (due to their atomic size) proteins as scorched bands on 
X-ray film because radiolabel-tagged proteins ‘burn’ X-ray film.  That way, 
researchers gain insights into the molecular properties of proteins, which in turn is 
important for gaining insights into human diseases.   
  
Third, consistent with the common definition of technology provided by Kroes 
(1998), and consistent with the potential ‘control’ dimension that Finn (1960; see 
                                                 
27
 Despite acknowledging, and accepting, the broader definition for ‘soft technology’ provided by 
Schoffner et al (2000) that includes the likes of, for example, theories of teaching as well as computer software, I 
restrict my definition here because it has most relevance and significance for subsequent arguments.   
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footnote 24) ascribes to technology, technology may be conceived as control
28
.  
McDermott likemindedly notes that 
 
technology, in its concrete, empirical meaning, refers fundamentally to systems of 
rationalized control over large groups of men [or women], events, and machines by 
small groups of technically skilled men operating through an organized hierarchy.  
(McDermott, 1981: 142).   
 
With this foundation in place, and building upon my earlier refinements of the 
technology concepts of Schoffner et al (2000), I conceive that control technologies 
are ‘organic’ in the sense that they ultimately manifest as a mediating ‘human hard 
technology’ (i.e., a human being; or more fundamentally, a human brain29) in addition 
to a mediating cognate ‘human soft technology’ (i.e., human or social psyche30).  
Control technologies, although organic, clearly have potential to be rendered into an 
inorganic ‘hard and/or soft technology’ format, such as a university official (the 
‘controller’) circulating an email memo (mediated by both the inorganic ‘hard 
technology’ of the PC and its cognate ‘soft technology’ that is the internet) enforcing 
a new policy that exerts some means of ‘control’ over faculty members.  The ‘human’ 
prefix to these ‘human hard/soft technology’ coinages denotes their inherently organic 
makeup.  As such, ‘human hard’ and ‘human soft’ technologies are distinct from, but 
at the same time relate to, my earlier notion of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ technologies31.  
                                                 
28
 Indeed, my satirical use of ‘ugly’ in the title of this chapter is a reference to control technology; we 
will see in Chapter 4 why control technologies are ugly. 
29
 But one might argue that this can be expanded to include, for example, human body parts like arms 
and hands in the case of a human physically assaulting, and hence controlling, another human.  However, it is the 
human brain that is the ultimate control technology because it is the very brain of the ‘controller’ that cognitively 
conceives the notion to assault the ‘controlled’ in the first place.  Such is an example of a ‘physical control 
technology’ whereby the ‘controlled’ is/are physically controlled, in contrast to a ‘mental control technology’ 
whereby the ‘controlled’ is/are mentally controlled, as in, for example, political ideology, propaganda, persuasion, 
or coercion.  Mental control technologies may be further subcategorized into either: ‘unconsciously-mediated’ 
(i.e., the ‘controlled’ is/are largely incognizant of being controlled), as, we will see, in the instance of neoliberal 
governance; or ‘consciously-mediated’ (i.e., the controlled is/are largely cognizant of being controlled)’, as in the 
instance of a patient knowingly being hypnotized by a hypnotist.  However, the dissertation primarily conceives, 
and concerns, control technologies as largely ‘mental control technologies’ of the ‘unconsciously-mediated’ kind 
(hereafter referred to as just ‘control technology’).  Further, this notion of control technology, first and foremost, 
affects human psyche (hence the designator ‘mental’) with the potential to subsequently affect human behavior 
when the ‘controlled’ actually act upon affects to their psyche brought about by control technologies.   
30
 Perhaps not limited to humans; control technologies may also be active in the wider animal kingdom 
as in the luring, hence control, of prey by predators.  One might argue that the plant kingdom also exhibits use of 
control technologies, as in the case of carnivorous plants, for example, such as the venus fly trap that traps flies in 
its hinged leaves to digest them for food.  However, I counter such a notion on the basis that plants entirely lack 
any form of conscience.  
31
 Unless we comprehend hard and soft technologies in a control technology light, the ‘human hard/soft 
technology’ label is necessary to reject the notion that hard and soft technologies may, too, control human 
behavior.  However, I counter-argue such a notion on the basis that hard and soft technologies do not consciously 
do so with a specific means/end.  For example, the hard technology of the Ford assembly line of early 20th century 
controlled humans to work in a very specific fashion within a very specific timeframe.  But, it is the ‘human 
Stewart Craig; 9610118 
19 
 
Control technologies, I conceive, should ultimately influence, affect, modify, comply, 
or conform, for example, the mental (and ultimately physical) faculties of those 
‘controlled’ – an act that would seem to represent the desired means/end goal of the 
‘controller’ (i.e., the ‘control technology’).  Furthermore, as we will see in Chapter 4 
in the case of neoliberalism, control technologies often get institutionalized as the 
modus operandi.  I now incorporate my notion of control technologies onto Kroes’ 
(1998) definition of technology to demonstrate how they complement one another 
(my additions are emphasized, and within square parentheses):   
 
transformation or manipulation of nature (the existing physical (material) [the 
‘human hard technology’ that is the brain] and biological environments [the ‘human 
soft technology’ that is psyche] to satisfy human needs and goals [‘external control 
technologies’ like wider political ideology, or ‘internal control technologies’ like 
institutional policy, e.g.]).  Technology is thus conceived to be a specific form of 
purposeful (teleological) action, that may result in a technological artifact: a human-
made object or state of affairs [‘controller(s)’ controlling the ‘controlled’] that 
fulfills a utilitarian or practical function [conforming human behavior with a specific 
means/end goal, such as neoliberal government’s (the ‘controller’) fashioning its 
citizens (the ‘controlled’) into free-market entrepreneurs; see, e.g., Peters, 2001b; 
Davies & Petersen, 2005].        
 
Fourth, and finally, in line with Heidegger’s (1977) conception of the essence 
of modern technology, I propose that neoliberalism reveals its essence as Heidegger’s 
‘challenging-forth’.  I validate this claim in four ways:   
First, Kroes (1998, online resource) states that technology ‘fulfils a utilitarian 
or practical function’.  The potentially ambiguous nature of such a statement, I 
suggest, invites technology to potentially be conceived as ‘control’, as I have 
demonstrated with my molding of Kroes’ definition of technology to fit with my 
notion of ‘control technology’.  ‘Control’, in turn, is a term laden with planning or 
premeditation – a notion that inextricably ties to my reconception of challenging-forth 
as a ‘proactive (i.e., premeditated) bringing-forth’32.   
Second, I earlier argued that humans (more specifically their psyche) are the 
control technology in question.  Indeed, in his example of the hydroelectric power 
plant, Heidegger (1977) casts humans in the context of human activity that precedes 
                                                                                                                                            
creator’ (i.e., the ‘human hard/soft technology’) of the assembly line that is the ultimate control technology – not 
the assembly line per se.    
32
 There is no denying that Heidegger’s (1977) conception of the windmill as an example of ancient 
technology was also designed and built by humans, like the hydroelectric power plant, with a certain degree of 
premeditation (i.e., to provide electricity), which would seem to invalidate this argument of mine.  However, I 
stress that the extent of premeditation along the lines of consumerism (see footnote 23) in the case of the 
hydroelectric power plant is far greater – especially in the context of today’s consumerist culture and global 
capitalist market – than that for Heidegger’s (1977) conception of the windmill.           
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(and essentially gives rise to) the phenomenon of challenging-forth, in a greedy, and 
conceivably controlling, light: ‘the unreasonable demand that it [nature] supply 
energy that can be extracted and stored’ (Heidegger, 1977: 14; my emphasis).  Such 
language, especially when juxtaposed to Heidegger’s (1977) seemingly romanticized 
notion of wind-generated power suggests, on the part of the planners of the material 
technology that is the hydroelectric power plant, a premeditation to ultimately provide 
electricity to the masses and, perhaps, to control that market, and reap profit in the 
process.  Such consumerist premeditation is invariably driven by a ‘means/end 
efficiency’33 that defines the sociologically rationalizing nature of today’s world (see, 
e.g., Ritzer (2007) who draws on Max Weber (2002) to build his thesis of the 
‘McDonaldization of society’).  Heidegger’s (1977) hydroelectric power plant speaks 
of ‘means/end efficiency’ in the sense that fewer, scaled-up plants more efficiently 
provide energy to hundreds of thousands more consumers in a rationalizing society, 
compared to a higher number of relatively tiny and geographically dispersed 
windmills of a largely bygone era.  Moreover, such ‘means/end efficiency’ seems 
particularly pertinent in light of today’s globalizing world, its population demands, 
and the capitalist markets therein.   
Third, the language of  ‘means/end efficiency’ under this broad banner of 
globalization
34
 sounds uncannily like the central driving force of the pro-globalizing 
political doctrine of neoliberalism
35
.  But how does neoliberalism as a perceived 
control technology reveal its essence as challenging-forth?  I argue that the human 
activity that furnishes a neoliberal agenda of any sort is laden, more so than the 
human activity that precedes technologies whose essence reveals as a bringing-forth, 
                                                 
33
 ‘Efficiency’ being a key word because it invites the reader into the notion of ‘maximizing the various 
outputs of a given system whilst minimizing the various inputs’ – the exact same maxim that Heidegger uses in 
reference to ‘challenging-forth’ (page 15, 1977).  For example, maximizing outputs may include ‘employee 
productivity’ in the case of not-for-profit entities like neoliberal governance, or ‘profit’ in the case of for-profit 
entities like industry; minimizing inputs may include ‘operating costs’ in the case of not-for-profit entities, or 
‘production materials’ in the case of for-profit entities.  But it is the minimizing input of ‘operating costs’ in the 
context of neoliberal reform of higher education that invariably comes at the cost of controlling these employees to 
rev up their productivity via ‘install[ing] relations of competition as a way of increasing productivity, 
accountability and control’ (Olssen & Peters, 2005: 326).   
34
 ‘Globalization’ is used here and throughout the dissertation to refer to the more contemporary 
meaning of the word, as globalization is not a new phenomenon; see, for example, Harvey, 2000.  
35
 For neoliberalism as a driver of globalization, see, for example, Torres and Schugurensky, 2002; Basu, 
2004; Hursh, 2004; and Olssen and Peters, 2005.  Also, given that I make a connection between consumerism and 
means/end efficiency, and I just now state the means/end efficiency of neoliberalism, I, in doing so, essentially 
connect neoliberalism with consumerism.  This is a justified move because neoliberalism espouses free-market 
capitalism, which drives consumerism, in addition to it driving marketization of the public sector, including higher 
education and healthcare, rendering these sectors more consumer-driven.  Indeed, Olssen (2001: 50) notes that ‘it 
[neoliberalism] commodifies everything including knowledge and cultural identity’.  For more on neoliberalism as 
a decidedly consumerist enterprise, see, for example, Liu, 2007; and Giroux, 2009.    
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with a greater degree of premeditation that is driven by a means/end efficiency desire 
on the part of the controllers (e.g., politicians, policymakers) of a neoliberal agenda.  
This is demonstrable by juxtaposing neoliberalism with its predecessor, classical 
liberalism.  For example, classical economic liberalism represents a negative 
conception of state power wherein autonomous individuals function with minimal 
state intrusion; neoliberalism, on the other hand, represents a positive conception of 
state power wherein individuals are implicitly engineered by the state as competitive 
auto-regulatory entrepreneurs (Olssen, 2004).  The individual in classical liberalism is 
perceived as an egoistic, rational utility-maximizer and, accordingly, labeled Homo 
economicus; a label that is warped under neoliberal ideology into what Olssen et al 
(2004: 137) call ‘manipulable man’.  Hence, such characteristics suggest that 
neoliberalism is laden with human premeditation that is driven by means/end 
efficiency manifesting at: the personal level via ‘responsibilising the self’ (Peters, 
2001b); the national level via marketization of the public sector through, for 
example, ‘new public management’ (Peters, 2001a); as well as the international 
level via pro-free trade agreements (Olssen & Peters, 2005).   
And fourth, Heidegger (1977) uses his concept of ‘standing-reserve’ in 
exclusive reference to his concept of ‘challenging-forth’ (they go hand-in-hand).  I 
therefore conceive that those controlled by the controllers under neoliberalism are 
instrumentally reduced to a mere ‘standing reserve’, or a ‘means’ to a desired ‘end’.  
Indeed, Lipman (2004: 179), speaking in the context of neoliberal-motivated US 
urban school reform, notes that ‘teachers are reduced to technicians and supervisors in 
the education assembly line – ‘objects rather than subjects of history’.  And even 
Heidegger (1977: 18) does not deny that technology, to a degree, reduces humans to a 
standing-reserve: ‘The forester … is today commanded by profit-making in the 
lumber industry, whether he knows it or not.  He is made subordinate to the 
orderability of cellulose, which for its part is challenged forth by the need for paper, 
which is then delivered to newspapers and illustrated magazines’.  Taken together, I 
conceive that neoliberalism, and perhaps other forms of control technology, may be 
driven by a desired ‘means/end efficiency’ of the controller(s).  Accordingly, I 
contend that neoliberalism reveals its essence more so as ‘challenging-forth’ than as 
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‘bringing-forth’, whereby the individual(s) ‘controlled’ may be perceived along the 
instrumental lines of ‘standing-reserve’36.  
   
Thus, the multiple faces of technology reveal themselves.  It would seem 
justified to claim that humans, in advanced contemporary society, inhabit a 
‘technological’ world in the sense that technology manifests as multiple different 
forms: hard (inspired by Heidegger’s instrumental definition, 1977; Kroes, 1998; and 
Schoffner et al, 2000); soft (inspired by Kroes, 1998; and Schoffner et al, 2000); and 
control (inspired by Finn, 1960; McDermott, 1981; and Kroes, 1998).  Moreover, 
Heidegger (1977) claims that ‘being’ is the state wherein humans are supposedly 
untethered from all preconceived notions of technology that may otherwise skew their 
perspective of it.  In ‘being’, ancient technology supposedly reveals its essence to 
humans as ‘bringing-forth’, and modern technology as ‘challenging-forth’.  I 
alternatively envisage challenging-forth as a proactive bringing-forth, which is my 
cue to the apparent consumerist premeditation laden in the mind(s) of those involved 
in the design, creation and/or implementation of a modern technology in question, and 
I extend this notion to the political doctrine of neoliberalism.  Before examining in 
detail exactly how neoliberalism is a control technology, I now utilize my above 
technology concepts framework to present examples of key hard and soft technologies 
that, I argue, were instrumental in paving the way for the birth of a knowledge 












                                                 
36
 Specific examples of the concept of the individual as a mere ‘standing reserve’ under neoliberal 
ideology will be explored in more detail in Chapter 4.   











Hard and soft technologies:  











The knowledge-based economy can be expected to continue to expand and grow 
using the ICT revolution as its main medium.  (Leydesdorff,  2006: 25) 
 
n this chapter I set out with a clarification of the difference in 
meaning between the terms ‘knowledge’ and ‘information’ because 
the two are often, wrongly, interchangeably used in the academic 
literature.  Next, I present and explore some concepts from the literature that 
attempt to capture the notion of a ‘knowledge economy’, before exploring the 
characteristics of ‘knowledge’ as an economic good.  Later in the chapter, I 
change course from the social sciences and philosophy literature to the economics 
literature in order to present compelling empirical data from two prominent 
economic papers that reveal a clear correlation between, not just any technology, 
I 
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but specifically information and communication technologies (ICTs), and the 
birth of a knowledge economy.  The chapter culminates with my use of the hard 
and soft technology concepts from my technology concepts framework in Chapter 
2 in order to argue that certain key hard and soft ICTs gave birth to a knowledge 
economy in the current professional context of the university.   
     
David and Foray (2002: 12) state that ‘knowledge – in whatever field – 
empowers its possessors with the [cognitive] capacity for intellectual or manual 
action’.  Information, on the other hand, is a message that consists of formatted 
data sets or code that remain passive until interpreted by individuals who possess 
the necessary knowledge to process them (David & Foray, 2002).  Furthermore, 
and along the lines of these definitions, Cowan et al (2000) note that the actual 
nature of the cognitive action by the recipient of the information need not 
necessarily be solely and uniquely determined by the information itself; instead, it 
is the ‘cognitive context’ of the recipient that imparts meaning to the information, 
which they then enact upon.  Finally, the transformation of knowledge into 
information – important for the digital transmission of knowledge within the 
context of a knowledge economy – is sometimes called ‘codification’ 
(Steinmueller, 2002), a process that allows economists to use knowledge 
objectively according to the standard tools of economics (Ancori et al, 2000). 
 
Turning to the concept of a knowledge economy, Smith (2000: 4) notes a 
pervasive weakness, or total absence, of clarity in the literature on the concept, 
arguing that the term is more of a ‘widely-used metaphor, rather than a clear 
concept’.  For example, the OECD (1996) definition of knowledge-based 
economies – ‘those directly based on the production, distribution and use of 
knowledge and information’ – Smith (2000) argues, serves only to obfuscate a 
definition because all economies are to an extent based on knowledge – from the 
economy of the Paleolithic era (Smith, 2000), to that of the industrial revolution 
(Houghton & Sheehan, 2000).  Similarly, David and Foray (2002: 9; my 
emphasis) state that ‘knowledge has been at the heart of economic growth and the 
gradual rise in levels of social well-being since time immemorial’.  What 
distinguishes today’s knowledge-based economy from those in the past, according to 
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Steinmueller (2002), is scale and speed, noting fundamental changes to the 
accumulation and transmission of knowledge. 
 
Not excluding outright any of the above definitions, but instead building upon 
them, I would like to further add that a knowledge economy in the late 20
th
 century 
largely refers to the obvious significant (but by no means exclusive) shift
37
 from the 
mechanical production of material goods during the industrial revolution, to the 
intellectual production, and commodification, of the immaterial good that is 
knowledge
38
.  Powell and Snellman (2004: 201) who also acknowledge a lack of 
transparency with the term ‘knowledge economy’ nevertheless define it as the 
  
production and services based on knowledge-intensive activities that contribute to an 
accelerated pace of technical and scientific advance, as well as rapid obsolescence.  
The key component of a knowledge economy is a greater reliance on intellectual 
capabilities than on physical inputs or natural resources, combined with efforts to 
integrate improvements in every stage of the production processes, from the R&D 
lab to the factory floor to the interface with customers.    
 
In breach of the neoclassical model of economics that recognizes capital and labor as 
the primary factors of production, knowledge in a knowledge economy, according to 
Burton-Jones (1999), is becoming the most important form of global capital, in what 
he calls ‘knowledge capitalism’.  This is demonstrable with the political doctrine of 
neoliberalism, for example, which came to prominence in the western world in the 
1980s, and will be subject to my examination in Chapter 4.  The political agenda of 
neoliberalism has been quick to harness the economic return to the state that results 
from educational investment in the individual – called ‘human capital theory’ (see 
Becker, 1964) – against a backdrop of a burgeoning knowledge economy (Olssen & 
Peters, 2005).  In the so-called knowledge economy, knowledge has risen as a robust 
global commodity that, according to Drucker (1993), is produced by a workforce 
comprising ‘knowledge workers’ who use their heads to produce knowledge more so 
than their hands to produce material objects.  Consequently, there has been a shift in 
the workforce from predominately blue-collar positions to white-collar positions.  
This example of social reorder within a knowledge economy may be captured by the 
                                                 
37
 Whether this ‘shift’ was a gradual and discrete transition from one era to the next, or a radical break, is 
the source of much controversy; see Carlaw et al, 2006.    
38
 But which, as we will see through the course of the dissertation, is manipulated, stored, transmitted, 
and generally conveyed by various hard and control technologies that have an actual physical manifestation.    
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concept of a ‘knowledge society’39, which reflects the general social order of a 
knowledge economy.  It is a concept that  
 
generally accepts that there are broader social and cultural factors that underlie the 
techno-economic momentum central to the post-industrial order and acknowledges 
knowledge’s intrinsic value beyond its worth as a commodity.  (Carlaw et al, 2006: 
652; writing about McLennan, 2003) 
 
The actual birth of a knowledge economy – the focus of this chapter – may be 
attributed to multiple forces.  Notably, Dearing (1997) states that information and 
communication technologies (hereafter ‘ICTs’)40, as well as other globalizing forces, 
most of which are enabled by technology, promoted the production, distribution, and 
sale of goods – including knowledge – on a global scale.  Such globalizing forces, 
coupled to the rapid proliferation and intensity of new knowledge domains – such as 
biotechnology, biogenetics, and bioinformatics, all under the umbrella of the 
‘biological sciences’ – in the post-World War II era, were clear causative forces in the 
birth of a knowledge economy.  Indeed, Houghton and Sheehan (2000) cite both 
‘increasing knowledge intensity’ and ‘globalization’ as the primary dual forces 
responsible for the formation of, or at least the transitioning of society to, a 
knowledge economy.  Before I build in this chapter my case for technology being a 
major causative force in the birth of a knowledge economy, it is necessary to first 
examine how knowledge as an economic good fundamentally differs from 
conventional economic goods. 
 
 
Knowledge: an economic good 
Stiglitz (1999a, 1999b) states that knowledge in its own right – not 
necessarily those material media such as books and computers that convey it – is 
                                                 
39
 Philosophical theories, other than ‘information age’, have been developed to capture the profound 
social and economic changes to society, now largely agreed among scholars to be ‘postindustrial’.  For example: 
‘Disorganized Capitalist’ (Lash & Urry, 1987); ‘Information Society’ (Toffler, 1984); ‘Post-Capitalist’ (Drucker, 
1993); ‘Post-Fordist’ (Hall, 1996); and ‘Network Society’ (Castells, 2000). 
40
 For the time being, the World Bank (2003a, 2003b) include, under the rubric of ICTs, hardware, 
software, networks, and media, for collection, storage, processing, transmission, and presentation, of information 
via the media of voice, data, text, and images.  Obvious examples of ICTs include various hard technologies (and 
their cognate soft technology) like the television, radio, telephone, and PC.     
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a ‘public’ good41.  Public goods tend to satisfy the economic criteria of 
‘nonexcludability’ and ‘nonrivalrousness’, in contrast to private goods that tend to 
satisfy the economic criteria of ‘excludability’ and ‘rivalry’42.  But as knowledge may 
be excluded in certain contexts, Stiglitz (1999a) argues that ‘impure public good’ may 
be a more fitting label for it.  I concur with Stiglitz that knowledge may be excluded 
in certain contexts, but I take this one step further and argue that knowledge may also 
be rivalrous in certain contexts.  I now argue this with the help of two real-life 
scenarios in the third premise of my four-premise argument that knowledge is a 
unique economic good: 
 
First, knowledge is ‘scarcity-defying’ (Stiglitz, 1999a; David & Foray, 2002; 
Carlaw et al, 2006).  Knowledge, according to Stiglitz (1999a), does not lose its 
value like the traditional factors of production that are capital and labor, but 
actually grows as it is applied.  Furthermore, there are zero marginal costs to 
adding more users (Stiglitz, 1999a) and, according to Houghton and Sheehan 
(2000), zero marginal costs to manipulate, store, and transmit knowledge.  The 
scarcity-defying characteristic of knowledge may be contrasted with food 
production, which is subject to scarcity as a result of very high demand, aberrant 
weather or natural disaster that results in poor crop yield, and/or invasion of the 
crop by a pesticide-resistant pest, for example.  The ‘scarcity-defying’ 
characteristic (Stiglitz, 1999a) of knowledge, with the aid of technology like 
virtual marketplaces and virtual organizations (Olssen & Peters, 2005), has been 
seized by multiple competing multinational corporations whose primary goal is to 
innovatively build, expand, and commercialize, the many existing, and often 
diversifying, pools of knowledge for subsequent sale at profit.   
                                                 
41
 For a historical perspective on ‘public goods’ see, for example, Desai, 2003.  One should not always 
assume that public goods necessarily increase the owner’s utility; Kaul et al (2003) introduce the notion of ‘public 
bads’ to refer to goods that decrease utility such as, for example, air pollution and financial cognation.  
42
 Building on Paul Samuelson’s (1954) original mathematical distinction between public and private 
goods, ‘excludability’ in economics refers to a good that can only be consumed by an individual who has paid for 
that good (Gazier & Touffut, 2006; Kaul & Mendoza, 2003).  ‘Rivalry’, meanwhile, occurs when consumption of 
a good by one individual inhibits simultaneous consumption by others of that very same good (Gazier & Touffut, 
2006; Kaul & Mendoza, 2003).  I use ‘consumption’ with caution as it connotes entire exhaustion of the good 
being consumed, which does occur if the good in question is a nondurable one such as an apple.  Knowledge on 
the other hand does not usually get exhausted as it is consumed (or more appropriately, ‘applied’), so I label 
knowledge a ‘durable’ good.  However, I realize there are instances when knowledge may be a nondurable good 
when an individual can no longer retrieve knowledge unique to them because of some mental anomaly such as, for 
example, forgetfulness or dementia.  Similarly, knowledge may be nondurable when it is printed in a one-of-a-kind 
book that subsequently gets lost or destroyed.  Knowledge in such scenarios truly is ‘consumed’ (until the same 
knowledge is realized/discovered subsequently by another individual) and as such, I believe, it warrants 
‘nondurable’ good categorization in such contexts.      
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Second, knowledge markets fundamentally differ from conventional 
commodity markets because knowledge fails to meet the essential market property of 
homogeneity.  The multidisciplinary and multiplying nature of knowledge means that 
a single given piece of knowledge differs from every other piece – even knowledge 
within the same discipline.  Knowledge markets, then, break with conventional 
market laws by exhibiting the unique market property of heterogeneity with the 
implication that knowledge not guarded by intellectual property rights (IPRs) has to 
be transacted in a culture of trust and reputation, otherwise one risks losing their 
knowledge property upon disclosure of the knowledge
43
.  Relatedly, there are 
extensive externalities associated with knowledge production in the sense that many 
individuals, beyond the initial creator or discoverer of a given knowledge, benefit 
economically from its discovery.   
 
Third, I disagree with the general notion among economists that knowledge is 
a ‘public good’ (e.g., Correa, 2003; Dalrymple, 2005)44.  For in practice, depending 
on a given knowledge and the circumstances, the inherently ‘fluid’ nature of 
knowledge defies its very own ‘nonrival’ and ‘nonexcludable’ economic labels45 that 
economists use to label it a ‘public good’.  Knowledge is a more fluid good than 
conventional goods because it is more manipulable than conventional goods in the 
sense that it has the potential to continually grow and it is continually subject to 
manipulation and exchange
46
.  I propose that knowledge is manipulable and 
exchangeable by organic means in a largely immaterial form by the human mind and 
speech (each of us carry knowledge in our very own heads, and speak it daily), and by 
inorganic means in a largely material form by the abundance in contemporary society 
of printed and electronic media like textbooks and the internet, respectively.  Such 
manipulations make knowledge a much more transportable (or ‘fluid’) good than 
conventional goods.  While it is generally assumed that knowledge is an impure 
public good by Stiglitz (1999a, 1999b) and economists generally (Stiglitz, 2006), it 
                                                 
43
 Source: ‘Analytics of the Knowledge Economy’ in the Knowledge Futures module from Glasgow 
University’s EdD program (student access only; last accessed 7/29/2012).   
44
 This third premise of my argument draws on discussions from my Open Studies One module 
assignment for the EdD program.    
45
 Following the definitions given in footnote 42 – not Stiglitz’ (1999b) definitions, which differ slightly. 
46
 Sure, conventional goods like apples and cars are manipulable in the sense that the former can, for 
example, be peeled, sweetened and spiced for apple pie, whilst the latter can be spray-painted or retro fitted with a 
music system.  But the point I am making here is that, provided intellectual and/or technological resources are 
present, there does not appear to be an end point or limit to the degree of manipulation of knowledge – an 
argument justified by both the unique scarcity-defying, and potentially immaterial, nature of knowledge.    
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should be appreciated that knowledge in certain highly contextual circumstances may, 
momentarily, be excludable and/or rivalrous.  This point is demonstrable with the 
following two case studies: 
Scenario 1:  Knowledge in the example of a non-digitized copyrighted 
textbook is excludable because those who have not paid for the book are prevented 
from ‘consuming’ it, which in the above context equates to reading it47.  Knowledge 
in the book is additionally rivalrous when the physical book
48
 is somehow 
unobtainable such as it being sold-out by all vendors or the book going out of print
49
.  
This notion of rivalry may be extended to include circumstances wherein these 
individuals who, despite being able to overcome the book’s excludability, are unable 
to read the knowledge contained in the book (hence ‘consume’ the good) because of 
illiteracy or blindness, for example.  The physicality of a book and its limited copy 
number mean all those that have a copy of (and are ‘consuming’) the book50 create a 
barrier to those individuals not in possession of the book (but are willing to purchase 
it) of simultaneously consuming it
51
.  And, 
                                                 
47
 I propose that IPR in the form of copyright protection essentially privatizes the book that in turn 
confers excludability to the book. 
48
 Used here to refer to having a physical manifestation, as in an actual book as we know it in the 
traditional sense.  This contrasts to a digitized book that has no apparent physical manifestation other than perhaps 
some physical medium, such as a USB flash drive, on which the book is conveyed.  
49
 Rivalrous insofar as the owner of the book does not share the knowledge word-for-word with others.  
But as the casual sharing of knowledge from books does inevitably occur among individuals to varying degrees, 
such as communication from one individual to another of a concept from a book, perhaps ‘partial rivalry’ is a more 
fitting label.  Therefore, one can partially override the rivalry conferred to a book by the book’s physicality by, for 
example, photocopying the book for others (which, incidentally, also overrides the excludability of the book).  But 
such overriding of excludability and rivalry of a good are not limited to knowledge, but can be extended to many 
private goods.  For example, a car is a private good because it being for sale confers to it excludability, whilst only 
one driver being able to ‘consume’ the car at any one time confers to it rivalry.  But one might argue that the 
excludability of the car is overridden when the car is given as a gift, while the rivalry of the car is overridden when 
the car is consumed by the driver along with passengers.  Hence, I believe that a good’s (non)excludability and 
(non)rivalry statuses are not set in stone, but instead are open to interpretation and some degree of philosophical 
malleability.        
50
 Here, I expand the notion of economic rivalry to refer to consumption of one good by one individual; 
or, using my example of a textbook, consumption of a multiply duplicated good (i.e., mass produced, such as a 
textbook and most other consumer goods) by a collective group of individuals.  In the former instance, 
consumption of the good by the individual prevents simultaneous consumption of the good by other individuals 
(unless the good is a communal one like the air we breathe, e.g.; see Kaul & Mendoza, 2003).  In the latter 
instance, consumption of the good by either one or more of the individuals within the collective group of 
individuals that possess the good will not prevent simultaneous consumption of the good within the collective 
group because each individual possess the good (i.e., nonrivalrous within the collective group); but it will prevent 
simultaneous consumption of the good for those outside the collective group because those individuals do not 
possess the good (i.e., rivalrous for those outside the collective group).  Lastly, using my example of a textbook, 
the point can be made that rivalry is conferred by the physicality of the book, whilst rivalry is mediated by the 
collective group of individuals that possess the book.     
51
 Unless an interloper peers over the shoulder of an owner reading her book, although this is an 
implausible argument, as an interloper cannot comprehensively consume the entire book in such a manner.  
Technically, because the interloper did not purchase the book coupled to their partial overriding the rivalry of the 
book, the book – to the interloper – reverts to a nonexcludable and nonrivalrous good – that is, a public good.  This 
scenario relates to the ‘free rider’ problem in economics (see, e.g., Hardin, 2003).  
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Scenario 2:  A single piece of knowledge (not that which is multiply 
duplicated in many copies of a textbook), such as a patent
52
  protecting a 
pharmaceutical company’s blueprint for a blockbuster drug, is rivalrous.  I conceive 
that patent protection of the knowledge in this case confers rivalry to the knowledge
53
 
in a manner similar to the rivalrousness conferred by the physicality and limited copy 
number of a book.  In the case of a patent-protected blueprint for the production of a 
novel pharmaceutical drug discovered in the university research lab, the patent allows 
consumption (or use) of the knowledge by only the patent holder(s) of that knowledge 
that in turn prevents simultaneous consumption by others (the vast majority of the 
population) of the very same knowledge
54
.  It could conceivably be argued that 
processing fees for patent protection for a given knowledge, fees for licensing the 
patent, or outright sale of the entire patent, confers excludability to the patent that, 
coupled to the rivalrous nature of the patent, fulfills its potentially ‘private good’ 
criteria
55
.   
Therefore, knowledge may be excludable and rivalrous – dual economic labels 
that designate knowledge a ‘private good’, which defies the ‘public good’ designation 
given to knowledge by many economists.  
 
Fourth, and finally, the transition to a knowledge economy, it has been 
advocated, requires in the workplace more democratic ‘horizontal’ pragmatic learning 
approaches espoused by the likes of Dewey, for example, as opposed to ‘vertical’ 
learning structures exemplified by Taylorism (Stiglitz, 1999a, Houghton & Sheehan, 
2000).  Pragmatic learning approaches are crucial for fostering creative knowledge 
production and transfer between knowledge workers, as well as facilitating exchange 
of difficult-to-teach tacit knowledge between them.  Stiglitz (1999a) notes that 
knowledge is produced and transferred more easily at the source – i.e., among 
                                                 
52
 Interestingly, Correa (2003) notes that patent offices in some countries have tended to admit 
increasingly broad claims in that patents are being granted for items that already exist in nature like genes that 
have merely been discovered, not invented.  He describes patent creation nowadays as ‘more of an art than a 
science under current law’ (Correa, 2003: 417).  
53
 Rivalry is exemplified further in the closely guarded context of ‘trade secrets’.  
54
 Except in the case of experimental research exceptions that permit any third party to freely experiment 
on a patented invention without the prior authorization of the patent holder (this exception applies only to scientific 
research in the US); see Correa, 2003. 
55
 However, it should be highlighted that knowledge that is a private good can be rendered a public good 
in the context of an individual freely communicating, via speech, writing, photocopying or posting online, for 
example, the private knowledge to others.  Private knowledge is rendered public knowledge – but only to the 
‘recipients’ receiving the free private knowledge because they are neither paying for that knowledge nor are they 
prevented from consuming it.   
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knowledge workers – as opposed to originating from vertical hierarchies.  This results 
in more of an ‘economics of scope’ rather than an ‘economics of scale’ that defined 
the Taylorist era (Houghton & Sheehan, 2000).    
 
Thus, knowledge has a number of unique qualities which render it a unique 
market good that demands unique market properties.  Furthermore, the inherently 
fluid nature of knowledge – enabled by its intangibility, and facilitated by its organic 
and inorganic manipulation – allows it to escape the conventional economic labels of 
nonexcludability and nonrivalry that designate it, by many economists, as a ‘public 
good’.  Knowledge is simply too pervasive and fluid an economic good to be 
pigeonholed – as my real-life scenarios demonstrate.  With this foundation in place, 
we now turn our attention to the economics literature in order to explore ICTs and 
their role in the transition of contemporary society to a knowledge economy. 
 
  
ICTs and a knowledge economy: the empirical connection 
An abundance of reports in the academic literature implicates ICTs as a major 
technological determinant in the transition of society to, and/or driving force of, a 
knowledge economy
56
.  Indeed, Carlaw et al (2006: 653) state (albeit in reference to 
an ‘information society’) that the  
 
key element in the transformative properties of the knowledge society is identified as 
‘information’ and here the major factor has been the ICT revolution and in particular 
the growth of the Internet and more recently digitization.   
 
Moreover, Goschin and Constantin (2007) cite a number of studies that correlate 
economic growth with ICT production and usage (e.g., Jorgenson & Stiroh, 2000; 
Oliner & Sichel, 2000; and Chen & Dahlam, 2004).  Similarly, the World Bank 
(2003b) correlates increased human capital accumulation with increased ICT usage.  
Building on these findings, I will shortly present the argument that key hard and soft 
ICTs are instrumental for the enhanced electronic manipulation and sale of 
knowledge, and hence, helped pave the way for the birth of a knowledge economy.  
                                                 
56
 For example: Dearing, 1997; Antonelli, 1998; Houghton and Sheehan, 2000; David and Foray, 2002; 
Steinmueller, 2002; OECD, 2004; Lopes et al, 2005; Carlaw et al, 2006; Fagerberg, 2006; Goschin and 
Constantin, 2007; and Chowdhury and Alam, 2009.  
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First, in order to help ground such a notion, I highlight two of the most compelling 
empirical papers in the economics literature that validate the correlation between ICTs 
and economic growth
57
.   
 
One such study is that by Oliner and Sichel (2000) of the US Federal Reserve.  
In this study, the authors employ a standard ‘neoclassical growth-accounting 
framework’ to examine the economic impact to the US economy from the use (as well 
as the production) of ICTs.  Acknowledging that computer-based networks like the 
internet and intranets facilitate the vast flow and exchange of knowledge between 
businesses, their employees, and consumers, Oliner and Sichel (2000) group 
communication equipment with hardware and software.  In doing so, the authors 
recognize, and their economic data reflects, the economic significance of such 
technologies – lending further validation to my argument for a role of both hard and 
soft technologies in the formation of a knowledge economy.  Oliner and Sichel’s 
(2000) study focuses on two main time periods: 1974-90 and 1991-95.  The authors 
present economic data showing, for example, that real nonfarm business output rose at 
an average pace of about 3% per year during these time periods – with ICT capital 
contributing a ½ % increase.  Oliner and Sichel (2000) derive this result from data 
showing that computer hardware accounted for a ¼ % point per year of that growth, 
whilst computer software accounted for about 0.1% point per year during 1974-90, 
rising to almost ¼ % point per year during 1991-95.  Communication equipment, 
meanwhile, contributed about a 0.1% point per year during both time periods.   
The data – relatively consistent with data generated by other economists 
(Oliner & Sichel, 2000) – clearly implicates ICT usage contributing to the US 
economy during the time periods studied.  The data is modest, but the authors note 
that this can be explained by the ‘productivity paradox’58 that lasted through the early 
1990s, and which refers to the apparent paradoxical slow growth in many sectors of 
the US economy despite hefty investments by businesses in ICTs (see Brynjolfsson, 
                                                 
57 The following two papers were published in 2000.  For more recent publications implicating ICTs in 
economic growth see, for example, Tranos (2012) who utilizes statistical tools to determine a relationship between 
internet infrastructure and European economic development; and Popescu (2012: 59) who cites two recent articles 
to report that ‘ICTs are a major contributor to productivity, profitability, and growth at the level of the firm’, and 
that (unrelatedly) ‘in a typical developing country, an increase of 10 mobile phones per 100 people boosts GDP 
growth by 0.6 percentage points’.  
58
 It is widely noted in the economics literature that Nobel laureate in economics, Robert Solow, in 
reference to the paradox, famously remarked ‘You can see the computer age everywhere these days, except in the 
productivity statistics’.   
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1993).  The most compelling data presented by Oliner and Sichel (2000), reveals 
resurgence in output growth of the US economy during the latter half of the 1990s 
(considered to be the end of the productivity paradox) – with overall information 
technology capital contributing about 1.1% points.    
The other prominent empirical study correlating increased economic growth 
with information technology (IT)
59
 usage is that by Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000) of 
Harvard University and the Federal Reserve, respectively
60
.  Here, consistent with the 
research findings of Oliner and Sichel (2000), the authors note a remarkable 
transformation in the US economy in the latter half of the 1990s that reflects strong 
growth in output, labor productivity, as well as total factor productivity.  
Notwithstanding complex economic formulae and jargon, much of which I do not 
understand, the crux of Jorgenson and Stiroh’s (2000: 60) results reveal a compelling 
correlation between rising contribution of information technology (IT) and outputs to 
US economic growth.   
Together, these two empirical studies reveal a clear correlation between ICT 
usage/production and US economic growth
61
.  On this note, I now examine key ICTs 
that, I believe, helped pave the way for a knowledge economy in the context of the 
university.  
    
 
Hard and soft ICTs: birth of a knowledge economy 
Similar to the disagreement in the academic literature concerning a clear 
definition for the terms ‘knowledge’ and ‘knowledge economy’, Linderhof et al 
(2006) likewise note a ‘lack of consensus’ in the literature on a definition for ICTs.  
Nevertheless, drawing on several scholars, Linderhof et al (2006: 5) attempt to define 
ICTs as ‘the total of technical equipment, products and services needed to digitize62, 
save, process, distribute and communicate information’.  Selwyn (2004), more 
specifically, states that ICT is an umbrella term to refer to a wide range of 
                                                 
59
 IT and ICT are used interchangeably in the dissertation.  Selwyn (2004) notes that ‘ICT’ evolved from 
‘IT’ in order to reflect the rapid convergence of technologies like computers, telecommunication, and broadcasting 
technologies.       
60
 In this study, the authors identify ICT with computers, software, and communication equipment; i.e., 
various hard and soft technologies using my technology concepts framework in Chapter 2.   
61
 For empirical data showing a correlation between European economic growth and ICTs, see, for 
example, Antonelli, 1998.  
62
 Here, I disagree with Linderhof et al (2006) that all ICTs digitize information (e.g., the analog 
television and radio do not digitize information).  ‘Digital’ as a concept will be explored in more depth later. 
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technologies that include technological applications like computer hardware and 
software, telecommunication technologies like mobile phones, as well as electronic 
information resources like the internet.  The OECD (2006), meanwhile, defines ICTs 
for both the manufacturing sector (e.g., office, accounting, and computer machinery; 
TV transmitters and receivers) and services (wholesale of computer equipment; 
telecommunications).  Regardless of these and other definitions for ICTs, I emphasize 
that the striking commonalty between all ICTs (and a prerequisite for labeling a given 
technology an ‘ICT’) is their heightened knowledge63 conveyance quality – compared 
to knowledge conveyed by the conventional means of a textbook in an era that 
predates the advent of ICTs
64
.  This heightened knowledge conveyance is threefold: 
  
1. ICTs generally have a greater capacity to manipulate knowledge.  
By contrast, knowledge in the textbook, from a pre-ICT era, is in the 
form of ‘static’ print that cannot be readily manipulated. 
 
2. ICTs generally have a greater capacity to store knowledge.  By 
contrast, the pages of the textbook, from a pre-ICT era, limit the 
very knowledge stored in it
65
.  And, 
 
3. ICTs generally have a greater capacity to disseminate knowledge.  
By contrast, the textbook containing the knowledge, from a pre-ICT 
era, generally has a limited copy number, and the book must be 
known and actively sought from a bookstore by the buyer; i.e., the 
owner must seek the book – the book does not come to them (unless 
it is given as a gift or borrowed).   
 
                                                 
63
 At this point in the discussions, I intentionally use ‘knowledge’ and ‘information’ interchangeably.  I 
refer to both terms as ‘knowledge’ (unless otherwise stated) to be consistent with ‘knowledge economy’, even 
though such a label is inaccurate when one considers that information, as well as knowledge, are conveyed and 
sold in a knowledge economy.    
64
 A good example is the industrial revolution because it is an era marked by considerable mechanical 
advances in printing whilst still predating ICTs.      
65
 Unless one reads the knowledge contained in a textbook, processes that knowledge, and then 
intellectually builds upon the knowledge by scribbling notes directly onto the pages of the book; in this case the 
reader is adding to the stored knowledge in the book.     
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I refrain, for the time being, from explaining how ICTs have a heightened capacity to 
convey knowledge within this framework, instead articulating it in my upcoming 
argument
66
.   
Using my heightened knowledge conveyance framework, I now set out to 
argue that the archetypal hard ICTs of the television (TV) and the radio, telephone, 
satellite, and PC, helped pave the way for a knowledge economy in the context of the 
university
67
.  My argument is structured such that each of these hard technologies 
forms an individual premise (four in total, counting the TV and the radio as one) for 
this central argument.  Under each individual hard technology premise, I use sub-
arguments to show how that hard technology has an increased capacity to store (first 
sub-argument), manipulate (second sub-argument), and disseminate (third sub-
argument) knowledge – the three criteria of my heightened knowledge conveyance 
framework.  In my argument, I make the distinction that knowledge conveyed by 
these hard technologies may be either: sold within and, hence, directly contributes to 
the economic aspect of a knowledge economy; or not sold within, but somehow 
indirectly benefits a knowledge economy along the way.  It is important to keep this 
distinction in mind as it is used throughout my argument: 
 
 First, utilizing my technology concepts framework in Chapter 2, and consistent 
with the general definitions for ICTs above, I argue that the hard ICTs of the TV and 
the radio, which were invented prior to a knowledge economy, nevertheless helped 
pave the way for it in the context of the university.  The TV and the radio satisfy my 
threefold heightened knowledge conveyance prerequisite for ICTs
68
 in the following 
ways:  
First, the TV and the radio – or more precisely the controller of these 
technologies – are more able to manipulate knowledge because the controller can 
instantaneously and limitlessly switch channels from one knowledge-containing 
program (e.g., news
69
) to another (e.g., a documentary)
70
 (see Negroponte, 1996).  
                                                 
66
 This threefold heightened knowledge conveyance quality of ICTs is in part inspired by Linderhof’s et 
al (2006) list of distinctions between various different activities related to ICT-mediated digitization.     
67
 I do not claim that ICTs were the sole determinant in the creation of a knowledge economy; other 
technological (e.g., advanced transportation networks) and non-technological forces (e.g., free trade) also helped 
pave the way for a knowledge economy; see Dearing, 1997.   
68
 Compared to knowledge conveyed by a textbook in an era (e.g., the industrial revolution) prior to the 
advent of ICTs. 
69
 Although it should be noted that some might question the neutrality, accuracy, or validity of 
‘knowledge’ broadcast by the mass media; see, for example, Goldberg (2003).   
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Nowadays, in light of modern recording devices, such as the digital cable receiver box 
provided by many cable-subscribing companies, the controller of the TV is further 
able to manipulate knowledge in the sense of pausing, rewinding, fast-forwarding, and 
recording it in knowledge-containing programs.   
Second, the TV and the radio – or more precisely their storage media – have a 
greater capacity to store knowledge in light of archival film stock or videotape that are 
the physical recording media onto which TV footage is recorded, or videotape that is 
the physical recording medium onto which radio programs are archived.  Nowadays, 
both technologies probably rely on storing (and recording) programs digitally (see 
Laurentis, 2006), which means that the hard drive of a computer serves as the storage 
medium
71
.   
Third, largely owing to their cognate soft technology that is electromagnetic 
radiation in the form of analog or digital radio waves, or infrared (received or 
mediated by an antenna, satellite dish, or fiber optical cables), the TV and the radio 
have a greater capacity to disseminate knowledge.  Unlike a textbook, which has a 
limited copy number and the physicality of which can be cumbersome
72
, radio waves 
emitting from one radio tower continuously transmit knowledge over vaster 
geographic distances (sometimes over several hundred square miles) through solid 
structures like buildings, thereby disseminating knowledge to the masses.   
Within this heightened knowledge conveyance framework, how did the TV 
and the radio as hard technologies pave the way for a knowledge economy in the 
context of the university?  The ability of the media to shape public perception is 
widely documented in the academic literature (see, e.g., Berquist & Golden, 1981; 
Poster, 1985; and Soderlund, 2007).  Poster (1985) refers to film, radio, and TV as the 
‘first media age’ that engages in a one-way ‘logic of broadcast’ whereby a ‘small 
number of producers sent information to a large number of consumers’ (Poster, 1985; 
cited in Lankshear, 1999: 8).  Poster’s (1995) ‘first media age’ contrasts with his 
‘second media age’, which is characterized by a greater reliance on satellite, 
telephone, TV, and computer-integrated technologies that supposedly break down the 
                                                                                                                                            
70
 News and documentaries are supposedly knowledge-containing non-fiction programs, but I do not rule 
out fictional programs as a potential source of knowledge because their content may contain, for example, accurate 
historical analysis that is, technically, nonfiction.  
71
 One might argue that the ‘library’ is the storage medium for textbooks, and that the storage 
capabilities of the library exceed those of the TV and the radio.  I counter this notion by stressing that the library 
does not possess the same highly concentrated and compact storage, and editing, capabilities as film and the PC 
hard drive. 
72
 Assuming the textbook does not have a digitized version.   
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boundaries between producers and consumers of information in a so-called two-way, 
hence more democratic, ‘logic of communication’.  Notwithstanding such potential 
democratizing effects, I nevertheless argue that there is still ample room in the second 
media age for the media to change public perception.  Ladd and Lenz’s (2009) study – 
conducted in the second media age – offers an excellent case in point.  Their study 
contains compelling empirical data that strongly points to the persuasive power of the 
news media in influencing peoples’ political behavior in the run up to the 1997 UK 
general election.  I therefore propose that the continual coverage by the TV and radio 
media of knowledge about social, political, and economic world affairs in knowledge-
containing programs indirectly contributed to a knowledge economy by helping to 
shape viewer/listener perception of society’s transition to it.  This shaping of 
perception could conceivably be extended to include, at the time, university personnel 
by inspiring, and organizationally readying, them for the eventual commercial 
exploitation of knowledge in the form of internal research data that is generated in its 
research labs.   
The TV and the radio, especially nowadays, convey knowledge that directly 
contributes to a knowledge economy by their broadcast of advertisements for 
knowledge products.  Examples of this include the intensive advertising on American 
TV of pharmaceuticals (Kaphingst et al, 2004) by the knowledge-intensive 
pharmaceutical industry
73, or in the context of ‘corporate higher education’ (see, e.g., 
Readings, 1996; Ruch, 2003; Washburn, 2006), the university advertising its degree 
programs on TV and radio (Kittle, 2000).   
  
Second, utilizing my technology concepts framework in Chapter 2, and 
consistent with the general definitions for ICTs above, I argue that the hard ICT of the 
telephone, which became commonplace in the workplace
74
 in the post-World War II 
era, helped pave the way for a knowledge economy in the context of the university.  
The telephone satisfies my threefold heightened knowledge conveyance prerequisite 
for ICTs in the following ways:   
First, the telephone – or more precisely the controller of this technology – is 
more able to manipulate knowledge.  In the case of either a landline or mobile 
                                                 
73
 For the pharmaceutical company as a major knowledge-producing industry, and in turn contributor to 
a knowledge economy, see, for example, Kofinas, 2008. 
74
 Here, I use ‘workplace’ to generally refer to knowledge-producing institutions, as exemplified by the 
university and industry.  
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telephone, knowledge is more manipulable in the sense that it may be conveyed 
almost instantaneously by making or receiving calls repeatedly to and from one or 
many ‘callers’ and ‘listeners’.  Furthermore, a knowledge recipient may then deliver 
that knowledge, or a built upon version of it that they have intellectually added to, by 
telephoning others
75
.  Knowledge is even more manipulable in the context of the 
‘smartphone’.  These phones possess PC-like functionality including a keyboard, 
powerful processors, and full operating system software, which enable users to 
manipulate knowledge in the sense of, for example, viewing it as a PDF document, 
and receiving and sending it via email.   
Second, the telephone has a greater capacity to store knowledge.  In the 
context of the landline telephone that is specifically used to convey university 
knowledge, it is not the landline telephone per se that has a greater capacity to store 
university knowledge; rather, it is the telephone switchboard
76
.  This claim is justified 
if we conceive of the telephone switchboard as a ‘virtual knowledge storage’.  In this 
conception, the switchboard is a concentrated convergence of potentially thousands of 
pending university knowledge connections that are wired to the switchboard in the 
form of telephone cables going to and fro the many offices of university knowledge 
workers – including the principal investigator of the university research lab – whose 
telephones are served by the telephone switchboard.  The knowledge is ‘virtual’ 
because it is not physically present in the switchboard (say, in the form of printed text 
on paper), but instead immaterially and rapidly flows to and from the switchboard via 
telephone cables.  The telephone operator (or nowadays a computer-controlled relay 
system) at the helm of the telephone switchboard unlocks the university knowledge of 
the ‘virtual knowledge storage’ through the process of connecting callers77.   
                                                 
75
 But how does this differ from a situation that is devoid of telephones, wherein one individual conveys 
knowledge from, say, the textbook, to one or many individuals either in person via speech (as in the lecture hall), 
or by traditional postal service (but not email, assuming we are in a largely pre-email era)?  It differs on the basis 
of the ability of the telephone (as well as the TV and the radio) to convey knowledge on a scale that is far greater – 
indeed, potentially global – at near-instantaneous speeds.  Moreover, these technologies are able to convey 
knowledge that is entirely new – unlike the knowledge conveyed by a textbook which is static.    
76
 If I propose that the ‘telephone switchboard’ is the larger storage medium for the telephone, I must, in 
order put the argument on equal playing ground, propose the larger storage medium for the textbook; this, I 
propose, is the ‘university library’. 
77
 Building upon my proposals in the previous footnote, surely the ‘virtual knowledge storage’ concept 
can be applied to knowledge collectively contained in the textbooks of the university library from a pre-ICT era, 
thereby negating my argument that the ICT of the telephone switchboard has a greater capacity to store 
knowledge?  I suggest no for two reasons.  First, knowledge in a pre-ICT era was not virtual because there were no 
computers then, which create ‘virtuality’ (unless we rethink ‘virtual’ in a broad metaphysical sense that transcends 
the conventional meaning of technology; see, e.g., Burbules, 2004).  Second, compared to the relative scale and 
vastness of the university library building from a pre-ICT era, the telephone switchboard, in contrast, represents a 
relatively small – but highly concentrated – stock of virtual and potentially new knowledge, the sum of which 
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Third, largely owing to its cognate soft technology that is sound waves 
converted to electrical signals and conveyed by copper wiring
78
 in the case of a 
landline phone, or electromagnetic radiation largely in the microwave range for 
mobile phones, the telephone has a greater capacity to disseminate knowledge
79
.  
These soft technologies defy vast geographic distances at near-instantaneous speeds 
that disseminate knowledge relatively quickly and cheaply to the masses
80
.  
Within this heightened knowledge conveyance framework, how did the 
telephone as a hard technology pave the way for a knowledge economy in the context 
of the university?  An example of university knowledge conveyed by the telephone 
that indirectly contributes to a knowledge economy is best illustrated if we conceive 
of the telephone as a ‘proactive hard technology’.  In this conception, the telephone 
requires the active participatory efforts of both ‘caller’, who often has an agenda or 
purpose upon dialing, and ‘listener’81.  With this in mind, the telephone is a 
networking tool of revolutionary capacity because it enables university knowledge 
workers to connect with one another, and with industry, in order to exchange, 
compare, build upon, and potentially sell to industry, their internal research data
82
.  
But such knowledge is not limited to university internal research data; it can include 
optimized lab protocols that my colleagues and I read in scientific articles, and which 
I obtain in detail by telephoning the source university research lab
83
.  These optimized 
protocols render my work as a lab researcher – and that of my students, in the context 
of my role as a lab educator – more efficient, which in turn increases my productivity 
and that of the university that, in turn, indirectly contributes to the efficiency of a 
                                                                                                                                            
could conceivably exceed that contained in the university library.  Hence, I believe, that the hard technology of the 
telephone – in light of the telephone switchboard – has a greater capacity to store knowledge than the library from 
a pre-ICT era.  
78
 Here, in the case of the landline telephone, we have a new technology concept that I term ‘secondary 
hard technology’ (the copper wiring) – connected to the primary hard technology (the landline telephone) – that 
conveys the soft technology (i.e., electrical signals originating from soundwaves).   
79
 Nowadays, calls made with the landline or mobile telephone may be partially served by the hard 
technology of fiber optic cables and its cognate soft technology that is electromagnetic radiation in the infrared 
range (or the hard technology of the satellite; see later). 
80
 One might argue, however, that the textbook trumps the telephone in terms of knowledge conveyance 
because the sheer volume of knowledge contained in the textbook cannot equivalently, and practically, be 
conveyed by the telephone.  However, I counter-argue that the telephone can convey equivalent volumes of 
knowledge in light of its sister technology that is the facsimile.  Also, the telephone and the modern facsimile boast 
the quality of near-instantaneous knowledge dissemination, including that for new knowledge – a quality that the 
textbook, which always contains ‘static’ knowledge, cannot match.        
81
 This is in contrast to the TV and the radio that are ‘passive hard technologies’ in the sense that these 
technologies only allow passive one-sided viewing/listening. 
82
 In particular, the highly networked and tacit types of knowledge that are characteristic of a knowledge 
economy – i.e., the ‘how to’, ‘who to’, and ‘what to’ (see Laurentis, 2006: 77) – come to mind.  
83
 Why not obtain such protocols by email, which seems quicker and easier?  Because the highly tacit 
knowledge contained in such optimized lab protocols necessitate that the requester speak in person to the lab 
researcher who wrote the protocol in order to grasp all the critical methodological nuances.   
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knowledge economy.  Muntean and Hauer (2008: 61) lend weight to this notion by 
stating that the 
 
dramatic improvements in ICTs [conceivably the telephone] enable knowledge 
workers [like myself and my students] to rapidly search, collect, evaluate and 
transmit enormous amounts and varieties of data [including optimized lab protocols] 
and to engage in complex, collaborative work activities [including the potential sale, 
or at least negotiation, of internal research data to industry] with anyone [outside 
universities; industry], anyplace, anytime.   
 
Additionally, the telephone and facsimile facilitate novel business propositions – 
including the sale of lucrative IP – drafted by the university for potential industry 
buyers.   
An example of knowledge conveyed by the telephone that directly contributes 
to a knowledge economy
84
 (outside the context of the university) is the newspaper 
industry, which depends on continual and timely feeds of knowledge that is both 
entirely novel (a quality that the textbook lacks) and sellable.  Nowadays, the advent 
of mobile telephone technology has rendered the telephone a more cutting-edge 
journalistic tool for the newspaper industry, and the media in general, in light of its 
ability to instantly relay news-at-the-scene to the pressroom either verbally (by voice), 
textually (by text messaging), or photographically (by in-phone cameras)
85
.  Another 
example of knowledge conveyed by the telephone that directly contributes to a 
knowledge economy is the practice of selling stocks over the telephone for trading on 




Third, utilizing my technology concepts framework in Chapter 2, and 
consistent with the general definitions for ICTs above, I argue that the hard ICT of the 
satellite
87
 (telecommunication versions of which were active in the 1960s
88
) helped 
pave the way for a knowledge economy in the context of the university.  The satellite 
                                                 
84
 In an era that predates the TV and the radio, and when the newspaper was the primary source of news 
for the public. 
85
 Indeed, such technology has fuelled the democratizing movement of ‘citizen journalism’ that 
empowers the public to report, using their mobile telephone, major incidents and news events to the media.  See, 
for example: http://www.nieman.harvard.edu/reportsitem.aspx?id=100542 (last accessed 7/29/2012). 
86 Up until October 1987, that is, when the stock market crashed because many brokers often did not 
answer their telephones; see ‘NASDAQ: Developing the Electronic Stock Market’ in a pamphlet entitled Software 
and Information: Driving the Global Knowledge Economy, available at: http://www.siia.net/estore/globecon-
08.pdf (last accessed 7/29/2012).  
87
 Used here to exclusively refer to ‘artificial satellites’ that are artificial objects placed into Earth’s orbit 
by humans, in contrast to ‘natural satellites’ that are celestial bodies that orbit planets or smaller bodies, such as the 
moon which is the natural satellite of planet Earth.   
88
 See: http://history.nasa.gov/satcomhistory.html (last accessed 7/29/2012).  
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satisfies my threefold heightened knowledge conveyance prerequisite for ICTs in the 
following ways:   
First, the satellite – or more precisely the end controller of this technology – is 
more able to manipulate knowledge.  Intelsat (2010, online resource
89
), a major US-
based communications satellite services provider, defines a communications satellite 
as a ‘radio relay station in orbit above the Earth that receives, amplifies, and redirects 
analog and digital signals carried on a specific radio frequency’.  I refer to those 
individuals in possession of a hard technology that is capable of receiving and 
processing satellite signals (e.g., a satellite radio) as the ‘end controllers’ of the 
satellite technology
90
.  Therefore, it is not so much the satellite per se that is able to 
manipulate knowledge; rather, it is the end controller of the terminating hard 
technology that the satellite serves, including any of the hard technologies I have just 
explored.   
Second, the satellite – or more precisely an onboard computer or the 
terminating hard technology served by the satellite – has a greater capacity to store 
knowledge.   
Third, largely owing to its cognate soft technology that is electromagnetic 
radiation in the form of analog or digital radio waves, the satellite has a greater 
capacity to disseminate knowledge.  Communication satellites boast a vaster 
geographic reach than the radio tower because their geostationary nature means that 
just three satellites strategically placed at the appropriate longitude can broadcast to 
our entire planet (Intelsat, 2010).   
Within this heightened knowledge conveyance framework, how did the 
satellite as a hard technology help pave the way for a knowledge economy in the 
context of the university?  I propose by acting as a ‘radio relay station’ for university 
knowledge (that either directly or indirectly contributes to a knowledge economy) 
conveyed by other hard technologies.  In this sense the satellite, by virtue of global 
span, facilitates the heightened knowledge conveyance function of the archetypal hard 
                                                 
89
 Available at: http://www.intelsat.com/resources/satellite-basics/how-it-works.asp (last accessed 
7/29/2012). 
90
 The fact that the satellite is a radio relay station that both receives and redirects radio signals (Intelsat, 
2010) renders the satellite with a greater degree of ‘technological intermediacy’ compared to other hard 
technologies.  Such ‘technological intermediacy’ becomes apparent when one looks at the infrastructure of satellite 
communications: a station on Earth transmits a signal to an orbiting satellite that, in turn, transmits the signal to 
satellite dishes back on Earth that, in turn, and finally, transmit signals to receiving hard technologies, such as, for 
example, the TV.  Hence, I introduce the coinage ‘end controller’ of the technology, as opposed to just ‘controller’, 
to reflect the greater degree of technological intermediacy that is characteristic of, and perhaps unique to, 
communications satellites.   
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technologies that are central to this argument of mine.  For example, the telephone 
call between the university and a potential international industry buyer of its IP may 
be part mediated by fiber optic technology within the originating country, and part 
mediated by satellite technology that bridges the call between the two countries (see 
Poster, 1995).  I conceive that that the satellite may additionally function as a dual 
‘radio relay station’ (as just sketched) and ‘knowledge acquisition’ technology.  In 
this dual function, the satellite acquires from the Earth or beyond our solar system 
novel knowledge in the form of data that it transmits back to Earth where it is 
processed, sold within, and hence, directly contributes to a knowledge economy.  
Examples of such knowledge include: meteorological data generated by weather 
satellites and sold to TV and radio networks, newspapers, and the media in general, 
for weather forecasting; ecological data generated by observation satellites and sold to 
research laboratories for strategic planning; global positioning data generated by 
navigational satellites and sold to transportation industries like ship, airlines, and 
nowadays even the driving public, for global positioning and real-time navigation; 
and astronomical data generated by scientific satellites like the Hubble Space 
telescope and sold to research labs for gaining insights into the origin of the universe.  
Importantly, the university is a key contributor to the creation of such satellite-
generated knowledge and, in turn, a knowledge economy.   
For example, Utah State University’s Space Dynamics Laboratory was 
recently commissioned by the meteorological startup firm GeoMetWatch to design an 
instrument to be hosted on a commercial geostationary communications satellite
91
.  
Meanwhile, Rutgers University in the US utilize satellite technology to collate 
meteorological and oceanographic data; their website states that ‘you will find all of 
the available satellite data products we offer to research, industry, education, and the 
general public’92. 
 
Fourth, and finally, utilizing my technology concepts framework in Chapter 2, 
and consistent with the general definitions for ICTs above, I argue that the hard ICT 
of the personal computer, which increasingly became commonplace in the university 
(and eventually in the home) in the late 20
th
 century, helped pave the way for a 
                                                 
91
 Read the full news article at: http://geometwatch.com/htm/news/articleID=16973 (last accessed 
7/29/2012).  
92
 See: http://marine.rutgers.edu/mrs/sat_data/?nothumbs=0 (last accessed 7/29/2012). 
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knowledge economy in the context of the university.  The computer satisfies my 
threefold heightened knowledge conveyance prerequisite for ICTs in the following 
ways:   
First, the computer – or more precisely the controller of this technology – is 
more able to manipulate knowledge in light of the various types of application 
software specifically designed for computers like the word processor, such as that 
marketed as ‘Microsoft Word’ by computer technology corporation Microsoft.  
Microsoft Word enables greater knowledge manipulation in the sense that knowledge 
may be subject to various paragraph, spelling, grammar, font, color, cut, copy, paste, 
and save reformats – multiple times over.  The spreadsheet is another example of 
application software, such as that marketed as ‘Microsoft Excel’ by Microsoft.  
Spreadsheets, it may be argued, have even greater knowledge manipulation 
capabilities over word processors because the former can create knowledge that is 
entirely new in the form of, for example, statistical trends from raw internal research 
data.   
Second, the computer is more able to store knowledge.  Both the internal 
central memory of the computer (i.e., the ‘hard drive’) and its various external 
memory media have, over time, become increasingly able to store far more 
knowledge than that contained in a single textbook.  For example, the storage 
capabilities of external computer memory media has grown from the compact cassette 
tape that is capable of storing 600 KB of data per side to, nowadays, the USB flash 
drive that that can store in excess of 256 GB of data.  Furthermore, the compact, 
lightweight, and portable qualities of the newer external storage media surpass that of 
any textbook whose much larger size, heavier weight, and static knowledge, seem 
cumbersome by comparison.  Indeed, Lyotard (1984: 4; my emphasis) states that ‘the 
miniaturization and commercialization of machines [including the PC] is already 
changing the way in which learning is acquired, classified, made available and 
exploited’ (more on this in Chapter 6).   
Third, largely owing to the cognate soft technology of the telephone, and with 
computer networks and the internet in mind, the computer has a greater capacity to 
disseminate knowledge.   
Within this heightened knowledge conveyance framework, how did the PC as a 
hard technology pave the way for a knowledge economy in the context of the 
university?  The PC unequivocally trumps the various other hard technologies just 
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examined in its heightened knowledge conveyance because it is fair to say that the PC 
was originally primarily conceived for knowledge conveyance
93
.  From all the hard 
technologies examined so far, the PC is the most revolutionary with respect to a 
knowledge economy in the context of the university.  Three points help validate this 
claim.  Firstly, a key distinction between the PC and the other hard technologies 
examined: the university lab researcher can control what knowledge is inputted
94
 to 
the PC (e.g., input of raw internal research data into a spreadsheet); how that 
knowledge is handled therein (e.g., processing the raw internal research data in the 
spreadsheet for conversion to statistical and graphical forms); and outputted from the 
PC (e.g., email of the processed internal research data that is part of a larger 
scientific manuscript to a journal for publication).  Therefore, the university lab 
researcher can often control the knowledge and all aspects of its conveyance from 
beginning to end
95
.  Secondly, the PC nowadays has come to incorporate much of the 
functionality of the other hard technologies just examined, such as the online 
streaming of TV and radio programs, as well as telephone calls.  Therefore, the 
modern-day PC already is to a degree all these other hard technologies combined.  
Thirdly, is the concept of the ‘digital’ that is unique to the PC, but which has become 
incorporated into the various other hard technologies just examined in light of their 
increasing ‘computerization’; for example, the increasing conversion of analog radio 
and TV signals to digital.  In light of the concept of the ‘digital’, the PC is 
undoubtedly a more powerful knowledge conveyance technology: 
   
digital communications reduce information into discrete, identifiable and thus, more 
easily transferable pieces of information.  Digital communications also efficiently 
maximize the transfer of information by allowing more signals to move through a 
single communication path.  (Lipschitz, (1998: e-journal)    
 
Negroponte (1995: 26) puts this statement into profound perspective when he notes, 
on the concept of the ‘digital’, that ‘a fiber the size of a human hair can deliver every 
                                                 
93
 Not to suggest that the PC was exclusively conceived for knowledge conveyance; take gaming and, 
nowadays, internet shopping and social networking, for example.   
94
 The same cannot be said for the other hard technologies examined.  For example, in the case of the 
TV and the radio, the controller (i.e., consumer) of these technologies has no control over what knowledge is 
inputted to them; that control is in the hands of the cable provider in the case of the TV, or the radio station in the 
case of the radio (and even though the controller can somewhat control what programming is outputted from these 
technologies by selecting a particular channel, the controller is nevertheless restricted to a set selection offered by 
the cable provider or radio station).   
95
 Aside, that is, from the professional context of a university clerical worker controlled by office 
superiors who dictate what knowledge the clerical worker inputs to, and outputs from, the PC.       
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issue ever made of the Wall Street Journal in less than one second (1000 billion bits 
per second)’.  All these qualities empower the PC to convey knowledge that indirectly 
contributes to a knowledge economy through the obvious rapid facilitation and 
automation of knowledge processing and sorting on my behalf as a lab researcher 
(e.g., spreadsheets that graphically depict my raw internal research data) and lab 
educator (intuitive animated internet sites that enable my students to grasp 
challenging scientific concepts).   
Knowledge conveyed by the PC that directly contributes to a knowledge 
economy is internal research data contained in articles published in peer-reviewed 
journals that are sold online (at which point the knowledge becomes external research 
data).  Such journals are often ultimately owned by multinational publishing 
conglomerates (see Altbach, 2006) – highlighting their direct, and significant, 
contribution to a knowledge economy.      
 
 Thus, the archetypal hard ICTs of the TV and the radio, telephone, satellite, 
and PC, helped pave the way for a knowledge economy generally, and in the current 
professional context of the university, because of their heightened knowledge 
conveyance.  Furthermore, these technologies are technologically complementary to, 
sometime dependent on, one another, which amplifies their heightened knowledge 
conveyance.  Crucially, the cognate soft technologies of these hard technologies, 
because of their ability to render knowledge weightless
96
, were collectively a key 
catalyst in the transition of an economy that historically has always partly been based 
upon the production and sale of knowledge (see David & Foray, 2002; Houghton 
& Sheehan, 2000; and Smith, 2000) – including that during the industrial 
revolution – to a literal ‘knowledge economy’ as we know it today97.   
Moreover, such soft technology-mediated weightlessness of knowledge is 
distinct from the weightlessness of spoken knowledge because the former outperforms 
                                                 
96
 Used here, ‘weightless’ refers to the apparent immaterialization and, hence, ease of transmission 
(Negroponte, 1995) of knowledge in transit when disseminated by soft technologies.  Although one can clearly see 
with one’s own eyes the material telephone cable, for example, that conveys a telephone conversation, one cannot 
see the actual knowledge being conveyed by it.   
97
 Conditions for a literal ‘knowledge economy’ as we know it today were apparently in place during the 
industrial revolution, such as technological advances in the high-speed printing of knowledge (e.g., newspapers, 
textbooks), as well as copyright law that essentially protects and privatizes knowledge for its controlled sale on the 
market (copyright law can be traced to the Statute of Anne, which was formally enacted by the British 
parliament in 1709 (Drone, 2000) – a period that predates the industrial revolution).  But despite such 
favorable conditions, the lack of soft technologies, I suggest, was a key inhibitory factor that forestalled formation 
during the industrial revolution of a literal ‘knowledge economy’ as we now know it today. 
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the latter with regard to volume, speed, and geographic distance of knowledge 
conveyed.  Nowadays, all industries including those that seem ‘knowledge light’ (e.g., 
the wood industry; see Laurentis, 2006) are seizing ICTs to create and convey 
scientific knowledge in order to boost company innovation and growth.  Such 
intensive industry-wide utilization of hard ICTs and their cognate soft technology – in 
light of the unique inherent scarcity-defying market property of knowledge – has 
transitioned contemporary society to a knowledge economy.           
 Now that a knowledge economy has set the technological stage, we now turn 
to Chapter 4 to see how the political doctrine of neoliberalism sets the economic 
















































The underlying tenet of neoliberalism is the extension of the market ethic into all 
areas of social, political and economic life, both as a disciplining mechanism for 
achieving efficiency in economic activity and as a moral code promoting liberty 
through private property.  (Birch, 2006: 9) 
 
his chapter opens with an excerpt on the contemporary political 
doctrine of neoliberalism – the central topic of the chapter.  But an 
examination of neoliberalism requires, or is at least assisted by, an 
examination of classical liberalism because the latter is considered by many to be the 
precursor to the former (see, e.g., Peters, 2001a; McCarthy & Prudham, 2004; Olssen 
et al, 2004); indeed, Lipman and Hursh (2007: 162) state that ‘understanding 
neoliberalism … requires a brief review of the history of [classical] liberalism’.  
T 
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Classical liberalism to the rise of neoliberalism  
Gaus (2010, online resource) states that ‘liberalism’ is not easily definable 
because it is an umbrella term that encompasses: 1) a political tradition; 2) a political 
philosophy; and 3) a general philosophical theory.  Waldron (1998, online resource) 
similarly states that  
 
defining liberalism is, on the whole, a frustrating pastime.  There are many ways of 
mapping this philosophical landscape, and there is no substitute for grappling with 
the disparate detail of the theories propounded by particular liberal philosophers.   
 
Waldron (1998) echoes the third component of Gaus’s (2010) understanding of 
liberalism, which is a ‘general philosophical theory’, by stating that liberalism is a 
heritage of abstract thought about human nature, agency, and freedom, etc.  This 
heritage of abstract thought (some of which we will explore in the chapter), Waldron 
states (1998), is largely attributable to the early modern English political philosophers 
Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, the Enlightenment philosophers Jean-
Jacques Rousseau, François-Marie Arouet de Voltaire, Henri-Benjamin Constant de 
Rebecque, and later, Immanuel Kant, and in the 19
th
 century, to Jeremy Bentham, 
John Stuart Mill and Thomas Green.   
According to Peters (2001a), classical liberalism (hereafter ‘liberalism’) 
emerged in the 17
th
 century to curtail excessive forms of western state intervention as 
exemplified by the ‘science of the police’ (Polizeiwissenschaft) that ruled in Germany 
during feudal times
98
.  Harrison and Dye (2010: 42) do not limit the rise of liberalism 
to just feudalism, but elaborate that liberalism was an ‘attack on hereditary pejoratives 
and distinctions’ that extended to the monarchy, the aristocracy, and the state-
established church.  Liberalism sought to set strict limits to the role of the state in a 
newly democratized and constitutional conception of governance (Waldron, 1998, 
online resource; Olssen et al, 2004).  It is generally believed among scholars that 
liberalism formed from the two founding ideals of: individualism, or ‘personal 
liberty’, which includes human equality, as well as freedom of expression, speech, 
                                                 
98
 Olssen et al (2004: 79) actually identify three historical phases to classical liberalism: ‘political 
liberalism’, which emerged from the 17th century, was a reaction to the excessive authority imposed by the church 
and the state, culminating in the Puritan Revolution of the 1640s and the Glorious Revolution of 1688; ‘economic 
liberalism’, which emerged in the 18th century, sought to institute policies that reflected an emerging capitalist 
order, particularly with the state’s transition to the industrial revolution; and ‘social democratic liberalism’, which 
emerged in the 19th century, breaks from the two preceding forms of liberalism in that it sought an interventionist 
mode of governance to counter the supposed socioeconomic disparities wrought by a fully-fledged capitalist order. 
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and religious persuasion; and a limiting government, which only intervened insofar as 
to protect the personal liberties of the people
99.  As ‘individualism’ appears to be the 
unifying characteristic of liberalism among many, if not almost all, scholars, it 
warrants a closer analysis. 
Waldron (1998, online resource) defines four main elements to individualism, 
a concept that he intimately ties to human value:   
First, and fundamentally, Waldron (1998) states that ultimate value for the 
individual lies in their personal pains, pleasures, desires, preferences, and ambitions, 
etc., and that such individualism is what matters the most with regard to social and 
political outcomes.  Waldron (1998, online resource) states that individualism 
‘excludes social and collective entities from the realm of ultimate goods’, and 
distinguishes ‘individualism’ from ‘egoism’ by stating that in the case of the former 
people still care for one another
100
.   
Second, Waldron (1998) highlights freedom as a central quality of 
individualism and that the extent of this freedom, although subject to much 
controversy, is, according to Waldron, realistically attainable under modest social and 
political conditions.  The extent of such freedom may be measured according to 
Berlin’s (1969) famous dichotomous conception of liberty that has, on the one end, 
negative liberty to refer to liberty free from coercion by others, and on the other end, 
positive liberty to refer to having the necessary resources (often through state 
provision or intervention) in order to act to reach one’s own potential.   
Third, is individualism’s grounding commitment to equality, although this has 
been subject to criticism or even outright rejection in contemporary circles, especially 
by some feminists (see, e.g., Phillips, 2001) who argue that liberalism fails to 
transcend gender boundaries (Waldron, 1998).   
Fourth, and finally, and perhaps most importantly, is individualism’s utmost 
commitment to individual reason (Waldron, 1998) – considered at the time, against a 
                                                 
99
 However, there is some variability of opinion among scholars on these two founding ideals; for 
example, Hudelson (1999) cites ‘individual liberty’ together with ‘free markets’ as the two core characteristics of 
liberalism.    
100
 The basis for such individualization of value varies.  For example, Locke believed it to be firmly 
rooted in a commitment to God, while modern liberalism has taken a largely secular turn as exemplified by the 
utilitarian movement that rooted the notion of the value of individualism to, for example, desire or preference – 
personal motives that, accordingly, render value to be individualistic.  Recent modern liberalism has appealed to a 
Kantian approach that links value to the ‘lonely individualism of will, conscience and the sense of duty’ and which 
regards humans as lonely individual moral agents who are conceived as an end in themselves – not as a means to 
wider social ends (Waldron, 1998, online resource).  However, Olssen et al (2004) note that, contrary to this 
Kantian viewpoint, the earlier works of Hobbes, Locke, Bentham, Hume, and Mill, paint individuals more in an 
‘egotistical’ and ‘self-interested’ light, which implies that individuals treat one another as ‘means’.      
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backdrop of an awakening Enlightenment era, to be the ultimate source of legitimacy 
and authority.  The Enlightenment marked an era characterized by a collective 
disenchantment with religious dogma, superstition, and tradition, and an 
accompanying revived faith in the application of human-derived epistemology to 
understand society and human nature (see Harris, 2003); hence, it is easy to see how 
this era gave legitimacy to, and indeed fuelled, the core individualist quality of 
liberalism. 
 
Moving forward, and consistent with liberalism’s principle of ‘sovereignty of 
the individual’, Locke advocated for each and every individual the inalienable right 
to, and protection by the state of, private property (Kramer, 2004).  Private property 
and liberalism are inextricably tied: 
  
classical liberals and libertarians have often asserted that in some way liberty and 
property are really the same and it has been argued, for example, that all rights, 
including liberty rights, are forms of property; others have maintained that property 
is itself a form of freedom.  A market order based on private property is thus seen as 
an embodiment of freedom.  (Gaus, 2007, online resource) 
 
In sum, under a dual framework of individualism – which extends to the right to 
private property – and a limiting government, liberalism represented an apparently 
civilized mode of governance that was continually cautious of infringing the, then 
newly granted, sacrosanct civil liberties of the citizenry.  Gordon (1991: 15) refers to 
such a climate of prudent governance as a continual ‘critique of state reason’.  Here, 
Gordon refers to Foucault’s (1991) conception of liberalism to mean a specific form 
of state rationality, or ‘governmentality’ – no doubt driven at the time by the rational 
mindset of the Enlightenment – which was perpetually policing and critiquing itself in 
order to avoid slipping into a scenario of ‘over-governance’ reminiscent of the 
totalitarian rule of the Polizeiwissenschaft
101
.  But paradoxically, under this apparent 
                                                 
101
 Peters (2001a) writes that this ‘state rationality’ was motivated at the time by an explosive interest in 
what Foucault (1991) calls the ‘art of government’, which was motivated by the introduction of economy into 
political practice (Peters, 2007a).  The ‘art of government’ was preoccupied with the task of determining a rational 
and legitimate framework for how to delicately and democratically govern in a post-Polizeiwissenschaft era that 
would not yield a hierarchal system like that between the Prince and his principality.  Moreover, Olssen et al 
(2004: 74) argue that Foucault’s (1991) ‘state rationality’ as a framework for liberal political execution is not to be 
represented simply as a ‘philosophy’ or ‘explanation’, but rather as a ‘complex system of political rationality 
comprising prescriptions as to how to rule, and how not to rule, of when to rule and when not to rule’.  Therefore, 
in the mind of Foucault, power manifests and works through human beings as subjects; it represents a specific 
construction of subjectivity that in the current context conceives neoliberalism, not merely as a political philosophy 
or economic field, but as a specific form of governmentality (see Rose, 1998) that is concerned with how power is 
exercised (Peters, 2001b).   
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hands-off mode of governance, liberalism, according to Foucault, represented not a 
mere absence of governance, but rather a specific exercise of rule through which a 
new form of civil society was to be governed along the lines of a ‘state-civil society’ 
relation, and more specifically a ‘state-market relation’ (Olssen et al, 2004: 76).  The 
latter refers to the state fashioning its citizenry, in the interests of state stability and 
security, along the lines of a, then emerging, capitalist-based economy.  Indeed, Peters 
(2001a: 63) notes that Foucault (1991) argues that the insertion in the 16
th
 century of a 
political economy (or ‘state-market relation’ using the terminology of Olssen et al, 
2004) as a very intentional exercise of ‘governmentality’ no longer represented a form 
of government, but rather a designated field of ‘intervention’.   
However, aside from legitimate feminist critique (see below), I distance 
myself from these somewhat skeptical interpretations of liberalism.  Indeed, Foucault 
(1991) paints liberalism in a light that is consistent with my notion of a control 
technology, as delineated in Chapter 2.  But bear in mind that when compared to its 
rather militant predecessor that is feudalism, and in light of its founding democratic 
values, I stress that liberalism represented a revolutionary political movement because 
it finally respected the autonomy of the individual, and for the most part, provided 
sufficient societal order as to avoid those societies under its rule from slipping into a 
state of outright anarchy.   
Consistent with the neoclassical conception of economics, liberalism espouses 
a free market, or laissez-faire, market model.  Indeed, liberalism is, to many, 
synonymous with ‘laissez-faire’, and as such it is not uncommon for both terms to 
appear in the same sentence, or even as a compound term
102.  But this supposed ‘free’ 
market tenet of liberalism, as well its founding ideal of individualism, may not be so 
free for all.  For feminists like Lloyd (1995) often feel subjugated by the profound 
gender inequalities, and their impact on identity and social roles, that are inherently 
laden in liberalism
103
.   
 
                                                 
102
 For example, in the entry ‘Dewey’s Political Philosophy’ in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
Festenstein (2005, online resource; my emphasis) writes that ‘Dewey was a critic of laissez-faire liberalism’.  
Indeed, an abundance of authors use the compound term ‘laissez-faire liberalism’; searching for the term in Google 
Scholar yielded 2,330 hits (as of 7/29/2012).    
103
 Lloyd (1995: 1,319) goes on to state that liberal political theories are seriously flawed because they 
‘rely on a distinction between public and private life that entrenches sexist and patriarchal practices’.  This 
liberalist dichotomization of life into the ‘private’ and the ‘public’ – translated by some feminists into a split 
between nature/culture, morality/power, or personal/political, for example – seems at odds with the supposed 
egalitarian ethos of liberalism (Shaver, 1996; Phillips, 2001).    
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The political doctrine of social democratic liberalism (sometimes called ‘new 
liberalism’; Shaver, 1996) was born around the 1880s out of classical liberalism when 
the latter began to incrementally incorporate increasing elements of social democratic 
liberal values and policies into its manifesto.  The primary driver for revamping 
classical liberalism was increasing concern with social stratification (Kotz, 2002) and 
other related social problems (e.g., legislation to control child labor, education, and 
increasing healthcare demands; see Lipman & Hursh, 2007) associated with 
industrialization and a fully fledged capitalist order.  The Hungarian intellectual Karl 
Polanyi (1944; cited in Polanyi-Levitt & Mendell, 1987) stated that the social 
stratification of capitalism was demonstrable at the time with its dehumanization of 
the working class, compared to their upper class counterparts in socialist Vienna.  
This social stratification is dramatically captured by revolutionary political 
philosopher Karl Marx (and Friedrich Engels) in The Communist Manifesto ([1848] 
2008).  The supposedly more egalitarian nature of state intervention in the context of 
a social democratic liberal approach to governance, especially in light of its numerous 
social welfare provisions, sought to diffuse a potential revolutionary ‘dictatorship of 
the proletariat’ – the awakening of which was manifest at the time in the growing 
disgruntlement of organized labor groups (see Goldfield, 1989; Shaver, 1996).   
After the Great Depression of the 1930s and the economic strain of World 
War II (right through until the mid 1970s), social democratic liberalism, or the 
‘welfare state’, became the political orthodoxy as it was fast adopted by the majority 
of western capitalist nation states (Solo, 1978).  A fundamental principle of social 
democratic liberalism is an increased positive role of the state as exemplified, for 
example, by extension of the state’s social welfare provisions into education and 
healthcare in the post-World War I period.  The 20
th
 century British economist John 
Maynard Keynes is generally credited as the founding figure of modern 
macroeconomics
104, commonly called ‘Keynesian economics’. 
However, rising stagflation in the late 1970s, which was precipitated by the oil 
crash in 1973 (Cerny, 2008), led to an increased skepticism of Keynesian economics, 
and the consequent demise in the mid to late 1970s of social democratic liberalism as 
                                                 
104
 Macroeconomics is the study of economics at the aggregate level in the sense that it collectively takes 
into account aspects like GDP, inflation, input, output, and unemployment, in order to evaluate how well the 
economy as a whole is functioning.  Macroeconomics contrasts to microeconomics, which refers to the role of 
constituent components of the economy – individual firms, households, consumers, for example – in determining 
price and quantity in individual markets (Source: A Dictionary of Economics, Oxford University Press, 2009).  
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the then dominant political paradigm of the time (Hemerijck, 2010).  These events 
resulted in a revived faith among politicians and policy-makers in classical liberalism 
that led to the rise of a reincarnated version of it called neoliberalism (Palley, 2004).  I 
now draw on Peters (2001a; see also Kotz, 2002) who explores the intellectual forces 
largely responsible for the rise of American neoliberalism before casting this political 
doctrine in the light of a control technology.   
 
Peters (2001a) draws on Gordon (1993) who characterizes three versions of 
neoliberalism presented by Foucault in his lecture series at the Collège de France in 
1979.  Namely, post-World War II German neoliberalism (or Ordoliberalen) under 
the government (1974-1982) of Helmut Schmidt, American neoliberalism, and French 
neoliberalism under the presidency (1974-1981) of Valéry Giscard d'Estaing; the vast 
geographic span of these three versions of neoliberalism highlights the global grip of 
this political doctrine from the 1970s onward, which is believed to have originated in 
Chile in the 1970s (Moore et al; 2011).  Since the dissertation focuses on the 
American higher education system and how it is impacted by the dual technologizing 
forces of a knowledge economy and neoliberalism in America, American 
neoliberalism is the primary focus here. 
 
 
The Chicago School and American neoliberalism 
The department of economics at the University of Chicago – commonly called 
the ‘Chicago School’ – is generally credited with inspiring many of the ideas behind 
American neoliberalism (Peters, 2001a; Hamann, 2009).  Peters (2001a) chronicles 
the various schools of thought generated at the School since its inception in 1892 by 
oil magnate John Rockefeller
105
.  In its early years between 1920 and 1945, and under 
the influence of the Austrian and Marshall School economists Frank Knight
106
 and 
Jacob Viner, and later under the influence of the Lausanne school economists Oskar 
Lange, Henry Schultz, and Paul Douglas, the school may be referred to as the ‘First 
Chicago School’.  During this time, and dissociating itself from the then prevailing 
positivist turn in economic circles, the school strictly adhered to the major tenets of 
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 According to Sally (1997) the Chicago School was founded by political economist Frank Knight.   
106
 Students of Knight included the prominent economists Milton Freidman, George Stigler, and James 
Buchanan (see Sally, 1997).  
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neoclassical economic theory, despite growing skepticism at the time towards the 
economic efficiency claims in laissez-faire.  The school believed in interventionist 
approaches to the economy whilst rejecting the then up-and-coming Keynesian 
revolution (see also Freedman, 2006).  Peters (2001a) notes that the 1940s saw the 
departure of a number of the school’s leading economists, including Henry Schultz, 
which paved the way for a new wave of theorists in the post-World War II period 
between the years 1945-1960, most notably the agricultural economist Theodore 
Schultz.   
Later in the 1960s the school, which then may be referred to as the ‘Second 
Chicago School’, saw the appointment of the Marshall school economists George 
Stigler and Milton Friedman who continued the school’s intellectual commitment to 
neoclassical economics – the only school of economics at the time to emphatically 
reject Keynesianism, which had swept most western capitalist states.  It is Friedman 
who advanced the macroeconomic theory of monetarism at the school (see Valdés, 
1995), which Friedman, according to Peters (2001a), used to justify rolling back 
interventionist approaches to the economy.  Peters (2001a) states that the Second 
School underwent a revival of neoclassical economics so much so that it was 
criticized for being ‘imperialist’.  These criticisms were levied at the school’s 
ambitious drive to extend the use of economics into traditionally non-economic 
realms – for example, political science, legal theory, history, and, under the influence 
of Nobel laureate Gary Becker and his colleague Jacob Mincer, sociology – in order 
to examine the legal and social norms and rules that underlie their economic activity.   
The Third school, which includes the period from the 1970s to the present, 
bridges Friedman’s monetarist theories of the 1960s to a conglomeration of 
mathematically rigorous schools of thought collectively called The New 
Institutionalism economics.  This economic paradigm   
 
seeks to explain political, historical, economic and social institutions such as 
government, law, markets, firms, social conventions, the family, etc. in terms of 
Neoclassical economic theory.  New Institutionalist [economic] schools can be 
thought of as the outcome of the Chicago’s School “economic imperialism” – i.e. 
using Neoclassical economics to explain areas of human society normally considered 
outside them.  (http://homepage.newschool.edu/het//schools/newinst.htm - last 
accessed 17/8/2010; cited in Peters, 2001a: 71).         
 
Indeed, Hamann (2009: 41) states that American neoliberals are distinguished by their 
‘unprecedented expansion of the economic enterprise form to the entire social realm’.  
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The trend of inserting neoclassical economics into non-economic aspects of life is 
succinctly captured at the Chicago School by, for example, the pioneering work of 
Nobel laureate George Stigler and his theories of ‘economics of information’, as well 
as the groundbreaking work of Fritz Machlup (1962) and his theories of the 
‘economics of the production and distribution of knowledge’ (Peters, 2001a).  Indeed, 
the latter inspired many of the ideas behind the theories ‘postindustrial society’, 
‘service economy’, and ‘knowledge economy’, which have become buzzwords in 
contemporary academic circles.  But probably the most famous synthesis of the theory 
of economics of information was that developed by Theodore Schultz and former 
Chicago School graduate student Gary Becker who essentially amalgamated Gregg 
Lewis’s theory on the application of economic theory in labor markets with Schultz’s 
work on human capital.  Becker synthesized this work at the Chicago School in his 
doctoral thesis entitled The Economic Approach to Human Behavior (1976).   
Human capital theory refers to an individual’s total accrued stock of 
competencies, skills, and knowledge gained through their education, professional and 
personal life experiences, as well as mobility in the labor market, and which may 
ultimately be practically applied in the labor market so as to produce economic return 
(Mincer, 1989; Davidsson & Honig, 2003)
107
.  It was only from the 1980s – 
coincident with the rise of neoliberalism as a dominant political ideology – that 
Becker’s version of human capital theory gained widespread acceptance among 
politicians and policy-makers.  Indeed, Becker (1993) in the Preface to his third 
edition of Human Capital (Becker, 1993) mentions that both former US President 
George W. Bush and, then current, US President Bill Clinton emphasized the 
importance of ‘investing in human capital’ as a means to improve the quality of the 
workforce – language that, according to Becker (1993), would have been 
inconceivable in past presidential campaigns (Peters, 2001a).   
Crucially, the Chicago School’s collective contribution to the economics of 
information and knowledge, in particular human capital theory, has, according to 
Peters (2001a), been used as a legitimation by western states for restructuring science 
and higher education policy (namely the production of research knowledge) along the 
lines of a consumerist culture in an increasingly privatized welfare regime (Peters, 
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 As the knowledge and skills accrued by the individual are often costly (e.g., tuition fees, cost of 
textbooks, etc.) they are considered an investment for eventual economic return (Mincer, 1989).   
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2001a; Peters, 2001b; see also Niggle, 2003).  The impact on educational reform is 
profound:  
 
in the past, so the neoliberal argument goes, too much emphasis has been placed on 
social and cultural objectives and insufficient emphasis has been placed on economic 
goals in education systems and the promotion of a greater partnership between 
education and business.  Henceforth, the prescription is for greater investment in 
education and training as a basis for future economic growth.  Such investment in 
human skills is underwritten by theories of human capital development.  (Peters, 
2001a: 74)    
 
 
Neoliberalism as a control technology 
American neoliberalism is exemplified by the policies of former US President 
Ronald Reagan (see Kotz, 2002; McCarthy & Prudham, 2004) of the Republican 
Party who was in office between 1981 and 1989, and more recently by the policies of 
former US President George W. Bush (see Cohen, 2007, online resource
108
), also of 
the Republican Party, who was in office between 2001 and 2009
109
.  These neoliberal 
tendencies of the US Republican Party are consistent with neoliberalism being 
synonymous with the ‘new right’ (Olssen et al, 2004), or along these lines, Cerny 
(2008: 1) calling neoliberalism a ‘nationally rooted transatlantic conservatism’ – 
descriptors that fit precisely with the politically and socially conservative ethos of the 
US Republican Party
110
.  Moreover, Cerny’s (2008) ‘transatlantic’ descriptor is 
undoubtedly a reference to the pro-globalization ethos of neoliberalism (see, e.g., 
Kotz, 2002; Worth, 2002; Hursh, 2004; Olssen et al, 2004; Olssen & Peters, 2005; 
Cerny, 2008, Frake, 2008; and Heron, 2008) that is demonstrable with the following 
features: the switch from fixed to floating currencies in the international monetary 
system, concurrent with the collapse of the Bretton Woods system that was 
synonymous with the Keynesian era (Worth, 2002); the proliferation of multinational 
corporations whose production or delivery enterprises stretch beyond the company’s 
home country; and significant technological transformations especially in the area of 
ICTs (Cerny, 2008).  Kotz (2010) similarly states that neoliberalism promotes the free 
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 Available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/05/28/ 
AR2007052801053.html (last accessed 7/29/2012). 
109
 However, Kotz and McDonough (2008) note that neoliberal restructuring in the US actually began as 
early as the mid 1970s with Democrat President Jimmy Carter who, the authors state, ‘made a sharp turn to the 
right’.    
110
 British neoliberalism is exemplified by the policies of former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher of 
the Conservative Party who was in power between 1979-1990; see the dissertation of Jones (2009), the abstract of 
which is available at: http://repository.upenn.edu/dissertations/AAI3381872/ (last accessed 7/29/2012). 
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passage of goods, services, capital, and money across national boundaries, meaning 
that corporations, banks, and individual investors, for example, are free to move their 
property across state lines as well as to acquire foreign property.  At the national 
level, meanwhile, neoliberalism is concerned with the following: dismantling the 
relics of the Keynesian welfare state in order to cut back, or eliminate entirely, social 
welfare programs; deregulation of the private sector with tax reductions on businesses 
and the investing class; and deregulation and privatization of the public sector that 
extends to higher education (Kotz, 2010).   
The vast majority of the academic literature, for one reason or another, paints 
neoliberalism in a predominately pejorative light
111
.  For example, Giroux (2002) 
refers to neoliberalism as ‘ideological’, while others, like Hursh (2000), view it as 
‘hegemonic’ – descriptors that are perhaps rooted in the notion of neoliberalism as a 
control technology
112
.  Before embarking on this argument, and in order to avoid it 
sounding illogical, it should be noted that the notion of neoliberalism as a control 
technology which, at the same time, reflects a classical liberal and laissez-faire 
freedom sounds somewhat contradictory.  This apparent contradiction is picked up by 
many:  
 
• Rose (1993: 298) famously refers to neoliberalism as a contradictory hand-
on/hand-off mode of ‘govern(ing) without governing’.  
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 See, for example, Peters, 2001a, 2001b; Worth, 2002; Niggle, 2003; Olssen et al, 2004; Ong, 2006; 
Liu, 2007; Cerny, 2008; Heron, 2008; Giroux, 2009; and Read, 2009.  However, it should be noted that 
‘neoliberalism’ is not an exclusively pejorative concept; neoliberalism is portrayed in a positive light by Nicholls 
(2008), for example, who conceives Fairtrade as a neoliberal solution to problems with trade, which actually 
benefits the livelihood of third world farmers.  See his article at: http://www.fairtrade.org.uk/includes/documents/ 
cm_docs/2008/a/alex_nichols.pdf (last accessed 7/29/2012).  Additional examples of neoliberalism portrayed in a 
positive light include Shearmur (1992) whose article is a systematic and vehement rebuttal of the criticisms of 
‘neoliberal ideology’ levied by another scholar; and the University of Cambridge Master of Philosophy in 
Development Studies Blog that has a multi-part article entitled ‘In Defense of Neoliberalism’ available at: 
http://cambridgedevelopmentstudies.wordpress.com/2011/04/12/in-defense-of-neoliberalism-part-i/ (last accessed 
7/29/2012).    
112
 One blatant example, in the context of ‘educational reform’, is presented by Ball (2003), for 
example, who is worth quoting at length.  Ball (2003: 216) cites three ‘policy technologies’ comprising the 
‘market’, ‘managerialism’, and ‘performativity’, that ‘collectively involve the calculated deployment of techniques 
and artifacts to organize human forces and capabilities into functioning networks of power’.  On ‘performativity’, 
Ball (2003: 216) goes on to write that it ‘is a technology, a culture and a mode of regulation that employs 
judgments, comparisons and displays as means of incentive, control, attrition and change – based on rewards and 
sanctions (both material and symbolic).  The performances (of individual subjects or organizations) serve as 
measures of productivity or output, or displays of ‘quality’, or ‘moments’ of promotion or inspection.  As such 
they stand for, encapsulate or represent the worth, quality or value of an individual or organization within a field 
of judgment’.  Despite only citing ‘neoliberalism’ a couple of times in his paper, Ball’s (2003) writings are an 
unambiguous reference to it. 
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• Davies and Petersen (2005: 93; original emphasis), in the context of higher 
education, note that neoliberalism ‘sets intellectual workers free to produce their 
critiques and at the same time and through the same practices governs them, shapes 
what they do and what they desire’. 
 
• Cerny (2008: 1; my emphases) says that 
 
neoliberalism in its varieties… paradoxically includes an active role for the state in 
designing, promoting and guaranteeing the free and efficient operation of the market 
(Plehwe, Walpen and Neunhöffer, 2006) – a kind of imposed laissez faire somewhat 
analogous to Rousseau’s image of people being “forced to be free”. 
 
• Read (2009: 29; my emphasis) views neoliberalism as a ‘trajectory [that] 
follows a fundamental paradox; as power becomes less restrictive, less corporeal, it 
also becomes more intense, saturating the field of actions, and possible actions’. 
 
Consistent with these authors, I suggest that the inherently contradictory nature of 
neoliberalism may be reconciled by framing it as a paradoxical control technology.  
With this in mind, I now build my central argument that neoliberalism is a control 
technology
113
.  In doing so, I use my technology concepts framework in Chapter 2 to 
examine the following four major (but not exhaustive) neoliberal concepts: Homo 
economicus; responsibilising the self; public choice theory; and agency theory.  I 
explore each of these concepts individually with a footnote at the end of discussions 
on each providing a specific working example of the concept in my current 
professional context of the university:  
 
                                                 
113 What renders the political doctrine of neoliberalism a control technology?  For do all political 
doctrines – good and bad – not ‘control’ the population to some degree?  Indeed they do, when one considers the 
plethora of economic controls, for example, like legal enforcement by the state of the population to pay Federal 
taxes at a pre-determined rate, or social controls, for example, like legal enforcement by most American states of 
school attendance.  But such controls generally provide a necessary and democratic governing infrastructure that is 
essential for the stable and efficient wellbeing of both the individual and the state.  Crucially, the precise nature of 
‘control’ in control technology in the current context is intended to imply a level of control that results in, relative 
to other political doctrines (aside from dictatorial agendas), more or weightier undemocratic consequences for the 
individual.  I say ‘relative to other political doctrines’ because even the most democratic of political doctrines will 
always appear somewhat undemocratic to some individuals or groups, especially in the minds of those who feel 
subordinate to the state, as in the case of many gays in most American states where, under a current ‘democratic’ 
government, Federally-recognized marriage is not an option.  There is an abundance of academic literature on 
neoliberalism as an undemocratic political doctrine, especially in the field of education (see, e.g., Timney & Kelly, 
2000; Davies & Petersen, 2005; Brown, 2006; and Giroux, 2009).  I will in the course of my argument on 
neoliberalism as a control technology, and later in the dissertation, demonstrate how and why neoliberalism is 
undemocratic, or how it ‘de-democratizes’ as some in the academic literature speak of it.   
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First, and fundamentally, is the fundamental shift in subjectivity of the 
individual from ‘Homo economicus’114 in classical liberalism to ‘manipulable man’ 
under neoliberalism (Olssen et al, 2004: 137).  Homo economicus is traditionally 
perceived as an egoistic, rational utility-maximizer (Litfin, 1996), with ‘rational’ 
intended to evoke a sense of self economic ‘means-end efficiency’, and not 
necessarily ‘rational’ in the wider social or ethical sense of the word.  Read (2009: 28) 
adopts a Foucauldian perspective to argue that Homo economicus undergoes a 
fundamental anthropological reconfiguration as a natural creature of ‘exchange’ in 
classical liberalism to an artificial creature of ‘competition’ in neoliberalism – what 
Olssen et al (2004) refer to as ‘manipulable man’.  The switch in subjectivity under 
neoliberalism to ‘artificial’ and ‘manipulable’ is laden with the language of control 
technology, which recall from Chapter 2, refers to ‘mental control technologies’ of 
the ‘unconsciously-mediated kind’115; ‘manipulable’, in particular, is indicative of the 
unconscious dimension of control technology.   
For Read (2009), neoliberalism is a particular construction of ‘subjectivity’, of 
the way in which individuals are constituted as subjects of ‘human capital’116 in a 
contemporary society so permeated by the application of neoclassical economics that 
society has become ‘subsumed’ by capital.  Indeed, Rose (1999; 141; cited in Davies 
& Petersen, 2005: 77) states that ‘all aspects of social behavior are now [in a 
neoliberal era] reconceptualized along economic lines’.  What is lost under 
neoliberalism, according to Read (2009: 35), is the rich heterogeneity of spheres and 
representations of subjectivity, and the critical distances opened up between them, 
such as the Marxian relationship of ‘work’ and the ‘market’, or the classical liberal 
relationship of ‘citizen’ and the ‘economic subject’.  These spheres under 
                                                 
114
 In keeping with the taxonomic rank of biological classification, I have italicized this concept – like 
Homo sapiens, for example – even though it frequently fails to be done so in the academic literature.   
115
 ‘Unconscious’ in the sense that those controlled by neoliberal ideology are largely incognizant of 
both being controlled by the state and/or the associated undemocratic forces that ensue, otherwise one would 
expect arousal of a collective (as opposed to ‘minor’, as in the academic literature) opposition, resistance, or revolt, 
by these individuals to overturn the control technology that is the neoliberal party in power.  This latter scenario is 
distinct from an electorate voting out a neoliberal party in power at the next general election, not because the 
electorate is cognizant of the neoliberal party in power being a control technology, but because the electorate is 
disgruntled with the party’s policies and/or socioeconomic outcomes resulting therefrom.  Further to the 
unconscious dimension of control technology, Davies and Petersen’s (2005: 84; my emphases) empirical research 
draws on Fairclough (2000) to note that ‘the naturalizing and normalizing of neo-liberal discourse … becomes 
‘mundanely familiar’, [and] enables intellectual workers [e.g., university faculty] to slide into the new ways of 
speaking and writing about what they do, performing themselves appropriately in a global discourse that 
apparently brooks no dissent’.   
116
 This is in contrast to the Marxian notion of ‘fixed capital’ to include the inanimate objects and tools – 
factories, machines, etc. – that contribute to the mode of production.   
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neoliberalism merge into one to create a society permeated by production, and in 
which the individual is perpetually perceived as ‘entrepreneur’ (Read, 2009).117   
 
Second, is Peters’ (2001b) concept of ‘responsibilising the self’ – his coinage 
for the greater neoliberal concept of the ‘entrepreneurial self’ (see, e.g., Brown, 2006).  
The ‘entrepreneurial self’ describes the entrepreneurial relationship that one is forced 
to embrace by bearing the economic and moral burden of the cost of one’s own health 
care, education, and other social welfare needs – through insurance programs, loans, 
and user charges, for example – in the context of the pervasive neoliberal trend of 
privatization, commercialization, and contracting-out, of public social welfare 
provisions (Peters, 2001b).  Yates and Lakes (2010) extend the concept of the 
‘entrepreneurial self’ beyond welfare to include the perpetual self training and skilling 
that highly competitive neoliberal labor markets demand from knowledge workers.  
Such a scenario, Rose states (1999: 161; cited in Yates & Lakes, 2010), is a 
‘continuous economic capitalization of the self’.  The ‘entrepreneurial self’, then, is a 
relationship characterized by the departure of a democratic ‘culture of dependency’ as 
the hallmark of the Keynesianism welfare era to one of ‘self-reliance’ under 
neoliberalism (Peters, 2001b: 58).  Similarly, Giroux (2002: 429), speaking in the 
context of a neoliberal-driven corporatization of higher education notes that 
 
the attendant reorientation of culture to the demands of commerce and regulation has 
substituted the language of personal responsibility and private initiative for the 
discourses of social responsibility and public service.  This can be seen in the 
enactment of government policies designed to dismantle state protections for the 
poor. 
 
Similarly, Read (2009) notes that the popular trend of temporary and part-time 
employment contracts not only frees corporations from the burden of costly full-time 
contracts and expensive commitments to health care benefits, but it also reinforces the 
                                                 
117 Working example of ‘Homo economicus’: Davies and Petersen (2005) present applied research in the 
form of biographical sketches from university faculty who, the authors claim, collectively demonstrate ways in 
which a form of neoliberal managerialism is not only passively taken up in the discourses and practices of 
university life, but has created a culture that forestalls resistance to such managerialism.  Davies and Petersen’s 
(2005) paper present reports from teachers that detail a controlling neoliberal trend of placing greater value on 
seeking research dollars outside the university than on publications generated therein.  Here, ‘each worker 
becomes the new Darwinian subject, and only the fittest will survive.  Competition and hierarchical domination 
over others, even the destruction of others, are legitimated if they lead to survival.  The terms through which 
survival is guaranteed, however, cannot be questioned, since the possibility of non-survival is always present for 
those who do not adapt.  The emphasis on individuality is central.  The competitive individual must resourcefully 
pit themselves against the others’ (Davies & Petersen, 2005: 89).  Therefore, Homo economicus under 
neoliberalism represents an aggressively competitive character – i.e., ‘manipulable man’ – more so than Homo 
economicus in classical liberalism.    
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cultural reconstruction away from ‘workers’ who gain something through collective 
camaraderie towards ‘companies of one’ (i.e., the ‘entrepreneurial self’).   
The ‘entrepreneurial self’ is undemocratic because ‘this master narrative [‘the 
entrepreneurial self’], which projects a national ideological vision, differs from the 
social democratic narrative: it does not adopt the language of equality of opportunity 
and does not attempt to redress power imbalances or socioeconomic inequalities’ 
(Peters, 2001b: 66).  Peters (2001b: 58, 60) employs language like ‘neoliberal 
restructuring’, ‘prescription’, and ‘engineering’, in reference to the state’s 
construction of the ‘entrepreneurial self’, language that speaks of control technology.  
For example, ‘engineering’, which may be defined as ‘the art or science of making 
practical application of the knowledge of pure sciences…’118, and may be applied 
here to the science or ‘art of government’, suggests a deliberate molding of the 
individual into an ‘entrepreneurial self’.  ‘Engineering’ is additionally defined as 
‘artful or skillful contrivance’ that implies – coupled to ‘prescription’ which suggests 
a dispensing of state rule to the population – that individuals are controlled passively 
so, which is wholly consistent with the unconscious dimension of control 
technology.
119
   
 
Third, is the new public management (NPM)
120
 tool of public choice theory 
(PCT), which I suggest provides the economic architecture for Homo economicus and 
                                                 
118
 See the definition of ‘engineering’ at Dictionary.com: http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/ 
engineering (last accessed 7/29/12). 
119
 Working example of ‘responsibilising the self’: This concept applies to students burdened with the 
responsibility of paying their own tuition fees with student loans, for example, in an increasingly privatized higher 
education system under neoliberalism where social welfare provisions have been phased-out, or abolished 
altogether.  Indeed, Tilak (2006: 3), writing about the global trend in declining public expenditure for higher 
education, states that higher education is no longer a public good, but rather a ‘highly individualized private good’.  
Similarly, US interest group The National Center for Public Policy and Higher Education cite not only escalating 
tuition fees, but the additional burden of new fees and reductions to student assistance (Source:  
http://www.highereducation.org/reports/affordability_supplement/affordability_1.shtml – last accessed 7/29/2012). 
120
 NPM refers to the extensive market-oriented and deregulatory overhauls of the public sector that 
were instituted by neoliberal governments in the 1970s and 1980s.  Tolofari (2005: 75) notes that ‘NPM is 
characterized by marketization, privatization, managerialism, performance measurement and accountability [of the 
public sector]’; Olssen and Peters (2005: 322) similarly note that NPM is characterized by ‘deregulation’, 
‘corporatization’, and ‘privatization’ [of the public sector], with the state’s end goal of modeling the public sector 
on the private sector.  Accordingly, the focus is shifted from the ‘social contract’ to the ‘economic contract’ 
(Zanetti & Adams, 2000: 534).  Tolofari (2005) lists ‘public choice theory’, ‘transaction cost economics’, ‘agency 
theory’, ‘micro-economic theory’, and ‘the new economic sociology’ as its principal economic restructuring 
strategies.  NPM is a popular product, or strategy, of neoliberal governance, and as neoliberalism is painted by 
many scholars in a pejorative light, NPM naturally is too.  For example, Timney and Kelly (2000: 557) highlight 
the threat to popular sovereignty that they believe is inherent in NPM by stating that ‘the commodification of 
government services by the private sector leads to a replacement of public values of openness, accountability, and 
transparency – ‘publicness’ – by private values of profit maximization and consumerism.  Most dangerous is the 
decline of democratic deliberation within the administration of public programs’.  Meanwhile, Balfour and Grubbs 
(2000: 570) draw a striking parallel between the detachment of employees under the corporate reengineering of the 





.  Central to PCT is the neoclassical notion of the individual 
as a rational, self-interested utility maximizer (Homo economicus) who is preoccupied 
with fulfilling and advancing their own goals, and from which behavioral assumptions 
are derived for deductive models of politics and government (Nesslein, 2008).  In 
other words, in the context of Homo economicus, PCT extends the application of 
neoclassical economic theories and methods to political behavior, which is an area 
normally confined to the province of political science (Shughart, 2011, online 
resource
122
).  Crucially, according to Olssen and Peters (2005), and Brendel (2009), 
state insertion of PCT into the public sector marks a major switch from classical 
liberalism to neoliberalism with the respective switch from a negative to positive 
exercise of political power.  Accordingly, the unfettered social and market 
spontaneity of classical liberalism, believed by Friedrich Hayek to be the best 
allocator of resources because of its supposed natural tendency towards 
equilibrium, as reflected in the self-ordering tendency of population dynamics, 
crystals, and galaxies, becomes substituted in neoliberalism with what Burchell 
(1996: 23; cited in Peters, 2001a: 62) calls ‘artificially arranged or contrived 
forms of the free, entrepreneurial, and competitive conduct of economic-rational 
individuals’.   
The pro-monetarist economist, James Buchanan, is an open critic of Hayek’s 
evolutionary market philosophy.  On his call for overhaul of the market with PCT, 
Buchanan makes the distinction between the ‘protective state’, which refers to the 
necessary legal and defense framework, and the ‘productive state’, which refers to the 
political framework that may be conceived as both ‘policeman’ and ‘watchman’.  
Crucially, according to Olssen and Peters (2005), in the context of PCT, Buchanan’s 
distinctions are essentially distinctions between the ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ roles of 
the state, respectively.  Hence, the positive arm of the ‘productive state’ provides the 
necessary reason for action within the rules and laws selected by the negative arm of 
the ‘protective state’:  
 
                                                                                                                                            
private sector – as portrayed in Richard Sennett’s The Corrosion of Character (1998) – and the ‘unintended, 
deleterious consequences for the public employee’ that has ensued from the ‘excessively rule-bound’, ‘hierarchic’, 
and ‘inflexible’ nature of NPM-reengineering of the public sector.  
121
 PCT theory emerged around the 1950s, but it was not until the mid 1980s that it gained widespread 
attention largely due to James Buchanan, one of its two founding figures, who won the Nobel Prize in economics 
for his contributions to the field (see Schneider & Damanpour, 2002). 
122
 Available at: http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/PublicChoice.html (last accessed 7/29/2012). 
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Buchanan’s state has a positive arm.  Hence, while the stringent constitutional 
safeguards on the protective state make any change in the status quo or redistribution 
of property almost impossible, the positive arm of the productive state effectively 
extracts compliance from individuals in order to engineer a market order.  In doing 
so it cuts across the traditional guarantees of classical liberalism regarding the spaces 
it sought to protect – a domain of personal freedom, the rights of privacy involving 
freedom from scrutiny and surveillance [e.g., Peters (2001b) mentions new biometric 
approaches to thwart benefit fraud], as well as professional autonomy and discretion 
in one’s work [e.g., Ball (2003) cites erosion of these by the controlling neoliberal 
practice of ‘performativity’].  (Olssen et al, 2004: 159). 
 
With this is mind, PCT is consistent with the definition of ‘control technology’ 
because of the state’s use of its positive arm, which displays clear elements of 
undemocratic and unconscious control.  PCT is fundamentally undemocratic because 
at its heart social behavior is pervasively ‘reconceptualized along economic lines’ 
(Rose, 1999: 141); it drives ‘Homo economicus’ and ‘responsibilising the self’.123                
 
Fourth, and finally, is the NPM tool of agency theory (AT)
124
.  AT, sometimes 
called the ‘principal-agent problem’, occurs in knowledge-producing professions, 
including the current professional context of the university research lab, under 
conditions of ‘asymmetric knowledge’ between an ‘agent’ and a ‘principal’.  AT 
describes the common workplace scenario of the attempts of a principal to motivate 
an agent in order to extract from the agent knowledge or information that is profitable 
to the principal, but relinquishment of which by the agent is often costly to the agent 
(Kivistö, 2005).  In the context of Homo economicus, the self-maximizing and 
rational goals of an agent are brought into alignment with those of the principal, by 
the principal, under conditions of greatest efficiency in terms of profit maximization 
(intellectual and/or monetary) for the principal, and compliance of the agent to their 
contractual obligations.  AT is often mutually underwritten by a contract that 
                                                 
123
 Working example of ‘PCT’: PCT is exemplified by the university practice of patenting public 
knowledge – in the form of internal research data – generated in its research labs.  Patenting such knowledge 
essentially privatizes it, which in turn sequesters the knowledge from the historically-perceived ‘public’ sphere of 
the university – and society at large.  Indeed, Orr (1997: 56) states that ‘commodified knowledge [originating from 
the university] is not available for social use’, highlighting ‘IPRs’ as a specific mediator of this trend.  This 
seemingly undemocratic scenario is particularly prevalent in a neoliberal era wherein the ‘funding of universities 
has come to depend less on state support, and more on the … commodification [via patenting] of university 
research’ (Denning, 2005: 9).       
124 AT is the ‘subject’ of (Olssen & Peters, 2005), and therefore is inextricably tied to, the NPM strategy 
of ‘transaction cost economics’ (TCE).  Extending Tolofari’s (2005) definition, transaction costs are basically 
those auxiliary costs incurred before, during, and/or after, an economic transaction and which reside outside the 
bare cost of the good in question.  Perrow (1986: 18; cited in Olssen & Peters, 2005: 320) state’s that TCE is 
‘relentlessly and explicitly an efficiency argument’.  Similarly, Tolofari (2005: 81) states that ‘central to the theory 
[of TCE] is that alternative methods, and attendant costs, for carrying out projects or delivery of services are 
examined for their merits, usually judged by the cost (Boston et al, 1996; Ferlie et al, 1996).  The question of 
efficiency is still the crux here’.  Hence, the formula for TCE sounds like ‘minimizing the various inputs of a given 
system whilst maximizing the various outputs’.   
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stipulates some form of remuneration (salary, commission, compensation, incentives, 
etc.) payable to the agent upon implicit provision to the principal of the good – for 
example, repeated release of lucrative knowledge/information over time – ideally at a 
price lower than if the principal were to personally provide the good (Tolofari, 2005). 
AT was originally conceived as an efficiency tool for businesses in the private 
sector, but in a neoliberal era of NPM it has increasingly been applied to the public 
sector as a means of maintaining efficiency and tracking accountability of employees 
because the public sector lacks the same market discipline that characterizes the 
private sector (Gordon, 1995; Olssen & Peters, 2005).  Gordon (1995), reporting on 
the neoliberal application of AT to the New Zealand schooling system, cites specific 
policy examples as the ‘coercive’ means through which the agency problem in the 
context that she describes is resolved.  Olssen and Peters (1995: 324) draw on other 
findings on AT that report ‘increased tensions’, ‘rivalry’, and ‘disruptive sub-
cultures’, of this neoliberal market reform strategy.  Moreover, both Gordon (1995), 
and Olssen and Peters (2005), state that AT lines of command are ‘hierarchal’.  Such 
descriptors reinforce the inherently manipulative, and therefore undemocratic, nature 
of AT, and justify categorization of AT, under the broader banner of neoliberalism, as 
a control technology.  Moreover, the implicitness of compliance of the agent to the 
principal’s commands within the dynamic of AT is indicative of unconscious 
behavior that is consistent with the unconscious dimension of ‘control technology’.125 
 
Thus, neoliberalism is a control technology because Homo economicus, 
responsibilising the self, PCT, and agency theory – all concepts unique to 
neoliberalism – fit with my notion of control technology, as delineated in my 
technology concepts framework in Chapter 2 (and earlier in this chapter).  Crucially, 
the common threads that tie these neoliberal concepts together, and a prerequisite for 
neoliberalism being a control technology, are their dual unconscious and 
                                                 
125
 Working example of ‘AT’: In the university research lab, a hierarchal situation often occurs whereby a 
postdoctoral fellow (i.e., the ‘principal’) pays the salary, via research grants, of a research technician (i.e., the 
‘agent’) for the purchase of the good that is internal research data that the agent is contractually obligated to 
generate (the moment in time at which the agent generates the data and thereby possesses the knowledge – but not 
the principle – is the moment of ‘asymmetric information’).  The principle often incentivizes the work of the agent 
in order to extract the good (that being data) in the form of a promise of publication of the agent’s work in a peer-
reviewed journal.  However, consistent with the model of AT, relinquishment of the good by the agent often costs 
the agent the much coveted first authorship ranking on the publication because it is instead taken by the principle.            
Stewart Craig; 9610118 
65 
 
undemocratic dimensions that are heightened relative to classical liberalism
126
.  I 
conceive that the heightened undemocratic dimension to neoliberalism stems from the 
fact that the individual under neoliberalism is, to borrow Heidegger’s concept (1977), 
instrumentally reduced to a mere standing reserve – an endless source of raw material 
on call and at the predetermined mercy of humans who, in the current context, are 
neoliberal politicians and policymakers
127
.   
The exact nature of control in control technology in the current context is to 
achieve the desired state goal of optimal market efficiency, which is accomplished in 
part by the four featured neoliberal concepts.  Optimal market efficiency, as we will 
see in chapter 5, could not be more relevant in light of the, nowadays, fiercely 
competitive and highly globalized capitalist economy in which prominent state 
position is of paramount economic importance.  The four featured neoliberal concepts 
appear to work in synergy to help achieve the goal of optimal market efficiency:  
Homo economicus sets the economic tone of the individual as a competitive 
entrepreneur in a highly capitalized society; furnished with such market mentality, 
and in a neoliberal era stripped of social welfare provisions, the individual is 
economically and morally burdened with their own social welfare needs, which 
creates a scenario of responsibilising the self; the state’s positive expression of power 
manifests in the NPM tool of PCT that essentially seeks to overhaul the public sector 
by making it an extension of the private sector; and AT is a hierarchal workplace 
strategy used by managers, including those in the university, to extract compliance 
from knowledge workers, akin to the ‘carrot and stick’ idiom.  Crucially, at the core 
                                                 
126
 One might argue that classical liberalism is a control technology because it is undemocratic because 
of its embodiment of capitalism, which is notorious for creating stark social stratification, as famously captured by 
Marx ([1848] 2008).  But I counter this notion by noting that classical liberalism was founded from democratic 
values that were a response to the very undemocratic nature of the totalitarian state rule that historically preceded 
it.  Furthermore, Kotz (2002) states that the establishment of American capitalism between the years 1800 and 
1860 – coincident with the classical liberal era – was kept in check because the ‘government played a relatively 
interventionist role’ (Kotz, 2002: 68).   
127
 That the individual under neoliberalism is reduced to a mere standing reserve, and is consequently 
treated undemocratically, is demonstrable with the four neoliberal concepts just examined.  Homo economicus: 
The individual’s ‘human capital’ (Read, 2009) provides a source of raw material that is indirectly extracted by the 
state and which, in the context of a knowledge economy, helps to lucratively propel the state’s position in the 
competitive global capitalist economy (Peters, 2001a).  Responsibilising the self:  The individual is implicitly 
engineered by the state to financially fend for their self (and from their self, with their own financing) with regard 
to social welfare provisions.  In this model, the individual is controlled by neoliberal ideology to be a self standing 
reserve – a scenario that conveniently exempts the state from providing to its citizens any form of a social welfare 
system.  PCT:  PCT is the specific market architecture – for example, incremental privatization of the public 
sector, contracting-out of public provisions, creation of quasi markets, etc. (Peters, 2001b) – that is fabricated by 
the neoliberal state for the efficient standing reserve function of the two preceding neoliberal concepts of Homo 
economicus and responsibilising the self .  AT:  The ‘agent’ in the AT model is treated by the ‘principle’ (but both 
ultimately by the state) as a standing reserve of raw material in the form of lucrative knowledge that is used to 
maintain maximum efficiency in the knowledge workplace and, in turn, for the state.       
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of these neoliberal concepts is capitalism.  These concepts (and neoliberalism 
generally) are the cogs that drive the capitalist machinery in the sense that the 
neoliberal subjection of virtually all public entities to capital – ‘the deeply 
problematic commodification of everything’ (McCarthy & Prudham, 2004: 276; my 
emphasis) – increases market efficiency because all entities are forced to compete 
with one another in a classic case of ‘survival of the fittest’128.  Indeed, the large 
number of biological evolutionary theory references to free market economics is no 
coincidence
129
.  As I showed, it is the pervasive and profound marketization of the 
public sector, including higher education, and ensuing undemocratic side effects, that 
render neoliberalism a control technology relative to classical liberalism.  It appears 
that the ethos of neoliberalism is so detached from classical liberalism that it becomes 
not merely a revival (e.g., Cerny, 2008), but rather a reincarnation (e.g., Hackworth 
& Moriah, 2006)
130
, of classical liberalism.  In this sense, and consistent with the 
views of the earlier noted scholars, neoliberalism is a paradox because it completely 
inverts – largely through unconscious and undemocratic means – the free classical 
liberal ideals it supposedly espouses.  
I demonstrated (in the footnotes at the end of each premise to my argument) 
that the university is not immune to the controlling effects of neoliberalism.  Neither 
is it immune to the forces of globalization, rapid technological evolution, changing 
knowledge functions, and other forces that are characteristic of postmodernity.  These 
forces have collectively and fundamentally reconfigured the philosophical, political, 
and economical dimensions of the university.  It is this reconfiguration – the changing 
face of the university – that we explore in Chapter 6.  Before closing this chapter and 
moving onto Chapter 5, I want to first discuss the nowadays fashionable political 
doctrine of the third way, and how it relates to neoliberalism. 
 
                                                 
128 This is so because a privatized (as opposed to a publicly-funded) university, for example, must 
compete with likeminded organizations, not just for a prominent market position, but more fundamentally, to 
economically survive.  Without using economic jargon, this is the very basis of competition in a free market.  Free 
market entities, like the privatized university, receive little or no state funding, so they must compete head-to-head 
with other likeminded entities for private funding from industry or personal benefactors.    
129
 For example, Hayek drew from Lamarckian evolutionary theory to describe the natural flow of the 
free market (Meyer, 2006).   
130
 I am highly cautious of stating that neoliberalism is a revival of classical liberalism, because to do so 
is to conflate their political, philosophical, and moral dimensions, which, in turn, is tantamount to claiming that 
they are the same political doctrine.  My use of ‘reincarnation’ reflects the embodiment by neoliberalism of 
classical liberalism – but in the variant form of a control technology.    
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Neoliberalism in disguise?131   
Despite the demise of Keynesian economics in the 1970s, the ensuing global 
financial crisis has seen a resurgence in Keynesian policy implementation by, for 
example, current US President Barack Obama whose political policies lean towards 
the third way (see Kumo, 2009
132
).  The third way is a current, progressive centrist
133
 
philosophy of governance that is exemplified by the political policies of Democrat 
President Barack Obama, who was elected to presidency in 2008, and former US 
Democrat President Bill Clinton, who was in office between 1993 and 2001.  In the 
UK, the Democratic Leadership Council defines the third way as 
 
a global movement dedicated to modernizing progressive politics for the information 
age.  The third way politics seek a new balance of economic dynamism and social 
security, a new social compact based on individual rights and responsibilities, and a 
new model for governing that equips citizens and communities to solve their own 
problems.  (http://www.ndol.org – last accessed 12/26/2008) 
 
Along these lines, I contend that the third way is a neoliberal-like agenda for a 
postmodern era.  I say ‘postmodern’ because, according to the above definition, the 
third way embraces globalization, the information age, and multiculturalism – key 
characteristics of postmodernity (see, e.g., Taylor, online resource
134
).  I say 
‘neoliberal’ because, according to the above definition, citizens and communities, in 
true neoliberal entrepreneurial fashion, are left by the state to ‘solve their own 
problems’ – a key characteristic of neoliberalism (see previous section).  Moreover, 
and wholly consistent with the characteristics of neoliberal ideology, third way 
authority Anthony Giddens states that the ‘new mixed economy [of the third way] 
looks… for a synergy between public and private sectors’ (1998: 100) and that 
‘government policy can direct support for entrepreneurship’ (1998: 124; my 
emphasis).   
Some scholars go one step further than my suggestion that the third way has a 
‘neoliberal-like agenda’.  Some believe that the third way is neoliberalism, albeit a 
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 This section of the chapter contains material adapted from my Educational Policy module assignment 
for the EdD program.   
132
 Online resource available at: http://www.politicalarticles.net/blog/2009/03/01/the-global-economic-
crisis-and-the-resurgence-of-keynesian-economics/ (last accessed 7/29/2012). 
133
 But, according to Coulter (1999), the third way has been adopted by parties of the left, center, and 
even the right.  
134
 Available at: http://www.aiias.edu/ict/vol_30/30cc_397-407.htm (last accessed 7/29/2012). 





, rebranded version of it; see, for example, Gray, 1998; Callinicos, 2001; 
Kelsey, 2002; and Coulter, 2009.  Indeed, Coulter (2009: 191; my emphasis) states 
that the  
 
Third Way approaches privilege capitalist interests, ensure corporate power, do little 
to curtail growing income inequality and, in many cases, accelerate it.  In practice, 
the Third Way is simply a variant of neoliberalism. 
 
With this in mind, it is conceivable that the third way’s collectivist agenda is merely a 
rallying by the third way politicians of the entire citizenry – some minority groups of 
which are marginalized under the socially conservative ethos of American 
neoliberalism (see Monini, 2003) – for their collective partaking in a lucrative 
knowledge economy.  Indeed, Giddens warns that a ‘highly unequal society is 
harming itself by not making the best use of the talents and capacities of its citizens’ 
(1998: 42; my emphasis).  Along these lines, it is conceivable that the third way 
provision of a reformed social security system is intended by the third way politicians 
and policymakers to keep sharp the physical, and particularly the mental, aptitude of 
the entire citizenry.  Because doing so – according to human capital theory – 
theoretically translates into greater economic return to the state when these citizens 
apply their knowledge and skills in knowledge-producing professions in the context 
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 Some would say ‘harder’; see, for example, Murphy (1999) whose classification system views the 
policies of former US President Bill Clinton as a ‘hard’ third way, while those of the Carnegie Commission Report 
and the World Drug Report are considered by Murphy as a ‘softer’ third way.  
136
 At the time of writing (Fall 2012), the ongoing global financial crisis not only highlights the delicate 
interconnectedness of the world’s economies, especially in light of the global capitalist economy, but it also brings 
into question the ability of the free market – on which it seems most of the world’s industrialized economies are 
built – to correct itself during such turbulent economic times.  We may, therefore, witness in the future a favoring 
by politicians and the electorate of more interventionist approaches to governance such as the third way.   











Hard, soft, control:  
the ‘technological triumvirate’  











In a global neoliberal environment, the role of higher education for the economy is 
seen by governments as having greater importance to the extent that higher education 
has become the new star ship in the policy fleet for governments around the world.  
Universities are seen as a key driver in the knowledge economy and as a 
consequence higher education institutions have been encouraged to develop links 
with industry and business in a series of new venture partnerships.  (Olssen & Peters, 
2005: 313) 
 
he arguments have been made that a knowledge economy was born 
from key hard and soft technologies, and that the political doctrine of 
neoliberalism is a control technology.  It is now time, in this chapter, T 
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to show how these two key historical events – one technological, the other political137 
– prompted the university to begin selling its internal research data to industry.  In 
order to do so, we first turn our attention to the Bayh-Dole Act
138
 that was passed by 
the US Congress in 1980.  The Act represents a pivotal neoliberal policy move that 
forged university-industry alliances because it enabled the university, for the first 
time, to sell to industry its internal research data generated from research funded by 
federal dollars (Boettiger & Bennett, 2006).   
 
 
The Bayh-Dole Act: forging university-industry alliances 
 The notion of a technological triumvirate can be gleaned from a paper entitled 
‘Science and neoliberal globalization: a political sociological approach’ by Moore et 
al (2011).  The authors (2011: 510; my emphasis) specifically correlate the growth of 
a ‘knowledge economy’ (representing my hard and soft technology concepts) with 
‘new patterns of university-industry relations’ as one way to understand the complex 
changes associated with ‘neoliberal’ (representing my control technology concept) 
globalization and science.  The authors go on to state that in light of the decline of 
Fordist production processes in industrialized countries in the post-World War II 
period, the state became increasingly preoccupied with the creation and utilization of 
science-intensive knowledge industries like ‘information technology’, 
‘nanotechnology’, and ‘biotechnology’ (see also Nelson, 2001), as an alternative 
means to propel the global economic position of the state in an increasingly 
competitive and globalizing economy (see OECD, 1996; St. George, 2006; Vallas & 
Kleinman, 2008)
139
.  Moore et al (2011) write that concerns with the industrial 
competitiveness of the US in the post-World War II period were facilitated by 
growing pressure on American industries to innovate, and these concerns were 
subsequently amplified by the central neoliberal policy of ‘trade liberalization’.  
Crucially, the university was seen as a pivotal player in industrial innovation because 
                                                 
137
 However, both a knowledge economy and neoliberalism are ‘technological’ in the context of the 
current technology concepts framework.  Here, a knowledge economy is ‘technological’ in the laypersons sense of 
the term.    
138
 The Act is named after the then sponsoring US senators Birch Bayh of the American state of Indiana, 
and Bob Dole of the state of Kansas.  
139
 Industry’s (or more specifically biotechnology’s) sizable contribution to the US economy is 
highlighted at: http://www.bio.org/speeches/pubs/ernstyoung.pdf (last accessed 7/29/2012); for a historical 
analysis of the rise in the post-World War II period of the pharmaceutical industry, in the context of a transnational 
corporation, see Tyfield (2008). 
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it is a major producer of such science-intensive knowledge (Sampat, 2006; Thornton, 
2009).  Consequently, the university saw sharp increases in its funding from industry 
to advance university research and development (R&D) (Moore et al, 2011).  Indeed, 
Moore et al (2011) cite striking data showing comparable amounts of expenditure by 
both the ‘state’ and ‘industry’ on academic R&D between the period 1950 to 1980.  
However, from 1980 onwards, their data shows that industry expenditure on 
university R&D doubled, whilst state expenditure remained constant – a trend 
consistent with the data presented by Tyfield (2008).  This doubling of expenditure on 
university R&D by industry is coincident with 
 
new intellectual property regimes [that] facilitated the repositioning of universities as 
engines of the new knowledge economy.  In the United States, the passage of the 
Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 (which facilitated university ownership of intellectual 
property) and the Supreme Court decision of Diamond v. Chakrabarty (also in 1980, 
which enabled the patenting of life) correspond temporally with the Reagan 
revolution and the emergence of the roll-back phase of neoliberalism.  (Moore et al, 
2011: 511) 
 
Therefore, in a new collective culture of an increased emphasis on industry 
funding for university research (Bercovitz & Feldmann, 2006; Moore et al, 2011), the 
imperative of industrial competitiveness, as well as revenue opportunities from the 
practice of technology transfer (see later), these new intellectual property regimes saw 
the university begin to ‘systematize relationships with industry’ via the 
entrepreneurial establishment of technology transfer offices (Moore et al, 2011: 511).  
The popular IP regime that is the Bayh-Dole Act
140
, which paved the way for the 




, is well 
chronicled in a paper by Sampat (2006), which we now turn to. 
  
                                                 
140
 Aside from the Bayh-Dole Act, Birch (2006: 8) tabulates a number of other policy moves (or 
‘competitiveness policy initiatives’) – alluded to in this chapter’s opening citation from by Olssen and Peters 
(2005: 313) – that reinforced the commercialization of publicly funded research.  Moreover, these policies were 
mostly implemented during the neoliberal administration of former US Republican President Ronald Reagan.  
They include: the Small Business Innovation Development Act of 1982; the National Cooperative Research Act of 
1984; the Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986; and the Biotechnology Process Patent Act of 1995.    
141
 I say ‘prolific practice’ in specific reference to a modern day trend; see, for example, Downing 
(2005) who traces university copyright law back to the 18th century when copyright served to distinguish and 
protect authorial ideas from authorial expressions.  Whereas copyright essentially assigned ownership to the 
professor’s expressions as manifested in a given written work, ideas, on the other hand, were free to circulate in 
the common expanding knowledge base of the university.  What distinguishes the university as a non-profit 
organization from industry is the fact the former was granted a ‘law of exception’ that barred the university from 
claiming ownership of a professor’s copyright.     
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In light of the massive increase in federal R&D funds awarded to the industrial 
sector in the post-World War II period, Sampat (2006) states that there was a 
contentious debate over who should, at the end of the day, obtain the rights to patents 
resulting from federally funded research – the government, or the recipient 
corporation
142
.  One camp of politicians believed that patents for federally funded 
research should remain in the public domain because the fruits of such labor were 
financed by taxpayer money, and that handing patents over to industry would not only 
‘give away’ these fruits, but would bolster the technological and economic might of 
the recipient industry.  The other camp favored handing patent rights to industry 
because they argued that it would allow industry to commercialize useful discoveries 
and inventions financed by federally funded research.  Sampat (2006) highlights 
another contentious issue during this era: lack of a standardized patent policy across 
various federal agencies.  After World War II, each federal R&D funding agency had 
its own specific patent policies, which created a great deal of confusion for 
contractors and government employees.  This scenario was cemented by each of the 
administrations of US Presidents Kennedy and Nixon who both believed that agency-
specific policies were appropriate in light of the individualized patent missions of 
each agency (Sampat, 2006).  Prior to the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act, universities 
wishing to obtain rights to patents resulting from federally funded research had to 
negotiate with the individual funding agency for an Institutional Patent Agreement 
(IPA) (Sampat et al, 2003) – a bureaucratic process that did not necessarily grant 
exclusive rights
143
.   
However, the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act in 1980 provided a standardized 
and expedited patent policy process for the university (and small businesses) that 
                                                 
142
 During this period, and indeed throughout much of the 20th century, universities were historically 
reluctant to engage in patent and licensing activity largely due to the fear that such a practice would erode their 
historic institutional mission of public knowledge dissemination and ‘open science’ (Sampat, 2006).   
143
 Sampat (2006) reports that the IPA was introduced in 1968, and was the predecessor of the Bayh-
Dole Act of 1980.  The IPA was enacted following the results of two reports released in 1968 – one by the US 
General Accounting Office (US GAO) and the other by the consulting firm Harbridge House – that examined the 
federal patenting policy in the context of university-pharmaceutical company collaborations in the 1940s and 
1950s.  Then, pharmaceutical companies often screened novel therapeutic compounds on behalf of the university 
that discovered them, using federal funds from the National Institute of Health (NIH).  Occasionally, depending on 
the patent policy of the university, a collaborating pharmaceutical company would be granted exclusive rights to 
develop and market a researched compound.  However, this practice was frozen in 1962 by the Department of 
Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) when they enforced universities to have collaborating pharmaceutical 
companies sign formal patent agreements that barred companies the rights to patents resulting from technologies 
discovered on NIH funds.  The US GAO and Harbridge House criticized this move by HEW because they argued 
that this ruling disincentivized pharmaceutical companies from screening compounds because the companies 
would be unable to obtain the rights to patents for their in-house work.  The IPA was essentially a compromise on 
the part of HEW in that it preserved universities’ full rights to patents whilst allowing them to license their patents 
(hence grant some control of their research) to pharmaceutical companies.           
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granted them full rights to patents resulting from research funded by any federal 
agency in addition to the freedom to license patents on an exclusive or non-exclusive 
basis (Sampat et al, 2003; Sampat, 2006).  The Act was introduced without much 
resistance because of the increased emphasis at the time on US competitiveness, as 
highlighted by the journal Science (1979: 479; cited in Sampat, 2006) who wrote that 
‘industrial innovation has become a buzzword in bureaucratic circles … the patent 
transfer people have latched onto the issue’.  As Sampat (2006) notes, the Act largely 
relieved any stigma previously associated with the business aspect of university 
patenting and licensing, as well as any potential political embarrassment associated 
with university patenting that prevailed throughout much of the 20
th
 century.  The 
Bayh-Dole Act heralded a new era of university ‘entrepreneurialism’144 and 
‘economic dynamism’ that was especially pertinent at a time when the state was 
preoccupied with propelling its position in an increasingly competitive global 
economy (Sampat, 2006: 780).   
Sampat (2006) presents statistical data on two indicators – ‘technology 
transfer’ and ‘university patenting’ – which are essentially barometers for Bayh-Dole 
Act usage by the university.  Sampat (2006) presents compelling empirical data 
showing a clear correlation between the introduction of the Bayh-Dole Act in 1980 
and an upsurge in the year of entry for university technology transfer activity.  
Similarly, Tyfield (2008) reports an eightfold increase in university technology 
transfer offices between 1980 and 1995.  Additional empirical data presented by 
Sampat (2006) shows a similar trend for the practice of university patenting.  It was 
an insignificant practice prior to and throughout the 1970s, and then – coincident with 
the introduction of the Bayh-Dole Act in 1980 – mushroomed to nearly 1,600 
university patent applications in the 1990s from less than 100 prior to the 1970s.  
Consistent with this trend, Tyfield (2008) reports three consecutive doublings of 
university patents in the periods 1979-1984, 1984-1999, and 1989-1997.  In terms of 
revenue, and according to a survey conducted by the Association of University 
Technology Managers (AUTM), universities in 1991 earned close to $200 million in 
license revenues – a value that has increased seven-fold since that time (Sampat, 
2006).   
                                                 
144
 For compelling empirical evidence of university entrepreneurialism, see the anthropological work of 
Vallas and Kleinman (2008) who, researching in the context of university-industry alliances, publish interview 
excerpts of scholars and researchers working in the university or industry. 
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Vallas and Kleinman (2008: 289) cite how ‘state policies’, with an earlier 
mention of the Bayh-Dole Act, contributed to the ‘co-evolution of previously separate 
organizational fields’ in reference to academic and corporate science; in other words, 
the forging of university-industry alliances.  Examples of such a trend include: the 
popular establishment of small start-up pharmaceutical research firms by former 
university faculty; the rise of collaborative scientific research initiatives between the 
university and industry, as reflected for example in the increase in the volume of 
publications co-authored by university and industry researchers; and the greater 
mobility between the university and industry as exemplified in the practice of the 
latter recruiting young PhDs, or undergraduate students for summer internships, from 
the former.  This is just a sampling, Vallas and Kleinman (2008) note
145
, of the many 
new and distinct ways in which the university and industry have forged alliances.  
Furthermore, such university-industry alliances, or at least the greater breadth and 
volume of them in the last few decades, were undoubtedly an outgrowth of the 
university’s exploitation of the Bayh-Dole Act.   
 
Crucially, drawing on my discussions in Chapter 3 about economic rivalry, 
one would think that the patenting of university internal research data, spurred by the 
Bayh-Dole Act and other likeminded neoliberal policy initiatives, essentially confers 
a degree of rivalry to the patented knowledge.  This is so because consumption by the 
researcher from the university research lab that holds the patent rights to a given 
knowledge creates a situation where they inhibit simultaneous consumption of this 
very same knowledge by all those who do not hold the patent rights to it (unless the 
patent holder(s) authorizes use of their patented knowledge by some or all 
individuals).  Such a scenario has serious ramifications for knowledge dissemination 
in the context of learning in the university research lab because patented knowledge in 
this context is sequestered from the public sphere of academe.  Indeed, Johns (2006) 
draws on sociologist of science Robert Merton’s classic ‘norms’ of scientific conduct 
(1942)
146
 to claim that ‘communalism’ (essentially the degree of non-rivalry of a 
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 See also Phan and Siegel (2006); online resource from the Rensselaer Working Papers in Economics 
available at: http://ideas.repec.org/p/rpi/rpiwpe/0609.html (last accessed 7/29/2012).  
146
 These norms include: universalism, which refers to transcending various boundaries – gender, race, 
age, cultural makeup, etc. – in order for scientists to equally participate in scientific research; disinterestedness 
refers to the objective and unselfish undertaking, and goal, of scientific research; communalism is the expected 
culture of sharing scientific ideas, methods, and results, within the scientific community; and organized skepticism 
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given piece of knowledge) is the most fundamentally implicated norm in the context 
of patenting university knowledge.  Johns (2006) argues that the incentive function to 
succeed in science has evolved from one historically based on ‘honor’ to, nowadays in 
light of university patenting, ‘economic reward’.  Furthermore, scholarly research is 
nowadays premised upon royalties earned from the practice of licensing patents, and 
not ‘reputation’ as was formerly the case (Johns, 2006).  On Merton (1942), Johns 
(2006) goes on to note that 
 
progress itself, he implied, depended on the repudiation of trade secrecy that this 
norm enshrined in the scientific community.  ‘The communism of science’, Merton 
therefore warned, ‘is incompatible with the definition of technology as ‘‘private 
property’’ in a capitalistic economy’ – and with contemporary uses of patents in 
particular (Merton 1942, p.275).  (Johns, 2006: 146) 
 
This excerpt provides a prelude, in upcoming chapters, to the types of contentious 
issues surrounding the patenting of university internal research data.   
 
 
Technology transfer: the emblem of university entrepreneurialism   
 Davidson (1971) gives a general definition of technology transfer as the 
transfer of technical information from one institution to another, with the adaptation 
and successful use of the transferred information by the recipient institution.  More 
specifically, and in the current professional context of the university, the AUTM 
captures the commercial potential of technology transfer by defining it as ‘the process 
whereby inventions or IP from academic research are licensed or conveyed through 
use rights to industry’ (AUTM, 1998: 3; cited in Carlsson & Fridh, 2002).  This 
definition clearly encompasses the university’s enactment of the Bayh-Dole Act.  It is 
no surprise, then, and consistent with the data presented above, that the explosive 
growth in the number of TTOs in American universities is concurrent with the 
introduction of the Bayh-Dole Act in 1980; university TTOs soared from 25 in 1980 
to 200 in 1990 to, nowadays, where almost all universities have a TTO (Nelson, 
2001).   
Whereas the Bayh-Dole Act represents the immaterial policy arm of the 
university IP process, it is the university TTO and its staff that represent the material 
                                                                                                                                            
refers to the democratic critique and scrutiny of one’s own and that of fellow scientists’ research, particularly in 
light of the preceding norms (Bencze et al, 2007). 
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arm through which the Bayh-Dole Act is enacted.  The university TTO – the physical 
office space located within the university campus that conducts actual technology 
transfer (Carlsson & Fridh, 2002; Phan & Siegel, 2006
147
) – provides the appropriate 
administrative and legal infrastructure required to manage the application, 
maintenance, and licensure of university patents, and the university’s IP portfolio in 
general.  Carlsson and Fridh (2002) employ a comprehensive empirical study 
comprising mail questionnaires and telephone interviews with several American 
university TTOs to better understand the technology transfer process.  From the many 
universities examined in their study, Carlsson and Fridh (2002) report that a given 
technology transfers process typically commences with the submission by a university 
researcher of an ‘invention disclosure form’ to the university TTO.  On receipt of this 
form, the TTO assesses the economic risk-benefit ratio of the application, taking into 
account such factors as the cost of IP
148
 protection of the information in question, as 
well as the potential economic gains that could ensue from licensing the IP.  Drawing 
on their empirical data, Carlsson and Fridh (2002) construct a general, four-stage 
protocol for how the university typically obtains an IP license, once IP for a given 
internal research data has been obtained.  We now take a look at this protocol, with 
each stage contextualized in accord with my own profession (in italics): 
 
1. Confidentiality or Non-Disclosure Agreement (NDA) (1-2 days).  
This is a legal contract between the university and industry that 
stipulates the disclosure of confidential information (pertaining to the 
IP in question) between the two parties, but not to third parties.  This 
disclosure allows substantive negotiations between the two parties to 
                                                 
147
 Online resource from the Rensselaer Working Papers in Economics available at:  
http://ideas.repec.org/p/rpi/rpiwpe/0609.html (last accessed 7/29/2012).  
148
 The TTO at the University of California at Irvine delineates four primary types of IP, any of which 
the website suggests may be filed by the university.  Patents are granted by the US government to provide 
exclusive rights (usually for a period of 20 years) to an inventor (of a pharmaceutical drug, e.g.) in exchange for 
public disclosure of the invention.  However, the patent-protected invention is protected from unlawful use in the 
public domain insofar as the ‘right conferred by the patent grant is the right to exclude others from making, using, 
offering for sale, or selling the invention in the US’.  Copyright is a form of protection granted by the US 
government to ‘original works of authorship’ – published or unpublished – that encompasses literary, dramatic, 
musical, artistic, and certain other intellectual works, and more specifically includes items as wide-ranging as 
maps, architectural depictions, computer programs, photographs, and motion pictures, for example.  Copyright law 
generally allows the copyright holder to reproduce and disseminate their copyrighted work among the general 
public.  Trademarks are a type of branding in the form of a ‘service mark’ that exclusively tags a tradable item (or 
service) as having a unique source or origin, and which distinguishes the trademarked item from goods provided 
by others.  A trade secret is highly lucrative information – such as a ‘formula, pattern, compilation, program, 
device, method, technique, or process’ – the potentially high economic value of which is preserved when its 
secrecy is maintained, otherwise it could be exploited by others.  (Source: http://www.ota.uci.edu/fac_intellect.htm 
- last accessed 7/29/2012.)   
Stewart Craig; 9610118 
77 
 
take place.  In the current professional context, the confidential 
information conveyed by the NDA could be internal research data that 
details the molecular structure and mechanisms of a novel drug that 
effectively cures a debilitating human disease. Such information is 
highly lucrative because of its obvious commercial value to alleviate 
human suffering and potentially save human lives.  Therefore, the 
confidentiality of the document detailing the drug must be 
contractually secured by the NDA so as to avoid appropriation of the 
data by competitors who could exploit the information before our lab 
is able to do so.     
 
2. Business Plan.  This document confirms for the university the 
intellectual, economic and technical resources of the licensee.  Such 
resources are essential to successfully exploit the IP in question into a 
commercially viable product.  In the current professional context, the 
university TTO may investigate the financial history and commercial 
success of the pharmaceutical company Novartis as a potential 
licensee of our IP.  The TTO may investigate various aspects of 
Novartis’s operations in their assessment of Novartis as a suitable 
licensee, including: intellectual and practical capabilities to optimize 
the drug’s mode of action, as well as to refine its bioavailability, and 
to lengthen its physiological stability in the patient; processing plant 
capabilities to successfully scale-up manufacture of the drug; and 
marketing capabilities to successfully advertise the manufactured drug 
to physicians and the general public. 
         
3.  License Term Sheet.  This document outlines the tentative agreement 
of the terms (including economic) of the proposed license.  In the 
current professional context, this may include the explicit cost to 
Novartis of licensing our IP that contains the blueprint for the drug, as 
well as agreed royalty payments to the inventor and our university that 
arise from eventual sales of the drug (see Rai & Eisenberg, 2003). 
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4. License Agreement (weeks to several years).  This final document in 
the process incorporates both the economic and other terms of the 
License Term Sheet including the university’s general licensing terms 
and conditions.  The authors’ study reveals that a TTO licensing 
associate and the inventor are typically involved in the negotiations 
required by this document.  Carlsson and Fridh (2002) report that one 
university TTO adopted a proactive role in seeking potential licensees 
through, for example, reaching out to potential corporate clients; this is 
consistent with Etzkovitz and Goktepe (2005: 4; my emphasis) who 
state that the TTO evolved ‘from a relatively passive entity focused on 
legal aspects of patenting to a proactive focus on marketing’.  In the 
current professional context, this final document solidifies the 
technical and economic agreement between Novartis and our 
university regarding the licensing of the IP containing the blueprint for 
our drug.  It may involve negotiations between Novartis, our university 
(as represented by our university’s TTO), and the principal 
investigator of our lab in which the original drug discovery was made. 
 
As we can see, the university TTO is the crucial connection that links the 
university – historically perceived to be a non-profit entity – to the corporate world; 
indeed, Macho-Stadler et al (2007) state that the creation of a TTO within the 
university is instrumental for developing university-industry relations.  From the 
above empirical data of Carlsson and Fridh (2002), we see that the university 
technology transfer process is a laborious one.  It is a multi stage process that can 
potentially prolong for several years, especially at the final stage of License 
Agreement.  Furthermore, each stage of the process appears to be deeply entrenched 
in complex administrative, legal, and economic matters that demand specialist 
resources from the university; along these lines, Bercovitz and Feldmann (2006: 175) 
note the ‘economic, social, and political influences that shape the ability of 
universities to both create new knowledge and deploy that knowledge in ways that are 
economically useful to firms’.  The pivotal importance of technology transfer to the 
university is underscored by the fact that the university’s annual budget for patenting 
and licensing activities can be as high as $2 million, and that the director of the TTO 
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reports directly to prominent members of the university such as the Vice President for 
Research or the Provost (Carlsson & Fridh, 2002).   
All the above university activities in the context of technology transfer are 
emblematic of university entrepreneurialism.  Consequently, the boundaries become 
blurred between the university as a strict academic institution, and industry as a strict 
commercial enterprise: 
 
universities assume entrepreneurial tasks such as commercializing inventions … 
companies take on academic roles such as sharing knowledge among each other and 
with universities. (Etzkovitz & Goktepe, 2005: 2) 
 
University entrepreneurialism in the context of technology transfer gives us a flavor 
of the type of fundamental change that the university has experienced in 
postmodernity, and which we explore in more detail in the next chapter.   
 
 Before wrapping up this section, I want to draw on Bercovitz and Feldmann 
(2006) who construct a conceptual framework comprising economic, social, and 
political forces that govern knowledge-based economic development in the context of 
technology transfer.  The social input of their model comprises the ‘individual 
researcher’, which is equivalent to my lab researcher role as part of my dual 
professional responsibilities as a ‘lab researcher’ and ‘lab educator’ in the university 
research lab.  Bercovitz and Feldmann (2006) note that the neoliberal ‘tightening of 
university budgets and competition for the relatively fixed pool of public funding 
create incentives for scientists to engage in entrepreneurial activity’ (Bercovitz & 
Feldmann, 2006: 180); i.e., technology transfer
149
.  Here, we see the manifestation in 
the university research lab of the neoliberal control technology of ‘responsibilising 
the self’ (see chapter 4) – highlighting the permeation of neoliberal control 
technologies across all aspects of contemporary life.   
That the university lab researcher is forced to ‘responsibilise’ herself was 
obvious the very instant I was handed a lab notebook upon beginning my job.  What 
was once a humble notebook intended for the scientist to objectively record her 
experimental data has evolved into a highly-prized ‘book of ideas’ that is additionally 
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 Indeed, engagement in technology transfer is incentivized by the university TTO with royalty 
distributions.  For example, see the University of Arizona’s royalty distribution policy at: 
http://www.ott.arizona.edu/content/royalty-distribution-policy (last accessed 7/29/2012); notice how the university 
lab researcher is seen by the university in an entrepreneurial light – i.e., as ‘inventor’.      
Stewart Craig; 9610118 
80 
 
intended for the scientist to subjectively record, in meticulous detail, all her 
experimental hypotheses and ideas.  That way – as it was explicitly made known to all 
new lab personnel during lab notebook training – there would be no legal ambiguity 
in the eyes of patent attorneys regarding which individual or institution thought of a 
potentially patentable idea first.  Indeed, the first few pages of the lab notebook are 
laden with the language of technology transfer – it includes terms like ‘information 
ownership’, ‘rights’, ‘property’, and ‘patenting’.   
But there is resistance among some university lab researchers towards the 
practice of patenting.  Bercovitz and Feldmann (2006) shed light on some of the 
social forces that influence whether or not a researcher engages in technology 
transfer.  For example, drawing on Thursby and Thursby (2002), Bercovitz and 
Feldmann (2006) cite three potential barriers to this practice on the part of the lab 
researcher working in American higher education: 1) a reluctance to engage in the 
necessary R&D that is sometimes demanded by some industry buyers of academic 
research; 2) publication delays on research data that are necessary to lure potential 
industry buyers (because presumably publication prior to patenting renders the 
research vulnerable to copying); and 3) the general feeling that technology transfer 
represents an inappropriate commercialization of science that prioritizes patenting 
over publication of research data.  These contentious issues, and others, will be 
explored in more detail in Chapter 7.   
 
 
Hard, soft, control: the ‘technological triumvirate’ 
 We now close this chapter, and this first phase of the dissertation, by revisiting 
the key concepts of preceding chapters to show how these concepts collectively 
cultivated the conditions that led to the formation of a technological triumvirate of 
university-industry alliances: 
 
 First, empirical evidence presented in Chapter 3 provides a clear role for ICTs 
in the transition in the late 20
th
 century of society to a knowledge-based economy.  
Chapter 3 further argues that the archetypal hard ICTs of the TV and the radio, 
telephone, satellite, and PC, helped pave the way for a knowledge economy in the 
context of the university because they collectively provide an increased capacity to 
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store and manipulate internal research data
150
.  Increased knowledge storage and 
manipulation, recall, constitute the first two criteria of my threefold heightened 
knowledge conveyance framework – a prerequisite for labeling a given technology an 
‘ICT’.  I proposed that the TV and the radio, in particular, through their continual 
broadcast of knowledge-containing programs like news and documentaries, helped 
cultivate in the university a cultural ethos (albeit largely implicit) of the transition of 
society to a knowledge economy.  This was key for the university’s political, 
economical, and cultural preparedness and restructuring for the then approaching 
knowledge economy. 
 
Second, drawing on Chapter 3, the cognate soft technology of each of these 
hard ICTs helped pave the way for a knowledge economy in the context of the 
university because they provide an increased capacity to disseminate internal 
research data.  Increased knowledge dissemination, which constitutes the third 
criterion of my threefold heightened knowledge conveyance framework of ICTs, is 
mediated by a given soft technology (e.g., radio waves in the case of the hard 
technology that is the satellite).  ICT-mediated heightened knowledge conveyance 
provides fertile ground for a knowledge economy because it fuels the scarcity-defying 
nature of knowledge thereby rendering it a forever available, abundant, mobile, and, 
within the context of IP law, lucrative global commodity.  Recall from closing 
arguments in Chapter 3, that the cognate soft technology of the above hard 
technologies, because of their ability to render knowledge weightless, were 
collectively the key catalyst that triggered the transition of an economy that 
historically has always partly been based upon the production and sale of 
knowledge – including that during the industrial revolution – to a literal 
‘knowledge economy’ as we know it today.  Hence, hard and soft technologies that 
gave rise to a knowledge economy set the technological stage for the technological 
triumvirate.    
 
Third, drawing on Chapter 4, the political doctrine of neoliberalism is a 
paradoxical control technology.  It is ‘paradoxical’ because while neoliberalism 
supposedly represents a revival of the main tenets of the democratic political 
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 Relative to knowledge conveyed by the conventional means of a textbook in an era that predates the 
advent of ICTs; for example, the industrial revolution. 
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movement of classical liberalism, it is, unbeknownst to the public, a control 
technology that undemocratically controls the individual along the lines of a strict 
state-fabricated free-market order that instrumentally reduces the individual 
(including lab educator and student) to a mere ‘standing reserve’ (Heidegger’s 
concept, 1977).  Therefore, the individual is controlled by the neoliberal state as a 
means, or ‘standing reserve’, for the neoliberal state end of optimal market efficiency, 
with a consequential reduction in state expenditure, as well as propulsion of the state’s 
ranking in the highly competitive global capitalist economy.  Hence, the control 
technology of neoliberalism set the political stage for the technological triumvirate. 
   
Fourth, and finally, and drawing on this chapter, exploitation by the university 
of a knowledge economy through the sale of its select internal research data, in the 
context of the past (and present) pervasive neoliberal culture of privatization, has 
become a dominant trend in higher education in late 20
th
 century.  Crucially, the 
neoliberal policy of the Bayh-Dole Act, enacted by the university’s TTO, propelled 
the university to the position of primary purveyor of its IP to industry; this opened the 
doors of the university to additional entrepreneurial ventures with industry, and the 
technological triumvirate of university-industry alliances was born. 
 
Thus, the university’s sale of its select internal research data as IP, and the 
licensing of this IP to industry, may be conceived as a product of our technologizing 
world.  The impact of this practice on everyday learning in the university research lab 
– the very sphere from which the knowledge in question is sourced – is explored in 
Chapter 7.  But first we turn to Chapter 6 to explore how university-industry alliances 
and attendant postmodern forces have seriously brought into question the historically 
perceived notion of the university as a public institution.  These postmodern forces 
have collectively given rise to a nowadays fundamentally reconfigured institution that 
we may refer to as the ‘postmodern university’ (see, e.g., Smith & Webster, 1997), 

















Local to the global:  











The University of Excellence serves nothing other than itself, another corporation in 
a world of transnationally exchanged capital.  (Readings, 1996: 43) 
 
his chapter opens with an epigram from Bill Readings’ influential 
book The University in Ruins (1996).  Readings captures the 
profound structural changes occurring to the modern university in a 
society that has succumbed to the forces of global capitalism.  He refuses to call 
today’s university ‘postmodern’, instead opting for ‘posthistorical’ to more accurately 
reflect the notion that the university has outlived itself
151
.  A common theme of the 
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 Readings’ (1996) stance that the contemporary university has ‘outlived’ itself may be warranted 
when one exclusively examines (as Readings does) the philosophical evolution of the university over time from its 
inception to the current day, otherwise such a viewpoint seems overly radical.  Furthermore, the fact that Readings 
rejects the notion of the contemporary university being ‘postmodern’ is entirely contrary to my own upcoming 
T 
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posthistorical university is the ‘University of Excellence’, which Readings (1996) 
defines as a ‘techno-bureaucratic institution’ that ultimately evolved from, and hence 
betrays, the ideals of Humboldt’s ‘University of Culture’ rooted in German idealism.  
Readings argues that ‘excellence’ is a ‘non-referent’, or arbitrary term, that forces all 
aspects of the university to be measured along corporate, rather than intellectual, 
lines.   
Readings’ epigram also captures the highly globalized world that we now 
occupy; the increasing global presence of the university
152
 – the notion of which is 
reflected in the title to this chapter – is no exception to this trend.  In short, we are 
witnessing the radical evolution of the university from a public nation-state-centric 
institution to nowadays (on many levels) a private global-centric business.  It is this 
marked evolution that, I believe, has given rise to the postmodern university – the 
central argument of the chapter.   
 
 
The university as a historical public sphere 
In this section of the chapter I draw a crucial, and as we will see later striking, 
parallel between the bourgeois public sphere – a concept formulated by Habermas in 
The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere ([1962] 1991)
153
 – and the public 
sphere of the university
154.  ‘Public sphere’ has many, often competing, philosophical 
connotations
155
, but my use of it here is narrow and specific.  It is my reference to the 
historical perception of the university as a non-profit academic institution that is, for 
the most part, free from any sort of corporate agenda
156
.  Indeed, Thornton (2009: 
                                                                                                                                            
argument that is compellingly premised and which, crucially, draws on the founding figure of postmodernism, 
Jean-Franҫois Lyotard (1984).     
152
 An important distinction should be noted here, for Eckel et al (2004) state that the university is both 
‘old hand’ and ‘newcomer’ to globalization.  It is ‘old hand’ because of its commitment to the global content of its 
curricula, as well as the international mobility of its students and faculty; the university is ‘newcomer’ to 
globalization in the many ways that we will explore in the course of this chapter.       
153 Habermas’s (1991) primary purpose of this work was to make people cognizant of the apparent 
erosion to the critical public sphere in contemporary consumerist culture (Gestrich, 2006).   
154
 The historical emergence of the American university is the product of a variety of international 
influences that can be traced primarily to an original colonial model imported from England that was combined 
with the German research university idea introduced in the 19th century; see Altbach, 2004.  See also Gould (2003) 
who cites the US Morrall Acts of 1862 and 1890 that enabled the creation of land-grant institutions.     
155
 See, for example, Parkinson (2006).  
156
 My use of ‘corporate agenda’ refers to the specific and narrow research, production, and marketing 
goals of a given corporation; for example, the corporate agenda of the pharmaceutical company Novartis Vaccines 
(i.e., ‘industry’) is to focus on the design, manufacture, and marketing of a narrow selection of vaccines to prevent 
various human diseases.  Here, industry operating under the framework of capitalism has a discriminatory 
research agenda because the specialized nature of corporate products, and the narrow demographics to which they 
are targeted, funnels the research down a specific narrow path.  The university, on the other hand, is apparently 
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376; my emphasis) argues that ‘for centuries, the university has been viewed as the 
custodian of culture, the seat of higher learning and the paradigmatic site of free 
enquiry’; similarly, Readings (1996: 6) states that the ‘university … exists to inculcate 
the exercise of critical judgment’.  Using Habermas (1991) as a framework, I aim to 
identify partial erosion of the ‘public sphere’ of the university research lab as a result 
of the university’s engagement in technology transfer.  Recall, technology transfer is 
part product of the hard and soft technologies of a knowledge economy, and the 
control technology of neoliberalism; indeed, Marginson (2005) specifically cites the 
market-driven forces of a ‘knowledge economy’ and ‘neoliberalism’ as testing the 
university’s degree of ‘publicness’. 
Before proceeding, we should note that Parkinson (2006) makes an important 
distinction between the ‘metaphorical’, versus the ‘physical’, public space157, where 
the former is often embraced by the field of social theory, and includes specific 
examples like the media, internet, and social networks.  Parkinson (2006: 1) 
appreciates the advantage of the metaphorical public space because ‘members of 
large-scale, complex societies cannot all gather together in a physical forum to argue, 
deliberate and decide’.  Moreover, he highlights the potential of the metaphorical 
public space to unveil implicit power disparities that are inscribed in spatial forms.   
But Parkinson’s (2006) paper is a call for the re-appreciation of the physical 
public space, which, according to him, has been forgotten in light of all the hype over 
the metaphorical public space.  Parkinson argues that the ‘physical public space 
matters because of the functional necessity of physical arenas for democratic action’ 
(Parkinson, 2006: 1).  Moreover, I would like to point out that many metaphorical 
public spaces are dependent on, and grounded in, a specific physical public space
158
.  
                                                                                                                                            
free from any sort of ‘corporate agenda’ because its research goals are open and multidisciplinary; they span, in a 
given university, several schools of thought or ‘faculty’, under which there are several departments, within which 
the research is broken down into numerous sub-specialties.  Furthermore, the trajectory of university research has 
historically been (for the most part) geared towards open and free intellectual inquiry whereby researchers are 
entirely free to apply for federal funding to finance their own personal research interests – free from corporate 
steerage.  So, although there may be (like industry operating under a capitalist framework) discriminatory research 
at the individual university researcher level, it is not the case if we look at the multidisciplinary nature of the 
university at the institutional level.  Crucially, the university’s free, open, and non-discriminatory research agenda, 
in addition to its open capacity for intellectual discussion and debate, rightly renders it the major (perhaps ultimate) 
‘public sphere’ of society. 
157
 For the purpose of this chapter, ‘public space’ is synonymous with the ‘public sphere’.   
158
 But not all metaphorical public spaces are grounded in a physical public space.  For example, a real-
time internet forum comprising a multinational group of individuals debating about politics represents a 
metaphorical public space, but such a space is not grounded in a physical one.  For the participants are not, and 
were not, a physical collective in the same close proximity (i.e., the notion on which a physical public space is 
premised); rather, the participants are located – as spatially separated individuals – at their respective computers 
with which they are using to partake in the forum.  
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For example, the metaphorical public space of the virtual, online learning forums for 
this EdD programme
159
 – shared by myself, my peers, and my professors – depends 
on the physical public space of the university boardroom wherein the forums were 
originally conceived among the directors of the EdD programme.  Mindful of this 
distinction, we now take a look at Habermas’s bourgeois public sphere, before 
applying it to the current professional context of the university research lab.       
 
In the period prior to the emergence of a public sphere (around the 17
th
 century 
and prior), Habermas (1991) argues, the then feudal state sought to represent itself 
through art and culture (Duvenage, 2005).  This totalitarian state essentially sought to 
represent itself to the public through hierarchal symbols of social status (as opposed to 
words), that included the wearing of certain insignia (badges, arms); adhering to a 
strict noble etiquette (formal protocols of social conduct); and engaging in formal 
discourse (formal addresses to the people) (Habermas, 1991).  In this so-called 
representative public sphere, the ‘“lord” was “public” by virtue of representation’ 
(Habermas, 1991: 13); anything of a lower social status to the lord (i.e., the general 
public) was simply not represented (Habermas, 1991).  The striking hierarchy 
between the state as ‘ruler’, and the individual as ‘ruled’, is underscored by Gestrich 
(2006) who notes that 
 
in the early modern period the people functioned merely as an ‘environment’ for the 
ruler’s demonstration of splendor and power. Their political participation was 
reduced to the role of bystanders in the streets, when the princes ‘represented their 
lordship not for but “before” the people’. (Gestrich, 2006: 416; quoting Habermas, 
1991: 8)  
 
Therefore, the representative public sphere did not constitute an actual physical social 
realm or public sphere as such (Habermas, 1991); rather, its function was to provide a 
mere platform for the spectacle of the state’s authority (Nathans, 1990). 
Habermas (1991) traces the emergence of the public sphere to around the 17
th
 
century when a bourgeois constitutional state emerged against the backdrop of a 
                                                 
159
 ‘Public’, that is, to all the members of the EdD program who are free to express their intellectual 
thoughts on any subject, in any forum, at any time.  So the meaning of ‘public’ does not extend to the entire 
human, or even school, population because every public space apparently has a philosophical demarcation that 
defines a certain predefined group of individuals that are admitted to, and can be entirely ‘public’ within, a 
specified public space.  In the current example, that predefined group of individuals is the ‘EdD community’ who 
are ‘public’ in the context of the EdD program.  When I say ‘are “public”’, I mean that there is, within the public 
space of the EdD community, a presupposed democratic ‘freedom of expression without restraint’ that is free 
insofar as it operates under an assumed commonsensical culture of respect and social etiquette.   
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burgeoning capitalist order.  It is no surprise, then, that the awaking of a public sphere 
– which essentially embodies a democratic culture of rational discussion and debate – 
is coincident with the emergence of the democratic political movement of classical 
liberalism in the 17
th
 century (see Chapter 4).  Essentially, a bourgeois public 
sphere
160
 arose in the modern era from a representative public sphere in the feudal era 
(Duvenage, 2005).  Other forces that helped precipitate the formation of a public 
sphere included the granting of private property rights to individuals, which allowed 
the individual to assert their authority as ‘property owner’; an increase in political 
debate; a rollback of press censorship; an opening of the doors of parliamentary 
sessions, first to the press, and then to the general public; and the growth in the 
number of sociocultural venues – for example, coffee houses, salons, literary journals, 
and newspapers – that enabled the general public to engage in critical discussion and 
debate (Nathans, 1990; Baynes, 1998).  Gestrich (2006) argues that Habermas (1991) 
overlooked the formation of a modern media-based printing press – and the network 
of postal routes required for its distribution – as a crucial factor in the transformation 
of early modern political culture, and in turn, the creation of a public sphere. 
Drawing on Habermas (1991), Duvenage (2005) states that the rise of the 
public sphere can be traced to two distinct phases of ‘rational-critical’ practice, the 
first of which was the literary public sphere:    
 
The identification (Empfindsamkeit) with the characters in the bourgeois novel and 
drama, the importance of a rational-aesthetical debate in salons, journals, and 
newspapers, and the educational role of the art critic all contributed to the 
institutionalization of the literary public sphere as some kind of a Vorform 
[predecessor] of the political public sphere. (Duvenage, 2005: 4) 
 
Consistent with a revived faith in democratization at the time under the political 
banner of classical liberalism, Habermas (1991; cited in Duvenage, 2005) 
distinguishes three ‘institutional criteria’ of the literary public sphere that are 
egalitarian in nature.  These included: 1) a complete ‘disregard of social status’ that 
‘far from presupposing the equality of status, disregarded status altogether’ 
(Habermas, 1991: 36); 2) a domain of ‘common concern’ whereby any subject, 
including those that were previously unchallenged, was entirely open to being probed 
at a time when the church and state were no longer seen as the ultimate source of 
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 That the ‘public sphere’ comprised primarily the bourgeois has been challenged; for example, 
Gestrich (2006) cites several scholars who believe that the bourgeois of the ‘public sphere’ more accurately 
comprised elites, civil servants, academics, and priests, and just a handful of bourgeois. 
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philosophical or aesthetic authority; and 3) ‘inclusiveness’ in the sense that any 
‘propertied and educated’ individual with access to literary material could participate 
in a debate so indiscriminate that power cliques apparently failed to form.   
That the first, literary, phase provided a forum for subjects of common 
concern that could be carried over into political discussion and public policy, led to 
the transition of the literary public sphere into the political public sphere (Nathan, 
1990; Duvenage, 2005).  The nature of the debates, instead of being of the artistic and 
literary kind that characterized the literary public sphere, were more politically 
orientated in the sense that they questioned the arbitrary political motives that began 
to shape bourgeois society at the time (Kellner, online resource
161
).  As Baynes (1998, 
online resource) writes, the political public sphere functioned ‘to restrain and 
legitimate the political power exercised by the administrative state’.  In sum, the 
public sphere bridged the private space of civil society – comprising the family, which 
shaped people through values, norms, religion and personal experience, and the 
workplace – with the realm of state power (Metzler, 1997).  The public sphere 
comprised private people who came together to engage in public rational discussion 
(Habermas, 1991).   
In the very way that capitalism created the bourgeois public sphere, it also 
precipitated its decline.  According to Habermas (1991), capitalist society transitioned 
from a culture of rational discourse, which so eloquently defined the public sphere, to 
one of passive consumption (Nathans, 1990; Duvenage, 2005).  This shift – central to 
the decline of the public sphere – occurred in the last quarter of the 20th century when 
liberal capitalism evolved into the cartels and protectionism that characterized the rise 
of contemporary capitalism (Duvenage, 2005).  Kellner (online resource) writes that 
corporations came to control and manipulate both the media and state, while the 
state’s increasing role in society dissolved the demarcation between ‘public’ and 
‘private’, resulting in a ‘refeudalization’ of society (Habermas, 1991).  The effects on 
the public sphere are profound.  Kellner (online resource) writes that in the now 
debased public sphere, ‘public opinion is administered by political, economic, and 
media elites which manage public opinion as part of systems management and social 
control’.  The decline of the public sphere is exacerbated by the economic and 
political motives of the modern mass media whose social engineering of the 
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 Available at: https://files.pbworks.com/download/vrjFrFPEqL/knowledgepublic/13684704/ 
Habermas_Public_Sphere_Democracy.pdf?ld=1 (last accessed 7/29/2012). 
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population – via advertising, marketing, and public relations, for example – shape 
voting behavior and consumption patterns among consumers (Duvenage, 2005).  Even 
the supposed democratic process of the modern political system of western nations 
has become victim to the decline of the public sphere.  Gestrich (2006) notes that the 
electorate’s reaction to political parties oscillates rather naively – hence, uncritically – 
between simple ‘acclamation’ or ‘disapproval’ in response to political campaigns that 
‘feed’ images to the electorate, as opposed to complex critical debate that 
intellectually and philosophically engages and challenges the electorate.
162
   
     
We now turn to the university which I place in relation to the bourgeois public 
sphere.  Recall that the hard and soft (Chapter 2) technologies of a knowledge 
economy (Chapter 3), and the control (Chapter 2) technology of neoliberalism 
(Chapter 4), collectively created the technological and economic conditions, 
respectively, that prompted the university to begin (in the late 20
th
 century) the routine 
sale of its select internal research data to industry.  The university practice of 
technology transfer, and other novel business alliances between the university and 
industry resulting therefrom, represents an additional source of revenue for the 
university in a neoliberal era of marketization of higher education.  But a disturbing 
new trend may be emerging as a result of university-industry alliances: ‘in higher 
education today corporations not only sponsor a growing amount of research – they 
frequently dictate the terms under which it is conducted’ (Press & Washburn, 2000: 
297). 
For example, a highly publicized and controversial case study concerns the 
University of Berkley which, in 1998, forged a multimillion dollar agreement with the 
pharmaceutical company Novartis (Press & Washburn, 2000).  Novartis agreed to pay 
the university $25 million to finance plant-based research; in exchange, Novartis was 
granted priority to negotiate licenses on a third of all research discoveries made in the 
research department – including those not financed by the Novartis deal.  
Additionally, the award of two of the five seats on the University’s research 
                                                 
162
 Despite significant contributions to many diverse scholarly disciplines, Habermas’s concept of the 
public sphere is not without its critics.  For example, a glaring deficiency of Habermas’s supposedly egalitarian 
public sphere is its exclusive bourgeois composition.  But what about the proletariat and plebian demographics 
marginalized by the public sphere (see Nagt & Kluge, 1993)?  And not to forget women who, ironically, at the 
time of Habermas’s writing were engaged in a revived social uprising (Ryan, 1992).  The answer to such 
criticisms, Kellner (online resource) writes, may lie in conceiving a multiplicity of overlapping and potentially 
conflicting public spheres that reflect new social movements and technological transformations of the time.    
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committee gave Novartis considerable leeway in deciding the academic research 
agenda (Press & Washburn, 2000)
163
.  But this could become problematic when 
industry, like Novartis, conducts and reports research that reflects its narrow 
commercial interests
164
.  A specific empirical study published in a peer-reviewed 
journal shows that 98% of drugs researched with industry funds are painted in a 
favorable light, compared to just 79% of drugs researched with non-industry funds 
(Press & Washburn, 2000).   
Press and Washburn’s disturbing report (2000)165 is peppered with numerous 
likeminded anecdotal accounts demonstrating a clear encroachment of the American 
university’s public sphere by industry.  Mindful of this encroachment, I now argue 
that the university
166





First, I propose that the public sphere of the university is theoretically and 
chronologically analogous to the literary public sphere (Habermas, 1991)
168
.  Central 
to the analogy is the notion that both actors – the bourgeois in the public sphere, and 
the university lab researcher – engage in unrestrained rational-critical discussion as a 
defining democratic characteristic of this sphere.  In the university research lab, this 
typically translates into freedom of the researcher to apply for federal funding to 
finance the research of her choosing
169
, as well as to openly discuss her internal 
research data with peers, present it at external conferences, and publish it in peer-
reviewed journals.      
  
                                                 
163
 It is these types of business alliance between the university and industry that are supplementary in 
nature to, and often ultimately stem from, university technology transfer – see Chapter 5.        
164
 This is reflected at the university institutional level with the downsizing of humanities departments 
and the upsizing of science departments, especially those that produce research that translates into commercially 
viable pharmaceuticals (see Press & Washburn, 2000; Blackmore, 2003).  See also my conception of a 
discriminatory research agenda in footnote 156.    
165
Available at: http://www.aaas.org/spp/rd/ch26.pdf (last accessed 7/29/12). 
166 More precisely, the current professional context of the university research lab; I cannot speak for 
other departments as I do not work in them.  
167
 I emphasize ‘loosely’ because my argument merely draws from the overarching points of 
Habermas’s (1991) thesis, and as such, does not capture (and therefore does not do justice to) its many 
philosophical nuances.        
168
 It appears that only the American (not the European) university is chronologically consistent with the 
emergence of a bourgeois public sphere because it emerged around the beginning of capitalism (with the exception 
of a few older institutions like Harvard University, which was founded in 1636 and therefore predates the 
beginnings of capitalism).  Indeed, Wittrock (1993; cited in Kwiek, 2000: 75) strongly alludes to the co-emergence 
of the university and capitalism when he states that ‘universities form part and parcel of the very same processes 
which manifests itself in the emergence of an industrial economic order’.   
169
 That is, within the theoretical constraints of the research department in which the researcher works.    
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 Second, I propose that the social mobilization that sparked the evolution of the 
literary public sphere into the political public sphere (Habermas, 1991) outside the 
university also occurred, by analogy, inside the university.  Indeed, Ambrozas (1998: 
online resource), in reference to the university, states that with the ‘birth of the new 
social movements during the 1960s and 1970s … politics was put on the academic 
agenda’170.  Central to the analogy is the notion that both actors become cognizant of 
and question the modus operandi.  For example, the realization among the scientific 
community that neoliberal policy sparked, at the time, an increasing dependency of 
the university on industry funding for its research in a new era of university 
entrepreneurialism (Moore et al, 2011). 
 
 Third, I conceive that industry steerage of the university research agenda, as 
reported by Press and Washburn (2000), represents a partial
171
 decline of the public 
sphere of the university that is strikingly analogous to the decline, in contemporary 
capitalism, of the bourgeois public sphere (Habermas, 1991).  Faithful to the original 
concept is the individual who evolves from a rational thinker in the bourgeois public 
sphere to a passive consumer shaped by corporate and media interests during the 
decline of the public sphere (Habermas, 1991).  By analogy, we may be witnessing 
the evolution of the university lab researcher from an intellectually creative and self-
exploratory actor – i.e., a rational thinker – in the public sphere of the university, to a 
passive actor whose research agenda is heavily predetermined by the commercial 
interests of industry
172
 in the era of the technological triumvirate of university-
industry alliances.  
 
Thus, the historical existence of the university public sphere, and what we now 
see as the partial encroachment of it by industry, is analogous to Habermas’s (1991) 
bourgeois public sphere (Habermas, 1991).  Crucially, the commonality prompting 
the decline of, or at least ‘erosion’ to, both the university and bourgeois public 
                                                 
170
 Ambrozas’ (1998) feminist critique calls for a capitalization of the increased social fragmentation and 
politicization of the contemporary university in order to assist her, and others, in the deconstruction of a pervasive 
male gender bias in what she considers to be an ‘elite’ institution.  Ambrozas’ loose analogy (1998) between the 
bourgeois public sphere and the public sphere of the university provided me with the original inspiration for this 
section of the chapter.  However, Ambrozas’ approach is quite different.  Her analogy focuses on the university as 
a whole – not the current professional context of the university research lab.  Also, her analogy is vague, unlike the 
more specific theoretical constructions that I present here.           
171
 I say ‘partial’ as to not suggest in any way that all public spheres of all universities have fully 
declined.     
172
 See footnote 156 regarding industry’s discriminatory research agenda.   
Stewart Craig; 9610118 
92 
 
spheres is late capitalism.  Late capitalism is manifested by, for example, the modern 
mass media and corporations in the case of the public sphere, and I conceive the 
political doctrine of neoliberalism in the case of the university
173
.   
The decline of the bourgeois public sphere comes with the apparent decline of 
rational-critical discourse, and hence democracy (Habermas, 1991).  In strikingly 
similar fashion, we see that the decline of the university public sphere as a result of 
technology transfer – a central expression of the technological triumvirate of 
university-industry alliances – comes with an apparent decline in democracy because 
free scientific inquiry, learning, and dissemination are, in some instances, steered by 
the overriding monetary motives of industry
174
.  Aside from this somewhat dystopian 
picture of the university being ‘victim’ to technology, it is important to realize the 
many positive contributions of technology to the promotion of democratic public 
spheres not just within the university, but beyond with the help of the internet (see, 
e.g., Bohman, 2008).  
 
Partial encroachment of the university public sphere by industry is just one of 
the many fundamental structural changes occurring in the university as a consequence 
of the technological triumvirate of university-industry alliances.  In the next section 
of the chapter, we explore other key fundamental structural changes occurring in the 
university as it adapts to the highly market-driven era of neoliberalism.  Such 
changes, I claim, collectively give rise to a fundamentally reconfigured institution that 







                                                 
173
 For neoliberalism as both an expression, and a key driver, of late capitalism, see Chapter 4.    
174
 That the unrestrained ability of the professor to perform these freedoms (which essentially equate to 
academic freedom) is inextricably tied to democracy is evident upon reading the 1940 Statement of Principles on 
Academic Freedom and Tenure of the American Association of University Professors (AAUP; see next section in 
this chapter).  In reference to academic freedom, it reads (my emphasis): ‘The common good depends upon the 
free search for truth and its free exposition … freedom in research is fundamental for the protection of the rights of 
the teacher in teaching and of the student to freedom in learning.  It carries with it duties correlative with rights’; 
full statement available at: http://www.aaup.org/AAUP/pubsres/policydocs/contents/1940statement.htm (last 
accessed 7/29/2012). 
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Characteristics of the ‘corporate university’ 
 
There may be uncertain financial times ahead for all universities, but I am confident 
we will strive forward, to the benefit of researchers, students and society, not only in 
Glasgow but also across the globe
175
.  (Principal of Glasgow University Professor 
Anton Muscatelli speaking in the university’s 2009-2010 Annual Review)  
 
Waks (2002) distinguishes three types of corporate university: 1) established, 
mainstream non-profit universities adapting to new economic and technological 
pressures by adopting the managerial practices of for-profit corporations (e.g. the 
University of Boston); 2) for-profit universities that satisfy the necessary political and 
legal criteria for Federal university accreditation (e.g., The University of Phoenix); 
and 3) relatively new educational organizations that provide in-house training and 
development for employees of for-profit corporations (e.g., McDonald’s Hamburger 
University), and which award degrees through accredited universities (either one of 
the first two types).   
For the purpose of the dissertation, we are primarily concerned with the first 
definition of corporate university
176
 for I believe it accurately describes the changing 
nature of most contemporary American universities as they adapt to ‘economic’ and 
‘technological pressures’; i.e., neoliberalism (a control technology) and a knowledge 
economy (the product of certain hard and soft technologies), respectively
177
.  
However, it is important to stress that Waks (2002) merely captures just one facet – 
i.e., the business function – of the contemporary university, in his first definition of 
which I use as a working model for the corporate university.  However, unlike Waks, 
my purpose with this chapter is to draw on Waks (2002) as well as other scholars in 
order to capture a more multi-faceted picture of the contemporary American 
university.      
                                                 
175
 This quote from the principal of a Scottish university, not an American one (the focus of the 
dissertation), is intended to convey the global mindset of the contemporary university – not just here in America, 
but abroad; that is, global institutions, serving a global market, competing within a global capitalist economy.  The 
quote additionally highlights the economic and cultural volatility of the contemporary university; Glasgow’s future 
position, as noted by Muscatelli, remains to be seen.           
176
 Whenever I refer to ‘corporate university’ I more accurately mean ‘quasi-corporate university’.  I use 
the prefix quasi to denote that the university embodies many, but not all, the characteristics of the corporation such 
as, for example, strict profit-making (if we adhere to the first definition of corporate university in the text above).    
 
177
 More accurately, I should say that the university has not just responded to the emergence of a 
knowledge economy and neoliberalism, but has actually utilized these key technologies to its advantage, as we 
have seen with technology transfer (see Chapter 5).   
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With these definitions in mind, we now turn to Schultz (2004, online 
resource
178) who makes an analogy between the university and Macpherson’s (1997) 
characterization of liberal democratic societies.  According to Macpherson (1997), 
such societies are caught between two competing expectations for their citizens: 1) the 
individual as a rational, ‘social creature’; and 2) necessitated by the competitive 
capitalist economy that is the hallmark of liberal democratic societies, the individual 
as a ‘consumer’.  In striking similarity to Macpherson’s distinction, Schultz (2004) 
goes on to argue that the modern American university (and higher education 
generally) has historically been caught between these two opposing mandates.  On the 
one hand, consistent with the notion of a liberal arts education and the educational 
philosophy of John Dewey, is the university imperative to cultivate pragmatic, self-
developing and democratic citizens (a view also echoed by Bok, 2003; cited in 
Delbanco, 2007
179
).  On the other hand, consistent with the educational philosophy of 
Horace Mann, is the university imperative to cultivate skilled and productive laborers 
(not necessarily consumers) for the workforce.  
Traditionally, these opposing philosophies have been more or less kept in 
balance throughout the history of the American university.  But this balance has 
apparently now tipped – brought on by the (strongly alluded to) policies of 
neoliberalism, and the knowledge-commercializing forces of a knowledge economy
180
 
– towards a more market-orientated model.  This imbalance, Schultz argues (2004), 
has nowadays given rise to the corporate university
181
.  Schultz states that the  
 
corporate university, unlike the commercialized one, is an institution that seeks to 
fulfill its accumulation function by stripping itself of its democratic function and 
fully adopting its capitalist function by both serving the market and participating in it 
at the same time.  In effect, the causes of a university becoming corporatized are 
endogenous to higher education, not exogenous. (Schultz, 2004, online resource)  
 
Schultz’s (2004) above reference to the commercialized university is confusing.  For 
if we are to adhere to the earlier three definitions of corporate university, a 
commercialized university (Schultz, 2004) is presumably one that does not adopt the 
                                                 
178
 Available at: http://www.logosjournal.com/issue_4.4/schultz.htm (last accessed 7/29/2012). 
179
 Online resource available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/30/magazine/30wwln-lede-
t.html?pagewanted=1&adxnnlx=1309622405-wjo6S/wemY82EG8Cfje6yA (last accessed 7/29/2012).   
180
 The author specifically cites the ‘Bayh-Dole Act’; see Chapter 5. 
181
 Aside from the ‘fiscal crisis of the state’ (discussions of which strongly allude to the market-driven 
policies of neoliberalism and a knowledge economy), Schultz (2004) argues that the emergence of the corporate 
university has been exacerbated by an ‘ideological war’ launched by the far-right against (their perception of) the 
exceedingly liberal agenda of the American university.   
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business practices of for-profit institutions, but nevertheless advertises, or at least 
promotes, its degrees via brochures and prospectuses (justifying the label 
‘commercialized’).  But, and this is where I think Schultz’s definition is unclear, at 
what point does a commercialized university become a corporate university?  That, I 
suggest, occurs when the university attempts to gain a greater market share relative 
to other universities (now ‘competitors’), and it is ‘market share’ that is precisely 
what Schultz (2004) is referring to when he says ‘accumulation function’182.  Schultz 
(2004), in the above quote, basically means that the American university nowadays 
embodies a corporate culture that historically existed exterior to it; the university in 
the past merely served the market by providing it with a competent workforce in the 
form of educated citizens.  The university is nowadays corporate, or is at least 
‘corporatizing’, because it both serves and participates in the market.  To see the 
many ways in which the university is a participant of the market, I use Schultz’s paper 
(2004) and others in the literature to explore the key characteristics of the corporate 
university.  Crucially, these characteristics are largely unprecedented in the history of 
the American university and, accordingly, mark the switch to a corporate entity: 
 
The first characteristic of the corporate university, and a key ingredient in its 
making, is its nowadays increased dependence on corporate sponsorship in light of 
decreased federal funding for higher education (Schultz, 2004).  A key example is the 
technological triumvirate of university-industry alliances – of which technology 
transfer is emblematic.  Indeed, Press and Washburn (2000) report that industry 
funding for the university skyrocketed from around $850 million in 1985 to $4.25 
billion less than a decade later.  Schultz (2004) additionally reports on the incidence 
of what I see as the unprecedented practice of product placement in (and by) the 
university of industry’s brand or logo that often occurs as a condition when the former 
receives funding from the latter.   
For example, Press and Washburn (2000) report on the pervasive presence of 
corporate logos in the University of Berkeley’s Haas School of Business as a result of 
business relations with various companies.  The school forged business relationships 
                                                 
182
 The ‘accumulation function’ cannot be ‘profit’ if we are to adhere to the first (of the three) earlier 
definitions of the corporate university; in the first definition, the university is ‘corporate’ insofar as it models its 
business practices after for-profit corporations – not because its goal is to make profit.  Nevertheless, it is difficult 
to imagine – especially in light of the current neoliberal era of reduced federal funding for the university and 
ensuing entrepreneurial ties with industry – that a commercialized university is not a corporate one; i.e., its 
primary business function is not to gain a greater market share, following this conception of mine.          
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with Donald Fisher, the founder of Gap, whose company features in an introductory 
business course in the school, while the ‘Bank of America Dean of Haas’ was created 
out of the school’s business connections with the bank. 
The university does not just bear the brand of corporate sponsors – but also 
that of itself.  Bunzel (2007) reports on the deployment by the American university of 
various costly corporate marketing strategies to improve its ranking in an increasingly 
competitive higher education market.  For example, a chunky white ‘H’ on a crimson 
backdrop – propagated on a plethora of university-branded university gift shop 
merchandise like clothing, stationary, and even candy – has (at least here in the US) 
become instantly associated with ‘Harvard University’.  Here, as Readings (1996) 
notes, university branding is intimately tied to corporate identity.    
Yet another characteristic of the corporate university concerns the American 
Association of University Professors (AAUP).  The AAUP was founded in 1915 by a 
group of academics including Arthur Lovejoy and John Dewey.  It is an organization 
run by American academics that has historically sought to promote and preserve the 
democratic ideals of academic freedom (‘the capacity to speak without fear in the 
public arena’; Blackmore, 2003: 11) and faculty tenure in the university (see Fruman, 
2009).  But Schultz (2004) cites serious erosion of the democratic nature of the 
‘shared governance’ model of the AAUP, in which faculty have historically been 
granted equal voice in the direction of university policies as wide-ranging as curricula 
content to faculty appointments.  Schultz (2004) claims that the organizational 
structure of the AAUP is increasingly being replaced by a top-down (hence, 
hierarchal) mode of governance akin to a corporate board of trustees in industry (see 
also Clawson & Mishy, 2008)
183
.   
Acknowledging these findings, Nelson (2006, online resource
184
) speaking in 
the AAUP’s Academe magazine warns of the ‘grave challenges’ faced by faculty and 
AAUP members.  His warning collectively concerns the transfer of shared power 
away from faculty and towards centralized administrations; the threat to academic 
tolerance and faculty tenure in light of the rise in adjunct or ‘contingent faculty’ 
                                                 
183
 Interestingly, the Chronicle of Higher Education reports that half of university presidents from 40 of 
the top American research universities serve on a company board (Giroux, 2011; online resource available at:  
http://truth-out.org/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=69:beyond-the-swindle-of-the-corporate-
university-higher-education-in-the-service-of-democracy - last accessed 7/29/2012).    
184
 Available at: http://aaup.org/AAUP/CMS_Templates/AcademeTemplates/AcademeArticle.aspx? 
NRMODE=Published&NRNODEGUID={846EC02B-06AD-4929-925F-90E372E2C608} 
&NRORIGINALURL=%2FAAUP%2Fpubsres%2Facademe%2F2006%2FND%2FCol%2Fftp.htm&NRCACHEH
INT=NoModifyGuest (last accessed 7/29/2012).  
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(because fulltime faculty are costly to employ and difficult to remove should their 
research specialty be deemed to lack market value; see Press & Washburn, 2000; 
Blackmore, 2003; Schultz, 2004)
185
; decreased tolerance of on-campus political 
dissent; and the university’s increased selection to prospective students and adult 
learners of vocational degree programs
186
.   
Finally, ‘local to the global’ in the title to this chapter is intended to emphasize 
the increased global presence of the university.  Increased global presence usually 
refers to either the operation by the university of an entirely separate satellite campus 
(or campuses) abroad, or the franchising by foreign higher educational institutions of 
a domestic university brand and products in a process sometimes called 
‘McDonaldization of the university’187 (Altbach, 2004).  In this sense, the university 
sounds uncannily like the aggressive business expansion ambitions of the corporate 
world.  Relatedly, curricular joint venture (CJVs) – a classic example of cross-border 
education (see Knight, 2003) – describes the university’s exploitation of new markets 
to generate additional revenue (Eckel et al, 2004).  CJVs entail the creation of new 
academic programs (often technologically-delivered) that are entirely conceived from 
alliances either among different universities, or between the university and industry 
(or non-profit or non-governmental organizations)
188
.  Eckel et al (2004) cite three 
drivers of this entrepreneurial process:  
                                                 
185
 See also McGee (2002) who provides a compelling personal reflection of her experiences as an 
adjunct faculty member at New York University.  McGee (2002) writes that her all-consuming passion for 
teaching was undermined by the demoralizing demands of the adjunct faculty position – an overworked and 
underpaid position through which the university strategically harnesses the free evening time of working 
professionals engaged in full-time day jobs.  This business structure is economically and administratively efficient 
for the university – but not, according to McGee (2002), for the adjunct faculty member.  McGee’s (2002) insight 
into adjunct faculty life is an uncanny reflection of my own adjunct faculty position at Cambridge College, 
Massachusetts, which I, too, walked away from precisely because of those reasons cited by McGee (2002).         
186
 For example, the often costly degree (for the student) of Masters in Business Administration (MBA) 
– the huge growth in demand of which has been part fuelled by the increased interest in the workplace for 
managerial positions in a knowledge economy – has become a ‘cash cow’ for the university as it seeks additional 
ways to recoup revenue (Schultz, 2004).  Moreover, online delivery by the university of the MBA program has, 
relative to on-campus degree programs, kept low the teaching costs of the program as well as enhanced the market 
penetrability of the program by making it available to a potentially global market.  Yet another vocational degree 
program on the rise in the university is the professional doctorate in business or education (such as this one), 
which, according to Fink (2006), was born out of a deficiency in the theoretical and practical applicability of the 
traditional doctorate (PhD) to professions in a knowledge economy.  Citing Gibbons et al (1994), Fink (2006: 37) 
writes that the professional doctorate is largely characterized by the pursuit of ‘mode 2’ knowledge which is non-
hierarchal, transient, multidisciplinary, and ‘operates within the context of application’, thereby rendering it highly 
applicable to a knowledge economy.  ‘Mode 2’ knowledge transcends the hierarchal, objective, and regimented 
knowledge structures that characterize ‘mode 1’ knowledge, the generation of which is exemplified by the 
traditional doctorate.   
187
 So-called presumably because it mirrors the franchising business structure of the fast-food restaurant 
chain McDonald’s. 
188
 One of the many examples of CJV listed by the authors was, at the time of their writing, Cardean 
University which was part of a multi-university collaboration (that included the London School of Economics) to 
deliver various online degree programs in business.     
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1) ‘the hunt for revenue, prestige and quality’ (Eckel et al, 2004: 301) paints 
the university as an aggressive business player that competes with other universities 
for a larger chunk of the student market in new era of university entrepreneurialism.  
An indispensible source of revenue for the university, aside from technology transfer 
and industry sponsorship, is the rising cost of tuition fees.  As a reflection of the 
increasing privatization of American higher education, empirical data reveals that 
tuition fees skyrocketed by 439% between 1982 and 2007 – despite meager and 
highly disproportionate rises in median family income (Lewin, 2008
189
).  In this 
scenario, the student – nowadays forced to finance university degree products with 
hefty debt – is increasingly perceived as consumer.  
2) The ‘potential of the curriculum’ describes the university’s entrepreneurial 
exploitation of ‘capital’ contained in its curricula through, for example, intensive 
summer school programs or corporate training.  Key to the ‘potential of the 
curriculum’ is a shift in emphasis from knowledge production (as in the case of 
technology transfer) to knowledge dissemination (Eckel et al, 2004: 302)
190
.  I extend 
‘the potential of the curriculum’ to the boom in the university provision of online 
learning and online degree programs – the number of students enrolled in an online 
course rose from around 10 percent in 2003 to around 30 percent in 2009 (Christensen 
& Horn, 2011).  Online learning is cheaper for the school because, compared to on-
campus teaching, fewer professors can teach a larger number of students (Schultz, 
2004).  Moreover, online delivery enables the university’s curriculum to transverse 
vast geographic boundaries to reach a potentially global market.  And 
3) ‘the global growing student market’ (Eckel et al, 2004: 303) reflects the 
increasing global demand for higher education.  The university’s drive to tap into this 
trend is motivated by a desire to increase its revenue through new student enrolments 
in global niche markets, as well as to boost its global exposure as part of its corporate 
branding process (see earlier)
191
.   
                                                 
189
 Online resource available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/03/education/03college.html (last 
accessed 7/29/2012).  Such is the gravity of the situation, Lewin (2008) reports that the empirical data of the 
National Center for Public Policy and Higher Education predicts that the soaring cost of higher education may, in 
years to come, be unaffordable for most Americans, with the poorest of students disenfranchised the most.     
190
 Relatedly, Eckel et al (2004) report on the practice whereby the various individual roles of the 
professor – for example, curriculum design, teaching, assessment, etc. – are each assigned to individual experts in 
a conveyor belt-like production process in an attempt to increase efficiency and product consistency, and to 
streamline instructional activity.         
191
 The increasing global presence of the university is undoubtedly contributing to its ‘massification’, 
which is consistent with Munene’s (2008: 1) definition of ‘massification’ as ‘acceleration and expansion of higher 
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Now that the concept of the corporate university has been explored, we 
conclude this chapter by constructing the concept of the postmodern university – the 
theoretical making of which, I will argue, is built by the collective actions of the hard, 
soft, and control technologies outlined in previous chapters. 
 
 
Hard, soft, control: the makings of the postmodern university 
Nazi Germany, third world hunger, racism, eurocentrism, global terrorism; 
this is a mere sampling of the many unsettling world events and atrocities (most of 
which are artifactual
192
) that seriously question the supposed rational ‘order’ of the 
modern era (Burke, 2005).  Consequently, some scholars (notably Lyotard, 1984; see 
upcoming discussions) argue that the pillars on which the grand unifying theories of 
society are supported – a central defining feature of modernity – appear to be 
crumbling.  It is this collective lack of faith in the ‘progress’ that modernity promises 
that has apparently caused our departure from modernity, and our corresponding 
entrance into postmodernity.   
In the same way that the actual era of postmodernity embodies a sense of 
cultural instability, or at least non-linearity (see Bodi & Maier-O-Shea, 2005)
193
, so 
too does a stable and robust working definition for the actual term of postmodernity.  
For example, Bertens (1995: 12; cited in Cheek, 1999) writes that ‘postmodernism has 
been a particularly unstable concept.  No single definition of postmodernism has gone 
uncontested or has even been widely accepted’194.  Nevertheless, Adams (1997, online 
resource
195
), also noting obfuscation surrounding the meaning and use of the term, 
                                                                                                                                            
education and increased access to it’.  Meanwhile, in light of a knowledge economy, Kwiek (2000) cites the 
governmental push for ‘life-long learning for all’ as fuelling massification of the university.  
192
 Being ‘artifactual’ – i.e., human-made – suggests a potential control technology property to some of 
these unsettling word events.  Recall, from Chapters 2 and 4, that the primary criteria for a control technology are 
their dual unconscious and undemocratic dimensions.  Indeed, using the first example, and with a basic 
understanding of world history, Hitler’s fascist regime was undoubtedly undemocratic, as well as unconscious in 
light of Hitler’s many mesmerizing public addresses to his people.       
193
 For example, the advent of modern, frequent, and cheap air travel has enabled mobilization in the 
masses of various cultural groups, ethnicities, and populations across their indigenous borders resulting, in any 
given (often urban) global location, a sense of rich cultural heterogeneity.  This phenomenon is exacerbated by 
various other modern technologies, such as those examined in Chapter 3, which seem to miraculously bend the 
physical laws of time and space, leading to the coinage ‘space-time compression’ (see, e.g., Mitchell, 1999).  As a 
result, the predictable linearity of modernity appears to have shattered.          
194
 Adding further confusion, Adams (1997; online resource available at: http://www.crosscurrents. 
org/adams.htm - last accessed 7/29/2012) states that ‘postmodernity’ and ‘postmodernism’ are two distinct terms.  
The former is used predominately by social scientists to refer to a cultural condition or state of being, while the 
latter is used predominately by artists and humanists to refer to a cultural movement or ‘plurality of movements 
within culture’.     
195
 Available at: http://www.crosscurrents.org/adams.htm (last accessed 7/29/2012).   
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lists four broad characteristics that, although not exhaustive, may assist our 
understanding of (but are not necessarily intended to define) ‘postmodernity’:  
1) ‘decline of the cultural superiority of the west’, as manifested for example 
in the linguistic turn, the trend in abstract art, and challenges to western democratic 
political theory such as neo-confucianism and Islam.  These factors are symptoms of 
decline presumably because they represent a threat to the stable and dominant cultural 
mainstays that collectively defined the superiority of the west (e.g., the increasing 
presence of Islam seems to strengthen the nowadays depopularizing image of 
Christianity in the western world).  This idea relates to metanarratives, which we turn 
to next;  
2) ‘the legitimation crisis’, which refers to delegitimation (or at least decreased 
faith in) the overarching theories, or ‘metanarratives’, that supposedly confer stability 
to society, such as the notion of ‘the afterlife’ as conveyed by the Christian bible.  The 
nowadays collective lack of faith in metanarratives has supposedly resulted in a 
society with a ‘pluralism of values and value systems with each competing against the 
others’ (Adams, 1997, online resource).  Moreover, there has been a supposed shift in 
modernity from a decreased faith in overarching authoritative knowledge primarily 
grounded in objective positivism, to postmodern notions of truth primarily grounded 




3) ‘the intellectual marketplace’, which appears to overlap with some elements 
of Habermas’s capitalist decline of the public sphere (1991), refers to the switch in 
control of cultural and religious knowledge and values by the intellectual and political 
elite (e.g., that teachers largely controlled their students) to nowadays control by the 
modern mass media and telecommunications
197
.  And 
4) ‘deconstruction’, which is to not simply accept texts at face value, but 
rather to dissect their myriad of meanings as shaped by the highly contextual 
circumstances and social situations at the time of writing.  Deconstruction, then, 
                                                 
196
 Indeed, for some (e.g., Young, 1997; Talen, 2002) postmodernism is synonymous with the 
epistemological stance of relativism, such that the two sometimes appear in the academic literature as the 
compound term ‘postmodern relativism’.  But this is an extreme exemplification of postmodernism for not all 
postmodernists advocate absolute relativism (see, e.g., Sayer, 1993).  Also note that a lighter version of positivism 
(which ordinarily rejects relativism in favor of singular overarching truths or theories), called postpositivism (see, 
e.g., Kuhn, 1962), responds to recent criticisms of the limitation of the application of the scientific method to 
social science research by actually advocating relativism (see Phillips & Burbules, 2000).     
197
 See also the radical theories of Baudrillard (e.g., 1995) who argues that the predominance of symbols 
and signs in our current (postmodern) media-laden world substitute actual reality.  
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‘categorically asserts the absolute impossibility of attributing to any text one single 
ultimate meaning’ (Adams, 1997, online resource).    
But absent from Adams’ list (1997; and also that of Sayer, 1993, who 
compiles a likeminded list) is any explicit singular reference to contemporary 
capitalism.  For if we are to understand Lyotard (1984), a central theme of 
postmodernity is the notion of knowledge as a technologically-mediated lucrative 
global commodity that is traded on a capitalist market.  Indeed, Woods (1997), like 
Kellner (2002), emphasizes the inextricable link between postmodernism and 
capitalism.  Woods (1997) notes that several theorists, such as Fredric Jameson and 
David Harvey, view the switch from modernity to postmodernity as merely a passage 
from one phase of capitalism to another, and ensuing cultural changes associated with 
this switch:  
 
Postmodernity then corresponds to a phase of capitalism where mass production of 
standardized goods, and the forms of labour associated with it, have been replaced by 
flexibility: new forms of production – ‘lean production’, the ‘team concept’, ‘just-in-
time’ production, diversification of commodities for niche markets, a ‘flexible’ labour 
force, mobile capital and so on, all made possible by new informational technologies. 
Woods (1997: 540) 
  
But to singularly view postmodernity as merely a switch to a different phase of 
capitalism disregards the many technological, political, economic, and cultural forces 
that contributed to that switch – such as those outlined by Adams (1997), above.  
Indeed, technology (namely cybernetics) forms a crucial theme in Lyotard’s (1984) 
interpretation of postmodernity, to which we now turn
198
.    
 
A philosophical narrative of postmodernity was famously proposed by the 
French philosopher Jean-Franҫois Lyotard in his book The Postmodern Condition: A 
Report on Knowledge (1984).  In this short but highly influential work, Lyotard’s 
working hypothesis states that ‘the status of knowledge is altered as societies enter 
what is known as the postindustrial age and cultures enter what is known as the 
postmodern age’ (Lyotard, 1984: 3).  ‘Postindustrial’ refers to highly developed 
societies that are nowadays heavily knowledge-based owing to the rapid and mass 
technological manipulation and mediation of knowledge; ‘postmodern’ refers to the 
                                                 
198
 The following paragraph on Lyotard is adapted from my Educational Policy module assignment for 
the EdD program.   
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consequent altered status of knowledge and its legitimation in such societies.  Lyotard 
goes on to state that ‘transformations which, since the end of the 19th century, have 
altered the game rules for science, literature and the arts’ (Lyotard, 1984: 3).  
‘Transformations’ refer to rapid technological advance in postindustrial societies in 
the post-World War II era, and the profound impact these transformations had on the 
two principal functions of knowledge – ‘research’, and the ‘transmission of learning’ 
(de Alba et al, 2004).  Transformations are built upon the disciplines of language and 
information processing in a cybernetic-permeated society wherein ‘the miniaturization 
and commercialization of machines is already changing the way in which learning is 
acquired, classified, made available and exploited’ (Lyotard, 1984: 4).  These 
transformations emerged amidst an ‘incredulity toward metanarratives’ (Lyotard, 
1984: xxiv), which is a reference to humanity’s collective disillusionment with the 
metanarratives of modernity.  As noted earlier, metanarratives are grand unifying 
stories that cultures tell themselves about their own practices and beliefs in order to 
legitimate them, and were formulated on the enlightenment notion of empiricism and 
reason, whose shared goal is truth (Peters, 2004).  Drawing upon Ludwig 
Wittgenstein’s concept of ‘language-games’ ([1953] 2001), Lyotard (1984) argues 
that the ‘game rules’ of technology have their ultimate goal not in truth, but in the 
efficiency of minimizing the various inputs (i.e., knowledge authenticity, accuracy, or 
even robustness) and maximizing the desired outputs (i.e., profit from this knowledge 
sold).  In the postmodern condition, then, knowledge becomes a commodity that is 
legitimated through the technological criterion of maximum market efficiency; this 
central defining tendency of knowledge markets is what Lyotard calls ‘performativity’ 
(Lyotard, 1984; Alba et al, 2000), and it must be kept in mind for my upcoming 
argument. 
So if we briefly depart the current professional context of the university 
research lab to look at the modern mass media, a good working example of Lyotard’s 
performativity thesis is demonstrable with what I see as the precedence by American 
network news of their selective broadcast of voyeuristic celebrity lifestyle stories over 
stories of more pressing social concern such as an ongoing humanitarian disaster.  In 
this working example, the broadcast by network news of celebrity stories often 
appears to be amorally prioritized over more pressing social stories (this equates to 
the ‘minimizing input’ of performativity) in the interests of corporate profit because 
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the former apparently attract a greater viewership, and hence greater advertising 
revenue over the latter (this equates to the ‘maximizing input’ of performativity)199.   
Interpreting the writings of Lyotard (1984) confirms my own arguments made 
earlier in the dissertation.  For Chapter 3 demonstrated that certain hard and soft ICTs 
of a ‘postindustrial’ era facilitated heightened knowledge conveyance that, in turn, 
was a primary causative force in the formation of a knowledge economy.  The 
meanings behind my heightened knowledge conveyance concept and Lyotard’s (1984) 
knowledge ‘exchange’ reference are very similar, although the latter, in its context, 
has a stronger connotation of ‘economic transaction’:     
 
knowledge is and will be produced in order to be sold, it is and will be consumed in 
order to be valorized in a new production: in both cases, the goal is exchange. 
Knowledge ceases to be an end in itself, it loses its “use-value”. (Lyotard, 1984: 4-5)  
 
Therefore, knowledge becomes ‘postmodern’ because it is supposedly no longer 
legitimated by the universal knowledge paradigms of modernity – but rather by the 
monetary motives of the contemporary capitalist market.  In the context of the 
university research lab, these monetary motives, as I conceive them, are the royalties 
earned from technology transfer.   
 
We will return to Lyotard (1984) later, but before we do, we now turn to the 
American university in the context of postmodernity
200
.  Building on Readings 
(1996), Kwiek (2000) cites globalization and the cultural passage to late modernity as 
primary dual forces responsible for the ‘decline’ of the modern university.  Kwiek 
(2000) states that the American university (like the European one) was founded on the 
project written in 1808 by the German philosopher Wilhelm von Humboldt for the 
University of Berlin, which he founded.  Crucially, the modern university was  
                                                 
199
 An example of Lyotard’s (1984) performativity thesis in the current professional context of the 
university research lab will be presented in my upcoming argument.  
200 It is obvious from discussions in this chapter that the university is undergoing a radical 
transformation as it adapts to postmodernity.  But is it really postmodernity that the university is adapting to?  
Delanty (2001: 587; cited in Blackmore, 2003) paints not one, but four pictures (all rather dystopian in nature), of 
the contemporary role of the university: 1) ‘the entrenched liberal critique’ views the university as a source of 
cultural reproduction; 2) ‘the postmodern thesis’ signifies the end of the nation-state, and along with it, the end of 
the university and its emancipatory capacity because of the collapse in metanarratives; 3) ‘the reflexivity thesis’ 
recognizes in the university a new mode of knowledge (namely, mode 2 type; see discussions earlier) that is 
sourced from a new reflexive relationship between the user and producer of knowledge working against the 
backdrop of a post-Fordist era; and 4) ‘the globalization thesis’ takes up on the theme of the corporate university 
to describe the instrumentalization of the university as it succumbs to, and indeed, actively embraces market modes 
of production.  Therefore, it is important to realize that there exists a variety of theoretical viewpoints (some 
overlapping, some competing) concerning the ongoing transformation and future role of the university, and that I 
merely focus on just one – that being the postmodern university.     




born together with the rise in national aspirations and the rise in the significance of 
nation-states in the 19th century. A tacit deal made between power and knowledge 
on the one hand provided scholars with unprecedented institutional possibilities and, 
on the other, obliged them to support national culture and to help with constituting 
national subjects: citizens of nation-states.  (Kwiek, 2000: 75) 
 
Here we see that the overarching metanarrative of the modern university was the 
cultivation of national citizens.  But with the rise of global capitalism – and the 
nation’s reorientation towards it in order to maintain global competitiveness (see 
Chapters 4 and 5) – the integrity of the nation-state and, in turn (because the two are 
intimately tied) that of the modern university, are seriously questioned.  Readings 
(1996) refers to the resulting institution as the ‘University of Excellence’.  Indeed, it is 
not difficult to find a university proclaiming some form of ‘excellence’ in its mission 
statement.  For example, the mission statement of Boston University – my first 
internet search of a mere few seconds – proudly proclaims ‘standards of excellence’201 
with regard to its founding principles.  But what exactly does Readings mean by this 
coinage?    
On analyzing Readings’ (1996) concept of the ‘University of Excellence’, 
Webster (2009; online resource
202
) describes the university mission statement as a 
‘dearth of conceptions’.  By this he means that the inevitable, sometimes pervasive, 
use of ‘excellence’ in the university mission statement – for example, ‘excellent 
location’, ‘excellent libraries’, ‘excellent gym’, ‘excellent parking‘, and so on – 
ironically rob the university of any distinguishable conception of exactly who, or 
what, the university actually is.  It seems that the ‘excellence’ word – abundant in 
glossy university marketing material like prospectuses and the ‘annual report’ – is a 
mere marketing device deployed by the university to entice prospective students to 
enroll at, and hence financially patronize, a given university.  Webster (2009) argues 
that the apparent lack of any overarching concept (or modern metanarrative) of what 
or who the university actually is sits at the heart of the postmodern university – an 
institution that he calls an ‘oxymoronic establishment, a collection of differences 
devoid of defining characteristics and no internal unity’.  According to Webster 
(2009), the university has succumbed to the rapidly shifting, non-linear, and fluid 
                                                 
201
 Available online at: http://www.bu.edu/info/about/mission/ (last accessed 7/29/2012).  
202
 Online resource available at: http://cjms.fims.uwo.ca/issues/07-01/Frank%20Webster.pdf (last 
accessed 7/29/2012). 
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forces of globalization, and which are a defining feature of the postmodern era.  These 
forces are so profound that the theoretical demarcation between the university and 
society – that which has granted the university historical ‘ivory tower’ status – has 
diminished.  Consequently, the university in its supposedly postmodern form has 
become an ‘inside-out’ institution in the sense that the very knowledge that it has 
historically generated and provided to society is, in light of knowledge workers 
working in a knowledge economy, increasingly being generated outside of its walls in 
the workplace
203
.   
With this foundation in place, I now draw on discussions in this chapter to 
offer a reconceptualized notion of the postmodern university that, to the best of my 
knowledge, is different from most others.  Crucially, I demonstrate that the collective 
actions of hard, soft, and control technologies provide hitherto overlooked 
components that are critical for the philosophical makings of the postmodern 
university: 
 
First, I argued that technology transfer results from the university’s 
exploitation of a knowledge economy (collectively born from key hard and soft 
technologies; Chapter 3) through sale, in a neoliberal market (a control technology; 
Chapter 4), of its select internal research data to industry.  Technology transfer 
opened the doors of the university to additional entrepreneurial ventures with 
industry, and the technological triumvirate of university-industry alliances was born 
(Chapter 5).   
But this chapter reports that such entrepreneurial ventures can – as is 
demonstrable with the University of Berkley and Novartis case study – lead to 
encroachment of the university public sphere by industry in a manner analogous to the 
decline in contemporary capitalism of the bourgeois public sphere (Habermas, 1991).  
Indeed, Press and Washburn (2000: 310) state that ‘as university-industry ties grow 
more intimate, less commercially oriented areas of science will languish’; in other 
words, industry science takes precedence over university science, which has 
                                                 
203
 For example, the corporate sector, including the pharmaceutical industry and engineering firms, 
conduct research of comparable rigor to that conducted in the university (indeed, many of those that work in 
industry are former university faculty).  Similarly, government surveys and statistical analysis provide compelling 
knowledge on the human sciences of the sort that reports the behavior – employment, crime, marriage, 
consumption, for example – of their own citizens, while unique, often highly specialized and current, knowledge 
contributions are made by a multitude of think tanks and consulting firms (Webster, 2009).  Webster argues that 
these contributions of the knowledge worker have in some ways eclipsed, and essentially rendered redundant, the 
specialized knowledge-generating functions of the university. 
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historically, in the context of the university public sphere, been academically free and 
open.   
Therefore, the technological triumvirate – born from certain key hard, soft, 
and control technologies – is an indirect causation204 of industry’s encroachment upon 
the university’s historic public sphere.  Moreover, because technology transfer is the 
metaphorical key that opened the university door to other entrepreneurial relationships 
with industry, technology transfer may additionally be conceived as the 
entrepreneurial seed from which the notion of the corporate university grew.     
 
Second, industry’s encroachment upon the university’s historic public sphere 
is a scenario – nowadays not uncommon in the American university (see Press & 
Washburn, 2000) – that reflects Lyotard’s (1984) performativity thesis of knowledge 
legitimation in contemporary capitalist society.  This scenario exemplifies Lyotard’s 
(1984) performativity thesis because, as reported earlier, industry clearly has the 
potential to steer the university research agenda away from the university research 
lab’s free and open academic research interests towards industry’s own commercial 
motivations.  Internal research data that the lab researcher generates on behalf of 
industry in such a scenario is compromised in the sense that the knowledge is not 
absolutely true to the research lab’s original academic agenda because it has been 
steered by industry
205
; it represents the minimizing input of Lyotard’s performativity 
equation.  In the same scenario, industry’s commercial motivation represents the 
maximizing output of the performativity equation because the ultimate goal of 
industry operating in a competitive capitalist economy is perpetual maximization of 
profit.   
                                                 
204
 It is indirect because, as we see from the above chain of events, it is not technology transfer per se 
that causes this result, but rather externalities stemming from it.   
205
 I am not suggesting that this knowledge per se is untrue, but rather that it is not entirely loyal to the 
lab’s academic research focus because it has been steered by industry.  The validity of knowledge produced by 
industry, on the other hand, has been subject to intense scrutiny in the past few years.  Namely, there have been a 
prolific and damning number of controversies regarding the fallacious or exaggerated marketing claims, as well as 
concealment of potentially deleterious clinical research data, made by industry regarding some its pharmaceutical 
products.  One notable case concerns the anti-inflammatory drug Vioxx that was formerly manufactured by 
pharmaceutical company Merck.  Vioxx was withdrawn from the market in 2004 amid safety concerns that it 
increased the patient’s susceptibility to heart attack; indeed, BBC news reports that Vioxx may have been 
responsible for heart disease in hundreds of thousands of patients in the US alone since 1999.  Merck was 
successfully sued in 2007 amid accusations that they were aware of such adverse side–effects associated with 
Vioxx (see full reports at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/4203437.stm and http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/ 
6443259.stm - last accessed 7/29/2012).  Writing in the Lancet, Horton (2004) states that ‘the licensing of Vioxx 
and its continued use in the face of unambiguous evidence of harm have been public health catastrophes’, going on 
to conclude that ‘Merck … acted out of ruthless, short-sighted and irresponsible self-interest’.  In this particular 
case study, and in the context of Lyotard’s (1984) performativity thesis, it appears that the ‘minimizing input’ is 
knowledge authentication, or lack thereof, while the ‘maximizing output’ is corporate profit.      




Third, and finally, my conceptualization of the contemporary university 
declines to incorporate theoretical threads of the corporate university – a move that I 
grappled with given the strong market tendencies of the contemporary university and 
the capitalist notion implicitly laden in Lyotard’s (1984) performativity thesis206.  
Why does my concept of the corporate university not contribute to the theoretical 
making of the postmodern university – despite it apparently doing so numerously in 
the academic literature
207
?   
Because, to the best of my understanding, internal research data produced by 
the corporate university (when examined as a sole concept, outside the context of 
postmodernity) is loyal to the university’s research agenda; the lab research agenda is 
not steered by industry.  However, an obvious exception to this rule occurs when the 
corporate university introduces academic products in accord with market demands.  
For example, Webster (2000) reports on the commercialization of recreational 
activities by the university by selling degree programs in, for example, ‘tourism’, 
‘golf course management’, and ‘intimate relations’, explicitly noting that this trend is 
being driven by Lyotard’s (1984) ‘performativity’.  Indeed, this trend could 
conceivably fit with the performativity equation in the sense that these academic 
programs undermine the university's true academic teaching and research agenda 
(representing the minimizing input to the performativity equation) in order to meet 
market demand and, ultimately, gain greater market share (representing the 
maximizing output to the performativity equation).   
However, there is a crucial distinction between the corporate university and 
the university in the context of its public sphere encroached by industry (as an 
authentic example of Lyotard’s (1984) performativity thesis, as argued above).  For in 
the former case, the university is merely responding – at its own will – to the 
inevitable changing nature of society (neoliberalism, the advent of postmodernity, 
                                                 
206
 Assuming, that is, that the technological triumvirate – the ultimate cause of industry’s encroachment 
of the university’s public sphere – predates the concept of the corporate university.  For if it did not, the inverse 
would be true; i.e., the corporate university predates the technological triumvirate.  If this were the case, the 
corporate university as an umbrella concept encompassing the technological triumvirate (and not the sole concept 
of the technological triumvirate per se) would be the ultimate cause of the rise of the postmodern university.  But I 
counter the notion that the corporate university predates the technological triumvirate because the latter is the 
embodiment of the entrepreneurial behavior that was necessary to give rise to the former.  Therefore, as noted 
earlier, the technological triumvirate is a key ingredient of (and as such predates) the corporate university.       
207
 The most obvious example being Readings (1996) whose book is an unambiguous reference to the 
corporate university and which (despite Readings rejecting the term ‘postmodern’) has become, among many 
scholars, synonymous with the postmodern university (see, e.g., Strickland, 2002). 
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etc.) and corresponding market demands by implementing its own necessary business 
initiatives and restructuring.  In the latter case, industry is an exogenous force (with 
potentially questionable ethical business practices; see footnote 205 about Merck) that 
is responding to market demands by proactively seeking, and enticing with financial 
incentives, the university as a means to appropriate its intellectual resources entirely 
for its own commercial ends.   
 
Thus, I have unveiled the changing face of the university.  It is a decidedly 
postmodern face for, in the context of industry’s encroachment upon the university’s 
historic public sphere, it is loyal to Lyotard’s performativity (1984) thesis of 
knowledge legitimation in postmodern society.  Moreover, my notion of the 
postmodern university sets out to break with orthodox notions of the concept on two 
accounts.   
First, I offer a novel formulation of the postmodern university that factors in 
the hitherto overlooked actions of the various hard, soft, and control technologies 
presented in preceding chapters that are crucial for its creation.   
Second, my reformulation of the postmodern university declines to incorporate 
theoretical threads of the corporate university.   
With regard to this second account, I appreciate that the concept of the 
corporate university has contributed significantly to the changing face of the 
contemporary university, which is why it was discussed at length in this chapter.  But 
I close my argument by suggesting that it has done so more on an aesthetic, rather 
than on a philosophical level, precisely because it fails to fit Lyotard’s (1984) 






















Global to the local: learning in the  











we cannot teach another person directly; we can only facilitate his [or her] learning 
(Rogers, 1983) 
 
e just learned of the first profound impact of the university sale 
of its internal research data to industry on American higher 
education: the rise of the postmodern university.  This chapter 
explores the second impact: fundamental changes in the nature of learning in the 
university research lab associated with the rise of the postmodern university.  In order 
to explore this impact, we must first understand what learning in the lab – assisted by 
my insights as a lab educator – entails.  
 
W 
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Learning dynamics in the university research lab    
Recall that I sketched in Chapter 1 an outline of the two major knowledge 
types of the university research lab – external research data, and internal research 
data – both of which are the primary source of learning for university lab researchers 
(i.e., my students).  It will also be recalled that my students are primarily exposed, 
with my guidance, to external research data upon searching for and reading published 
scholarly articles obtainable from online bibliographic databases; exposure to internal 
research data occurs primarily upon my students’ attendance to mandatory in-house 
lab meetings.  But there is more to internal research data than just lab meeting.   
My students’ clarification of, or at least new insight into, a perplexing piece of 
their internal research data (such as an unexplainable graph trend depicting a time-
lapse experiment), aside from lab meeting, is additionally gleaned from informal 
scientific discussions with myself and other peers, as well as informal one-on-one 
meetings with the lab principal investigator (PI).  Such educational insights tend to 
happen more frequently (sometimes daily) than the more predictable and periodic lab 
meeting.  Moreover, a crucial distinction regarding the nature of the internal research 
data presented by my students in lab meeting versus that presented to peers or the PI 
is that the data in the former is more historical in the sense that it has amassed over 
time, whereas the data in the latter is entirely novel (sometimes just graphed moments 
ago by the student who generated the data).  It is this sort of novel research data that is 
casually exchanged among my students and the lab PI – which we will now refer to as 
current internal research data to highlight its newness, and to distinguish it from 
internal research data
208
 – that fuels learning on the part of my students.  Such 
learning is both theoretical as in my students’ intellectual formulation of new 
scientific theories, and practical as in my students’ optimization of existing, or the 
design of entirely novel, experimental approaches.  Either way, such day-to-day 
learning in the lab demands (as with all professions) a highly tacit ‘reflecting-in-
action’ (Schon, 1984) that is too complex to articulate in writing to the layperson here, 
as has been additionally underscored by Dasgupta and David (1994).   
Suffice to say, current internal research data, and informal scientific 
conversation about it, is an immensely rich learning experience for my students who 
                                                 
208
 However, as to not sound contradictory, I adhere to my point made in Chapter 1 that exposure of the 
lab researcher to internal research data occurs primarily through attendance to periodic lab meeting because lab 
meeting represents the cumulative sum of all relevant and important data, including current internal research data, 
accrued over time.   
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generate the data, and whoever else in the lab is exposed to it.  Indeed, current 
internal research data is of paramount importance because my students rely on their 
interpretation of it, with the help of my perspective, in order to steer the short-term 
research project trajectory.  For if a given piece of data (or data set) of my students 
confirms, or at least suggests to confirm, a given experimental hypothesis, the lab 
continues to theoretically and practically explore (and fine-tune, if necessary) their 
grand scientific theory
209
 to which the experimental hypothesis is loyal (see Colless, 
1969), and the research project is invariably preserved.  If, on the other hand, a given 
piece of data (or data set) of my students refutes an experimental hypothesis, the lab 
must reformulate their grand scientific theory (see Colless, 1969), and in some 
instances change direction by abandoning the research project altogether in favor of a 
new grand scientific theory.  But either scenario engages robust learning among my 
students.   
For a current research project must be fed with fresh intellectual vigor in order 
to keep the research project moving.  Likewise, an entirely new research project 
requires fresh intellectual vigor in order to conceive an entirely novel grand scientific 
theory that must ultimately be tested empirically
210
.  In both cases, prior knowledge 
provides the theoretical foundation for moving forward (Spens & Kovácks, 2005). 
This style of scientific inference by my students in the lab – a ‘theory testing 
process’ involving the deductive falsification or corroboration of hypothesizes by 
empirical testing (i.e., from general theoretical laws to the specific findings; Spens & 
Kovácks, 2005: 377) – aligns with the ‘hypothetico-deductive’ model (Lawson, 2000; 
Schickore, 2008).  This model largely belongs to the broader epistemological branch 
of postpositivism associated with Karl Popper (Cruickshank, 2007).  In 
postpositivism, current knowledge is supposedly subject, at the point of acquisition 
and interpretation of additional data, to potential falsification; in this sense, 
                                                 
209
 ‘Grand scientific theory’ (or simply ‘research project’) is my reference to one (out of usually many) 
of a given lab’s overarching scientific theories, the ultimate corroboration of which is typically attained (and often 
documented in a manuscript for publication) by the confirmation of several experimental hypotheses.  For 
example, the grand scientific theory that compound ‘A’ inhibits replication of a given virus may be corroborated, 
in part, by the hypothesis that compound ‘A’ binds to, and hence blocks, the viral ‘key’ protein that the virus uses 
to ‘unlock’ the host target cell.  This hypothesis can be tested experimentally by showing that compound ‘A’ and 
the viral ‘key’ protein bind to one another in a test tube; however, various other supporting hypotheses, and their 
empirical testing, would be required to make a more complete and convincing story.  
210
 However, the ethnographic findings of French philosopher Bruno Latour (1979) would have us 
believe that experimental data generated in the university research lab is a mere product of various social 
constructions.  Although I reject this radical viewpoint, as reinforced by these discussions, I nevertheless 
appreciate that social constructs play a pivotal role in the political dynamics, outcomes, and motives, of many 
university lab researchers; indeed, much of the content of the dissertation is testament to this.     
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‘knowledge is not based on unchallengeable, rock-solid foundations – [rather] it is 
conjectural’ (Phillips & Burbules, 2000: 26; original emphasis)211.  The search for 
knowledge is motivated by the most convincing warrants
212
 at the time – in my case 
our lab’s collective internal research data as well as that from other labs published as 
external research data.  Postpositivism, then, is a nonfoundationalist approach that 
contrasts to the two foundationalist approaches of empiricism and rationalism – 
largely associated with René Descartes and John Locke, respectively – that defined 
western epistemological thought up until the end of the 19
th
 century (Hjørland, 2005).     
 
Two points are to be made from these discussions.  First and foremost, my 
students’ generation of current internal research data is an ongoing event that 
continues to self-educate my students and all members of the lab.  Second, I wish to 
highlight the highly systemized nature of my students’ learning concerning the 
interpretation of current internal research data; such learning is, as I understand it, 
how learning should be in the university research lab.  So what happens to my 
students’ learning concerning current internal research data in the postmodern 
university research lab – an institution shaped by the forces of various hard, soft, and 
control technologies?  In order to answer this, we first take a lesson from Nussbaum 
(1997). 
Nussbaum’s (1997) landmark book Cultivating Humanity: A classical Defense 
of Reform in Higher Education is a rigorous and compassionate defense of 
contemporary curricula reform in liberal education; namely, the rise in the American 
university of undergraduate introductory courses in philosophy, often mandatory, that 
encompass diverse topics of pressing social relevance such as women’s studies, 
African-American studies, and sexuality.  Such courses have come under fire from 
radical right-wing groups who argue that their content threatens the social and 
political status quo.  But Nussbaum believes that such philosophy courses unleash the 
                                                 
211
 However, I contest the notion that all knowledge, at least in the context of lab research, is ‘fallible’.  
For example, clearance by the body of a given viral infection as substantiated by determination of the crystal 
structure of a molecular complex comprising a pharmaceutical compound bound to a viral protein whereby the 
former inhibits entry of the latter into the host target cell is, indeed, very real and ‘true’ knowledge.  Although not 
definitively authoritative – because there will always be some ‘holes’ or incompleteness with this knowledge, as 
with all knowledge – I suggest that a more fitting label to describe such robust cause-and-effect knowledge is 
‘pending’, which not only reflects the relative accuracy of the knowledge, but its inherent incompleteness in light 
of the fact that more knowledge layers will inevitably be added to it in due time (provided research continues on 
it).      
212
 ‘Warrants’ is derived from ‘warranted assertability’, which is a term proposed by Dewey (1938) to be 
used in lieu of ‘truth’ in order to presumably reflect the open-ended and nonfoundationalist nature of knowledge; 
see Phillips and Burbules, 2000.    
Stewart Craig; 9610118 
113 
 
full intellectual potential of the partaking student because they catalyze engagement in 





failure to think critically produces a democracy in which people talk at one another 
but never have a genuine dialogue.  In such an atmosphere bad arguments pass for 
good arguments, and prejudice can all too easily masquerade as reason.  To unmask 
prejudice and to secure justice, we need argument, an essential tool of civic freedom. 
(Nussbaum, 1997: 19) 
 
Nussbaum notes that in the current era of increasing cultural heterogeneity the 
university is morally obligated more than ever to maintain, through delivery of a 
liberal education, its duty to cultivate ‘citizens of the world’.  Crucially, such citizens, 
she argues, can intelligently understand and confidently partake in debates about 
deeply entrenched societal doctrines as well as the diverse differences among various 
cultural groups.  For Nussbaum (1997: 9), educating ‘citizens of the world’ is a 
passionately humanist project – a ‘cultivating humanity’214 – that recognizes the 
‘worth of human life wherever it occurs and [that we as ‘cultivators’] see ourselves as 
bound by common human abilities and problems to people who lie at a great distance 
from us’.  ‘Citizens of the world’ are de facto ‘cosmopolitans’ – not legal or political 
cosmopolitans – but rather ‘moral cosmopolitans’ (Friedman, 2000).  
The connection between a contemporary liberal education and its supposed 
product of ‘citizens of the world’ has been most notably embraced by the American 
academy, but is deeply rooted in western philosophical thought; Nussbaum draws on 
Socrates and the Stoics (particularly Diogenes) to detail criteria for ‘cultivating 
humanity’215.  But what relevance does cultivating humanity – a humanist campaign 
for the advancement of university courses in philosophy – have to do with my 
students’ learning in the university research lab?  This is answered in my next 
argument.  
   
                                                 
213
 Socratic-like inquiry additionally results in superior moral reasoning and even emotional harmony.  
On emotional harmony, Nussbaum (1997: 29) cites the example of the typical Roman male who felt anger at being 
seated low at the dinner table, stating: ‘challenge the culture’s obsession with these outward marks of status, and 
you have effectively challenged the person’s basis for anger’.       
214
 I like to think of ‘cultivating humanity’ as the process, while ‘citizens of the world’ is the product, of 
Nussbaum’s (1997) project.    
215
 Aside from a deeply philosophical project, Nussbaum’s (1997) book is an empirical study that is 
abundantly peppered with illuminating anecdotal accounts of ‘cultivating humanity’ in various American 
universities.   
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‘Inside-out learning’ in the lab 
First, there are striking similarities between the sort of highly reflective 
learning engaged by students in the humanist liberal higher education envisioned by 
Nussbaum, and the highly systemized nature of my students’ learning in the historic 
university research lab, as sketched above.  For my students’ analysis and 
interpretation of current internal research data (and the prior theoretical planning of 
experiments that generated it) clearly necessitates robust intellectual reasoning
216
 akin 
to the logical thinking at the heart of Socratic debate, and which, according to 
Nussbaum, is engaged by the student in the academic philosophy course.  In this 
sense, my students in the university research lab are loosely analogous to the 
philosophy student – at least in terms of their approach to, and style of, learning.    
 
Second, and not complementing the first point, I conceive that the postmodern 
university – an institution whose public sphere has been encroached by industry as a 
result of the technological triumvirate of university-industry alliances (see Chapter 6) 
– poses a threat to my students’ research style concerning current internal research 
data generated in its labs.  Indeed, Angell (2010, online resource
217
; my emphasis) on 
university-industry relations warns that the research style of industry ‘focus[es] too 
much on targeted, applied research, mainly drug development, and not enough on 
non-targeted, basic research into the causes, mechanisms, and prevention of disease’.  
In other words, Angell fears that what I have described as the technological 
triumvirate has changed the university’s scientific research style from a historic basic 
approach to a more applied approach (see also Giuliani & Arza, 2008).  What is the 
problem with this? 
Basic research – by virtue of its comprehensive ‘cause-and-effect’ approach 
(see McCall & Groark; online resource
218
) that attempts to understand underlying 
                                                 
216
 Not to suggest that regular internal research data does not necessitate reflective thinking.  Indeed, lab 
meeting, at which this data is periodically presented, provokes intense intellectual thinking and discussion among 
peers and the lab PI as we collectively troubleshoot methodological problems, or brainstorm new theories and 
future research directions for the project being presented.  However, my point is that current internal research 
data, due to its regularity (typically daily), regularly demands from the lab researcher a highly intellectualized 
reflecting-in-action (Schon, 1984) in order to steer the course, and maintain the logical integrity, of the research 
project at hand.  For example, upon generating current internal research data that confirms a given hypothesis, the 
lab researcher, usually that same day in light of the current competitive internet-driven pace of scientific research, 
must brainstorm new hypotheses, and experimental ways to confirm them, in order to corroborate, or at least 
strengthen, the grand scientific theory.           
217
 Available at: http://bostonreview.net/BR35.3/angell.php (last accessed 7/29/2012).  
218
 Available at: http://www.ocd.pitt.edu/Files/Publications/Challenges%20and%20Issues%20in%20 
Designing%20Applied%20Research.pdf (last accessed 7/29/2012).  
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molecular mechanisms – demands from my students (and indeed produces) a robust 
intellectual breadth for its theoretical planning and practical execution
219
.  Applied 
research, on the other hand, ‘expands on basic research findings to uncover practical 
ways in which new knowledge can be advanced to benefit individuals and society’ 
(online resource
220
).  I therefore conceive that industry’s predominant applied 
research approach – to include that imposed by industry on the university – is largely 
characterized by just an ‘effect’ approach because, although it may use, it does not 
always construct basic research knowledge
221
; applied research is not necessarily 
interested in the molecular mechanism of a drug candidate – only if that drug works 
or not.  Accordingly, I propose that industry’s applied research approach demands 
from my students less intellectual breadth
222
 than university’s basic research 
approach.   
Lending weight to this notion, the empirical questionnaire-based research of 
Blumenthal et al (1996) reveals a striking correlation between industry-funded 
university labs and less influential publications, as well as lower publication rates (see 
also Goldfarb, 2008) – a trend that reverses when industry funding becomes a 




Third, and finally, and going hand-in-hand with the reconfiguration in the 
scientific research style just discussed, is the additional threat to critically reflective 
thinking on the part of my students.  For earlier I showed how the frequency of 
generation of current internal research data routinely necessitates my students to 
systemize – largely through hypothetico-deduction – the next logical step in the 
research project.   
                                                 
219
 ‘Cause-and-effect’ refers to the process of discovery by the lab researcher of a molecule that ‘causes’ 
a specific biological ‘effect’.  In other words, a molecular mechanistic basis for the ‘effect’ has been discovered, in 
contrast to just an ‘effect’ discovery that is caused by an unknown ‘cause’.  ‘Cause-and-effect’ research tends to be 
intellectually broader because there are more pieces of the scientific puzzle that fit together to reveal a more 
complete picture.  Such research is the primary target for the academic because, if conducted robustly and the 
findings are significant, it tends to be accepted for publication in high-impact peer-reviewed journals such as 
Nature and Science – a crucial incentive for academics vying with one another for academic tenure.        
220
 Available at: http://www.csrees.usda.gov/qlinks/research.html (last accessed 7/29/2012).  
221
 ‘Effect’ research lacks equivalent intellectual breadth to ‘cause-and-effect’ research because the 
former results in fewer pieces of (namely the ‘cause’), and resulting gaps in, the scientific puzzle.  Industry tends 
to strategically adopt an ‘effect’ research style (with the exception of rational drug design, e.g.) because there is no 
greater monetary motive for industry to pursue ‘cause-and-effect’ research (see related discussions by Angell, 
2010); indeed, it is more time-consuming and costly to industry if they did so because further inquiry would be 
required (i.e., to find the ‘cause’).   
222
 Here, a crucial distinction is made: ‘effect’ research, despite it generally lacking the same intellectual 
breadth as ‘cause-and-effect’ research, does not necessarily lack experimental breadth; ‘effect’ research can still be 
conducted with a comprehensive and robust set of experimental methodologies containing all the critical controls.   
223
 These findings are substantiated by the empirical data of Manjarrés-Henríquez et al (2009). 
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But with industry at the helm of the postmodern university research agenda, 
such critically reflective thinking could conceivably become redundant, or at least less 
frequent, because industry wants a greater voice with regard to the choice and 
execution of research projects.  Here, the self-exploratory and critically reflective 
aspects of student-centered learning (see Rogers, 1983) – a style of learning that I 
advocate, and which has been empirically determined in numerous educational 
settings to be superior (see, e.g., O’Neil & McMahon, online resource224, for several 
cited studies; Good, 2004) – are undermined because my students are reduced to an 
automaton
225
 (see Gibbs, 1995).  Indeed, Dreyer and Kouzmin (2009: 10), writing 
about industry steerage of the university research agenda, state that ‘learning then 
becomes more akin to indoctrination on how to act efficiently and effectively in 
accordance with the prescribed set of beliefs’.         
 
Thus, in the same way that the nature of learning in Nussbaum’s (1997) notion 
of a liberal higher education is resoundingly democratic
226
 because it grants the 
learner intellectual autonomy, so, too, is the nature of my students’ learning 
concerning current internal research data in the historic university research lab.   
But in the postmodern university, reconfiguration of the research lab’s 
fundamental research style concerning current internal research data from a basic to 
a more applied approach, as engendered by industry, undercuts the intellectual breath 
of my students – and the lab as a whole.  Additionally, potential encroachment by 
industry of my students’ intellectual freedoms – including that involving their 
interpretation of current internal research data, and subsequent steering of the 
research project accordingly – has the potential to render my students apathetic 
learners, similar to that which can occur in lecture-based didactic instruction (see 
Shreeve, 2008).  Crucially, these characteristics of the postmodern university appear 
to undemocratically undermine the robust Socratic-like reasoning necessitated by 
current internal research data.   
                                                 
224
 Available at: http://www.aishe.org/readings/2005-1/oneill-mcmahon-Tues_19th_Oct_SCL. 
html (last accessed 7/29/2012). 
225 That is, reduced to an automaton with regard to intellectual breadth, but not necessarily experimental 
breadth.  
226
 However, in highlighting the democratic nature of learning in a liberal higher education, we should 
not forget the deeply democratic outcome of such learning: i.e., a world wherein all humans, regardless of 
multicultural status or personal uniqueness, have a common understanding, respect, and acceptance for one 
another. 
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This argument has examined the nature of learning in the university research 
lab from the ‘inside out’ in the sense that we probed the epistemological heart of the 
research and learning process.  But what about those forces that affect learning in the 
lab from the ‘outside-in’?   
 
 
‘Outside-in’ learning in the lab 
Grimpe et al (2011: 1; online resource
227
) starkly remind the reader that 
‘industry sponsors [of university research] frequently limit disclosure of [university] 
research findings, methods, or materials by delaying or banning public release’; i.e., 
such relationships are contractual agreements often with strings attached.   
For example, two prevalent cultural changes that occur in the university 
research lab as a consequence of the technological triumvirate of university-industry 
alliances, and a focus of this section, are: 1) a culture of research secrecy on the part 
of the university lab researcher (i.e., my students); and 2) delays, often (but not 
always) enforced by industry on a collaborating university research lab, on the 
submission for publication of research papers based on internal research data.  
Indeed, there is a wealth of empirical data in the academic literature that attempts to 
evaluate either quantitatively (with statistical analysis) or qualitatively (with 
questionnaires and surveys), or both, the extent of research secrecy and publication 
delays in the university research lab that arise from the university’s – or more 
precisely a collaborating lab’s – increased entrepreneurial ties with industry.  This 
empirical data has been systematically reviewed by Larsen (2011).  But Larsen warns 
that such data, and discussions arising therefrom, cannot be taken at face value, for  
  
the existence of a significant relationship … does not necessarily imply a causal 
relationship.  Where there is a positive relationship between for instance a scientist’s 
patenting activities and her scientific productivity, it is possible that neither is a 
consequence of the other, but that they are both instead related to other factors, such 
as for example personal characteristics of the scientist, to the presence of additional 
resources that have not been fully measured, or to the type of research problem that 
the scientist is working on.  (Larsen, 2011: 7) 
 
My goal with this section of the chapter, then, is to not simply recount this review of 
Larsen (2011); rather, I myself will draw on the academic literature in order to present 
                                                 
227
 Available at: http://druid8.sit.aau.dk/acc_papers/rbsry98g24d64rr632hel8u17n88.pdf (last accessed 
7/29/2012).  
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a selection of empirical papers that, I believe, warrant discussion based on their 
research rigor.  By this I mean that the papers appear to utilize sophisticated statistical 
analysis, the data generated from which reveal a compelling correlation between 
technology transfer (or other examples of university entrepreneurialism, like industry 
funding) and cultural changes in the university research lab arising as a result.  In 
short, the data will confirm various cultural changes in the lab, before assessing their 
impact on learning in the university research lab.      
 
My reference to the historic university public sphere (as explored in Chapter 
6) is often, in the academic literature, correspondingly paraphrased as the ‘scientific 
commons’, or (in critical discussions about technology transfer) the ‘growing 
privatization of the scientific commons’228 (see, e.g., Nelson, 2004).  Historically, 
according to David (2004), the notion of an academic scientific commons, or ‘open 
science’ as he calls it, is a relatively new cultural phenomenon that can be traced back 
to the 17
th
 century concomitant with the collapse of feudalism (see Chapter 4) and the 
rise of the scientific revolution.  Prior to this period, science was performed in staunch 
secrecy in pursuit of ‘nature’s secrets’ as exemplified by the medieval and 
Renaissance traditions of alchemy (David, 2004).  And only just recently, in the past 
few decades, has the notion of open science been formally delineated by Merton’s 
ideal ‘norms’ of scientific conduct (1942; see Chapter 5), in particular the norm of 
‘communalism’ that is the expectation of the lab researcher to share with peers her 
scientific ideas, methods, and results; in other words, ‘complete free disclosure’ 
(Dasgupta & David, 1994: 492).  Merton essentially laid the ethical groundwork for 
the democratic conduct and dissemination of scientific research.   
In the context of the university, open science is exemplified by the ‘priority-
reward recognition system’, also originally devised by Merton (1957).  In this model, 
the lab researcher competes with other lab researchers with the goal to be first in 
contributing a significant and novel scientific finding to the scientific commons 
because the lab researcher is motivated by eventual professional prestige, publication 
of research findings, or the award of a prize (Godfrey-Smith, 2003)
229
.  But even in 
                                                 
228
 Alternatively labeled in the academic literature as the ‘anti-commons’, which describes underuse by 
people of a limiting resource because many others in the population restrict access to it; see, for example, Heller 
and Eisenberg (1998).  
229
 Cohen and Walsh et al (2007) cite additional rewards associated with ‘winning’ first place in the 
‘priority-reward recognition system’.  These include the award of external sponsorship through consulting and 
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this system, as Hong and Walsh (2009; see also Dasgupta & David, 1994) are quick to 
note, academic science is built upon the contradictory motivations of ‘openness’ and 
‘secrecy’: ‘openness’ because research findings are published, eventually, and thereby 
contribute to the culture of open science; ‘secrecy’ because research findings are 
invariably kept secret until the point of publication so that the lab researcher and her 
lab can be the first to claim credit for the discovery.   
However, such a model of university scientific conduct predates the passing 
by the US Congress in 1980 of the Bayh-Dole Act that, recall from Chapter 5, 
heralded the heyday of university patenting and the consequential rise of the 
technological triumvirate.  Against this backdrop, it is easy to see how the ‘priority-
reward recognition system’ may become (or perhaps has become, to an extent) 
imbalanced as it tips more towards ‘secrecy’.  For it is conceivable that commercially 
viable discoveries are kept secret by the lab researcher pending their patent protection 
in order to avoid the theft, and potential ultimate monetary rewards, of such 
discoveries by competitors.   
 
Turning to the empirical data, and consistent with the general findings of 
Campbell et al (2002), Hong and Walsh’s (2009) data230 reveal that secrecy231 among 
experimental biologists
232
 soared, with increasing scientific competition (and to a 
lesser extent industry funding), from 55% in the 1960s to 87% in the late 1990s
233
.  
Moreover, the data additionally reveal that secrecy is significantly more prevalent in 
experimental biology than in mathematics or physics (the other two subjects 
examined), which is consistent with the notion that experimental biology is a field 
                                                                                                                                            
speaking fees; salary increase and job security; and gaining a competitive advantage in the application for research 
grants, the award of which is absolutely dependent on historical reputation, particularly the quantity and quality of 
past research publications. 
230 Using their own mathematical modeling and independent analysis, Hong and Walsh (2009) 
incorporate two comparable research surveys from two different groups of lab researchers taken 30 years apart by 
two independent researchers.  The first survey was conducted in 1966 by Hagstrom (1974) who sampled a national 
random sample of 1,947 academic scientists; the second survey was conducted in 1998 by Walsh et al (2000) who 
sampled a national random sample of 399 academic scientists.  The former study predates the Bayh-Dole Act of 
1980 – the time around the advent of the technological triumvirate of university-industry alliances (see Chapter 5) 
– whilst the latter survey postdates the Act.  These studies, therefore, provide unique insights into the before and 
after effects of technology transfer on academic secrecy.  Although the overlapping academic subjects of both 
surveys covered were mathematics, physics, and experimental biology, only the data of the latter subject will be 
considered here because it most closely aligns to the current professional context of the university molecular 
biology research lab.   
231
 ‘Secrecy’ is defined by the authors, and presented to respondents, as being ‘at least somewhat 
unwilling to talk about their ongoing research’ (Hong & Walsh, 2009: 157).   
232
 Here, ‘experimental biologist’ is professionally equivalent to ‘lab researcher’.   
233
 Importantly, this data complements the empirical data presented in Chapter 5 that shows a sharp 
spike in university patent applications, and in general technology transfer activity, after the passing of the Bayh-
Dole Act.     
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with more patentable discoveries, especially when one thinks of pharmaceutical 
drugs.  Interestingly, the data reveal that patenting is not associated with secrecy 
among university lab researchers, which contradicts the empirical data of Blumenthal 
(1997).     
Similar to the findings of Hong and Walsh (2009), Grimpe et al (2011) reveal 
a significant correlation between increased industry sponsorship and increased 
secrecy and disclosure delays with regard to publications.  Although the data of 
Grimpe et al (2011) regarding industry sponsorship and secrecy is derived from 
German universities, it does align with the data derived from American universities 
collated by Blumenthal et al (1996) to suggest that a culture of secrecy born from the 
technological triumvirate is not country-specific
234
.   
Whereas the data of Hong and Walsh (2009) demonstrate a culture of secrecy 
among lab researchers within the same lab (or university), the data of Blumenthal et 
al (1997) demonstrate a culture of secrecy, in the context of data and material 
requisitions, between lab researchers from different universities.  Blumenthal et al 
additionally report that close to 20% of respondents claim at least one historical delay 
of more than 6 months on the publication of their internal research data.  The reasons 
given for such publication delays are, by majority, tied to technology transfer: 46% 
related to pending patent applications; 26% to buy time to negotiate license 
agreements; and 17% to resolve legal issues related to IP (Blumenthal et al, 2007).  
Moreover, the authors reveal that delays in publication are significantly correlated 
with the university research lab being a recipient of industry funding – 27% of 
respondents receiving industry funding report publication delays, compared to 17% 
receiving non-industry funding – a finding that favors the notion of industry-imposed 
publication delays of university research lab papers containing proprietary internal 
research data (Beckelman et al, 2003).  Lastly, 31% of respondents who engage in 
commercialization of their research report publication delays of more than 6 months, 
compared to just 11% of respondents who do not engage in commercialization.  
Commercialization was also significantly associated with competitiveness (and 
                                                 
 
234
 That a culture of academic secrecy is not specific to the US is consistent with the implementation of 
Bayh-Dole-like Acts in several European countries.  For example, in Germany (the country of investigation in the 
Grimpe et al 2011 study, above) Siepmann (2004) reports that an amendment to the German Employed Inventor’s 
Act essentially transferred greater commercial and economic rights of patented discoveries from the university to 
the lab researcher who discovered them (online resource available at: http://www.ipeg.eu/blog/wp-content/uploads/ 
Thomas-Siepmann-THE-GLOBAL-EXPORTATION-OF-THE-U.S.-BAYHDOLE-Act.pdf - last accessed 
7/29/2012). 
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perhaps a perceived notion of secrecy) because of those that engage in 
commercialization 13% denied other scientists access to biomaterials, compared to 
5% who do not engage in commercialization.  Indeed, the requisition of biomaterials 
from, and by, lab researchers is an area of investigation undertaken empirically by 
Walsh et al (2007). 
The authors in this study utilized mailed questionnaires and subsequent 
statistical analysis in order to evaluate the impact of either patents containing, or 
biomaterials
235
 required for research in order to reproduce, key ‘knowledge inputs’ 
necessary for the progress of research projects of university lab researchers.  Walsh et 
al (2007) show that 20% of respondents’ requests for tangible biomaterials were met, 
on the part of the lab researcher, with noncompliance.  They find that such 
noncompliance is not associated with a patent on the biomaterial, but rather is tied to 
the donor lab researcher being engaged in commercial activity, secrecy, or 
inconvenience
236
 – findings consistent with the data of Campbell et al (2002).  
Importantly, the authors report that noncompliance leads to the abandonment of one 
out of nine university lab research projects.   
By contrast, the data of Walsh et al, from the same study (2007), demonstrates 
that access by the university lab researcher to intangible knowledge inputs is largely 
unimpeded by patents.  This is despite the fact that patents legally prohibit others 
from using the patented knowledge (Cohen & Walsh, 2008).  The authors reveal that a 
mere 8% of university lab researchers report that in the past two years they had 
conducted research using knowledge contained in an active patent; in other words, the 
vast majority of university lab researchers are oblivious to, or simply disregard
237
, the 
possibility that their knowledge inputs may be covered by an active patent (Walsh et 
al, 2007).  The study finds that for those lab researchers cognizant of, and who 
subsequently submit a request to obtain, a knowledge input contained in an active 
patent is a minimal impediment to the requester’s research: none of the random 
respondents aborted their research project; less than 1% experienced delays or 
                                                 
235
 ‘Biomaterials’ are defined by the authors as tangible materials required for research inputs such as a 
plasmid, cell line, tissue, organism, etc. (Walsh et al, 2007).   
236
 Much of the source of this inconvenience comes from the requirement by the donor university lab 
researcher to draft a Material Transfer Agreement (MTA), which is the necessary formal paperwork required to 
fulfill such requests.    
237
 Reasons for this ignorance on the part of the university lab researcher are suggested by the authors 
and include, for example: habits originating from pre-patent times; competitive career advancement; and the 
historically low incidence of lawsuits centered on patent infringement.   
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modified their research; and the vast majority incurred no cost to access knowledge 
contained in a patent (Walsh et al, 2007).   
 
In light of all this empirical data, we now assess the impact of cultural 
changes in the university research lab on my students’ learning therein.  In order to do 
so, I apply the same economic framework and nomenclature (Gazier & Touffut, 2006; 
Kaul & Mendoza, 2003) that I utilized in Chapter 3 to determine the ‘economic good 
status’ of knowledge in various contexts: 
 
First, from previous chapters we learned that technology transfer – a complex 
and collective product of key hard, soft, and control technologies (Chapters 2, 3, 4) – 
opened the doors of the university to additional entrepreneurial ties with industry, and 
the technological triumvirate of university-industry alliances was born (Chapter 5).  
Upon review of the empirical data presented in this chapter, we now see that the 
technological triumvirate is apparently responsible for a heightened culture of secrecy 
among lab researchers (i.e., my students) in the postmodern university
238
 (a concept 
built in Chapter 6).   
For the data of Hong and Walsh (2009) – a longitudinal study examining 
before and after effects – shows that heightened secrecy strikingly correlates with the 
emergence, around the 1980s, of the technological triumvirate
239
.  Consistently, the 
data of Grimpe et al (2011; and Blumenthal et al, 1996) correlates increased secrecy 
with increased university sponsorship from industry
240
; industry sponsorship, like 
technology transfer, is a key manifestation of the technological triumvirate (Chapter 
5).  Increased industry sponsorship of the university research lab additionally 
correlates with increased publication delays, according to the data of Blumenthal et al 
(1997).  And lastly, the data of Walsh et al (2007; and Campbell et al, 2002) shows 
that such secrecy may provoke on the part of the university lab researcher actions of 
noncompliance for requested tangible biomaterials from other lab researchers.    
 
                                                 
238
 ‘Postmodern’ is my designator (not the authors) for the contemporary universities examined in these 
studies; see Chapter 6. 
239
 The emergence of the technological triumvirate is coincident with the passage in 1980 of the US 
Bayh-Dole Act; see Chapter 5.   
240
 The data of Blumenthal et al (1997) demonstrates that this heightened culture of secrecy is not just 
contained within the same university, but rather reverberates among many universities – suggesting that secrecy is 
an industry-wide phenomenon. 
Stewart Craig; 9610118 
123 
 
 Second, as a probable product of the technological triumvirate, heightened 
secrecy would appear to confer among my students a degree of economic rivalry to 
the internal research data (hereafter ‘knowledge’) being kept secret.  This is so, 
because consumption
241
 by one of my students of a given secret knowledge precludes, 
by virtue of the fact that it is secret and therefore non-sharable, simultaneous 
consumption by other university lab researchers of the very same knowledge
242
.  
Moreover, because no one purchased this knowledge – my student generated it – then 
I conceive that this knowledge to this student is economically nonexcludable.  
However, I conceive that the knowledge becomes excludable to others should the 
student patent it, and legitimate use of which is only available upon payment of a 
license fee.  However, this scenario is contrary to the data reported by Walsh et al 
(2007) where illegitimate use (knowingly or unknowingly) of knowledge protected by 
a patent is not uncommon among university lab researchers.   
Meanwhile, in the case of noncompliance for requested biomaterials, I suggest 
that this may create a case of economic rivalry whereby the requestor knows a certain 
knowledge, but requires a critical biomaterial from another research lab in order to 
conduct an experiment(s) that generates tangible confirmation of the knowledge (such 
as a picture of a protein gel) for a scientific paper.  In this instance, the knowledge – 
more precisely, tangible confirmation of it – is rivalrous to the broader scientific 
community insofar as noncompliance for the critical requested biomaterial is ongoing.      
 
Third, and finally, as a probable product of the technological triumvirate, 
heightened publication delays would (like heightened secrecy) appear to confer 
among my students a degree of economic rivalry on the knowledge being delayed.  
This is the case because consumption by the author of a given publication-pending 
paper precludes simultaneous consumption by other university lab researchers of the 
                                                 
241
 ‘Consumption’ in this context refers to use by the lab researcher of the knowledge to steer her 
immediate experimental direction.  You will recall from earlier discussions that a given knowledge comprising 
either a single piece or set of data can entirely confirm or refute an experimental hypothesis; knowledge 
acquisition, no matter how big or small, is key to contributing to the greater scientific picture – not just for the 
university lab researcher who generated it – but for all university lab researchers working in the same research 
field.     
242
 Remember we are talking here about a heightened degree of secrecy – as opposed to the regular, and 
expected, degree of secrecy common among many university lab researchers outside the context of the 
technological triumvirate (see Merton, 1957). 
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very same knowledge contained in the paper
243
.  However, a crucial distinction 
between these two causes of rivalry must be made:   
In the case of secrecy, the length of the rivalry is at the arbitrary will of the 
university lab researcher maintaining rivalry of the knowledge via secrecy.        
In the case of publication delays, the length of the rivalry is presumably at the 
will of the industry sponsor imposing the delay (and in turn rivalry), but such delays 
appear to be of a more predictable length of time (6 months or so) than that for 
secrecy.  Indeed, the fact that the university lab researcher has packaged her data as 
part of a scientific paper is testament to her eagerness to get the paper published, 
which in turn, in the context of online bibliographic databases, would ultimately lift 
the rivalry conferred to the knowledge
244
.            
Therefore, with secrecy we see greater embodiment in my students of 
‘manipulable man’ – a neoliberal constructed character that, recall from Chapter 4, is 
a more aggressive market player than the Homo economicus character of classical 
liberalism (Ollsen et al, 2004; Read, 2009).  For secrecy – more precisely heightened 
secrecy – has the opposite effect of publication: that is, to proactively stall 
dissemination of knowledge for potentially prolonged periods of time presumably for 
my students’ personal competitive advantage.  
 
Thus, certain internal research data generated in the university lab against the 
backdrop of the technological triumvirate is both more rivalrous and, for the most 
part, nonexcludable – dual economic designators that label such knowledge a 
‘common good’245 (Gazier & Touffut, 2006; Kaul & Mendoza, 2003).  Moreover, 
such heightened rivalry is primarily mediated by tangible and intangible forms of 
secrecy on the part of my students, as well as publication delays imposed by industry; 
i.e., a heightened culture of commercialization triggered by the technological 
triumvirate.  No mention is made in my argument about the patenting of internal 
research data because, paradoxically, it apparently does not impede subsequent 
                                                 
243
 Again, because no one purchased this knowledge then the knowledge, to the university lab researcher 
who generated it, is economically nonexcludable.    
244
 One might argue that, upon publication, the paper comes under the control of a publishing company, 
and access to it is only possible by purchasing the article (up to the point of purchase, then, the paper is technically 
excludable).  However, recall from discussions in Chapter 1 that access by the university lab researcher to most 
scientific papers published in scholarly journals is free – i.e., nonexcludable – owing to free institutional access to 
them.   
245
 More precisely, I should say ‘heightened common good’ to reflect the fact that university lab 
knowledge already is a common good, just less so outside the context of the technological triumvirate. 
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access to, use, or duplication of, this knowledge by others (Walsh et al. 2007; also 
Straus, 2002)
246
.  Walsh et al (2007) conclude their study by actually downplaying the 
notion of any potential adverse impacts of patenting on the downstream use of such 
knowledge by arguing that  
    
debates … on the effects on academic research of the patenting of upstream 
biomedical discoveries may not be addressing the most pressing policy question. 
Research may … be more effectively supported by addressing the transaction costs, 
competitive pressures and commercial interests that are impeding the sharing of data 
and material research inputs. (Walsh et al, 2007: 1201) 
 
So, surprisingly, it is not so much technology transfer per se that is the cause of 
heightened knowledge rivalry, but rather the heightened culture of commercialization 
– such as secrecy and publication delays – arising therefrom, as well as the broader 
technological triumvirate that extends to industry sponsorship.   
The finding that my students’ knowledge is a ‘common good’ in this context 
has obvious profound implications for learning in the university research lab; namely, 
that less knowledge is shared within the research community.  Yet an equally 
profound and not-so-obvious implication comes from considering external research 
data.  The reader will recall from Chapter 1 that university internal research data 
ultimately becomes, following the peer-review process, external research data in the 
form of papers published in scholarly journals; after all, the ultimate (perhaps not 
short-term) goal of my students is professional recognition and reward via publishing 
(Merton, 1957).  These journals are available to a global scientific audience in 
centralized online bibliographic databases like PubMed.   
But when internal research data has been subject to a heightened state of 
rivalry, the external research data pool is partially and temporarily starved pending 
actual publication (or presentation at a conference) of the rivalrous internal research 
data that will ultimately contribute to it.  Such collective rivalrous knowledge could 
conceivably impede the pace of learning among my students because this knowledge 
                                                 
246
 Note that an empirical paper by Murray and Stern (2007) contradicts these findings of Walsh et al 
(2007).  However, the study of Murray and Stern exclusively concerns university ‘patent-paper’ outcomes – the 
process by which academic scientific discoveries are simultaneously patented and published.  But this data, I 
caution, cannot be compared to that of Walsh et al because the latter study does not take into account patent-paper 
outcomes, and so comparing the two studies is like comparing apples and oranges.  Moreover, Murray and Stern 
find a mere modest anti-commons threat within this highly specialized and narrow publishing outcome with just a 
single scholarly journal; indeed, the authors warn that ‘evidence for the anti-commons effect captures only one 
aspect of the impact of IP’ (Murray & Stern, 2007: 684; my emphasis).  Underscoring potential shortcomings with 
their study, the authors conclude that ‘[we] are cautious in the interpretation of [our] findings’ (Murray & Stern, 
2007: 683), and then proceed to list several caveats with their methodological approach and the data arising 
therefrom.  
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may be the critical missing piece of the jig-saw puzzle of the scientific hypotheses of 
other researchers.  Then again, not having the critical piece of the jig-saw puzzle may 
make my students even more motivated to find it, thereby increasing productivity in 
the lab – and, in turn, learning through the generation of current internal research 
data.      
 And so with these arguments we see how the expansive and potent forces of 
our technologizing world trickle all the way down into the university research lab 
where they can profoundly impact my students’ learning concerning internal research 
data.  In the next, and last, chapter I collectively review the major arguments of the 
dissertation before proposing solutions for the various problems highlighted in this 














































orrowing from the popular 1985 time-travel film of the same name, 
the oxymoronic title of this last chapter of the dissertation is 
intended to convey the chapter’s twofold purpose.  First, we ‘travel 
back in time’ to the beginning of the dissertation in order to summarize its central 
arguments, and from which we extract and deconstruct a central theme of the 
dissertation, the purpose of which will become apparent later.  And second, we ‘travel 
into the future’ where we explore possible realms of freedom from the undemocratic 
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Hard, soft, control: reflections on the ‘technological triumvirate’  
The dissertation consists of two phases: phase one delineated the concept of 
the technological triumvirate of university-industry alliances, and phase two explored 
the actual impact of the technological triumvirate on the shaping of the contemporary 
university and, in the context of this institution, learning in its research labs.  A more 
detailed summary of the dissertation follows.  
  
First, having outlined in Chapter 1 my professional practice and central 
research problem, Chapter 2 laid the conceptual backbone for the dissertation.  Here, I 
delineated three types of technology common to contemporary society: hard, soft, and 
control; i.e., my technology concepts framework.  
Chapter 3 showed that certain hard ICTs were instrumental in the late 20
th
 
century transition of the university to a knowledge-based economy because these 
technologies collectively provide an increased capacity to store and manipulate 
knowledge
247
.  Moreover, the cognate soft technology of each hard ICT examined 
provides an increased capacity to disseminate knowledge
248
.  Such ICT-mediated 
heightened knowledge conveyance cultivated the necessary conditions for a 
knowledge economy by fuelling the scarcity-defying nature of knowledge, thereby 
rendering it (within the context of IP law) a lucrative global commodity.  In sum, 
hard and soft technologies that gave rise to a knowledge economy set the 
technological stage for the technological triumvirate.    
Chapter 4 argued that neoliberalism is a paradoxical control technology.  For 
while this political doctrine appears to represent a mere revival of classical liberalism, 
it is actually a control technology that undemocratically controls
249
 the individual in a 
state-fabricated free-market economy that instrumentally reduces the individual 
(including the lab researcher) to a ‘standing reserve’250.  In essence, the individual and 
institutions are controlled by the neoliberal state as a means (‘standing reserve’) for 
the neoliberal state end of optimal market efficiency in a competitive global capitalist 
                                                 
247
 Increased knowledge storage and manipulation, recall, constitute the first two criteria of my threefold 
heightened knowledge conveyance framework – a prerequisite for labeling a given technology an ‘ICT’.    
248
 Increased knowledge dissemination, recall, is the third criterion of my threefold heightened 
knowledge conveyance framework.   
249
 Recall that neoliberalism is a control technology due to its dual unconscious and undemocratic 
dimensions that are heightened relative to classical liberalism. 
250
 This is a concept of Heidegger (1977); for a more descriptive definition refer to Chapters 2 and 4.    
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economy.  In sum, the control technology of neoliberalism set the political stage for 
the technological triumvirate.   
Chapter 5 demonstrated that exploitation by the university of a knowledge 
economy through sale of its internal research data to industry in a neoliberal era of 
university entrepreneurialism has become a dominant trend in the American higher 
education system.  The Bayh-Dole Act was a crucial neoliberal policy that catalyzed 
the university’s historical engagement in technology transfer; this opened the doors of 
the university to additional entrepreneurial ventures with industry, and the 
technological triumvirate of university-industry alliances was born.   
Hence, the university sale of its select internal research data to industry may 
be conceived as a product of our technologizing world – a finding that concluded the 
first phase of the dissertation.   
 
Second, we switched gears in Chapter 6, and in doing so segued to the second 
phase of the dissertation; i.e., a closer examination of the actual university in the 
context of our technologizing world, and (in Chapter 7) learning dynamics in the lab 
therein.  Chapter 6 showed that the technological triumvirate – as exemplified by the 
archetypal university-industry alliance of technology transfer – caused industry’s 
encroachment upon the university’s historic public sphere251.   
I argued that industry’s encroachment upon the university’s historic public 
sphere is a scenario that reflects Lyotard’s performativity thesis of knowledge 
legitimation in contemporary capitalist society.  This argument was based on 
industry’s desire to steer the university research agenda away from the research lab’s 
academic research interests, and towards industry’s own commercial motivations; 
under these conditions, the university became postmodern
252
.  
Further, I argued that my notion of the postmodern university does not include 
theoretical threads of the corporate university.  For in the former, industry represented 
an external force that proactively sought the university in order to appropriate its 
intellectual resources entirely for its own commercial ends.  In contrast, the corporate 
university was (and is) an institution that merely adapted to the inevitable changing 
                                                 
251
 I further argued that because technology transfer opened the university doors to other entrepreneurial 
relationships with industry, technology transfer may additionally be conceived as the entrepreneurial seed from 
which the notion of the corporate university grew.      
252 Because such knowledge is not absolutely true to the research lab’s original academic agenda, it 
represents the minimizing input, while in the same scenario, industry’s commercial motivations represent the 
maximizing output of Lyotard’s performativity equation.   
Stewart Craig; 9610118 
130 
 
landscape of contemporary society – neoliberalism, the advent of postmodernity, etc. 
– by implementing its own necessary restructuring.    
Hence, in the context of the technological triumvirate, the contemporary 
university revealed its face in Chapter 6 as a decidedly postmodern one.   
 
Third, and finally, Chapter 7 argued that the technological triumvirate could 
cause a fundamental switch in the postmodern university’s research style from a basic 
to a more applied approach.  The latter of the two, I argued, is a less robust learning 
experience because it demands a narrower intellectual breadth on the part of the 
university lab researcher.  Relatedly, increased steerage by industry of the university 
research lab’s theoretical and practical research direction could erode the critically 
reflective capacity of the researcher.    
Chapter 7 additionally revealed that the technological triumvirate is 
responsible for three prominent cultural changes in the postmodern university 
research lab that fundamentally reconfigure the ‘economic good status’ of knowledge 
generated therein:   
1) heightened secrecy, I showed, confers among university lab 
researchers economic rivalry to the internal research data being kept 
secret.  And because no one purchased the knowledge, it is additionally 
nonexcludable.  Paradoxically, the patenting of internal research data 
apparently does not impede subsequent access to, or use of, this 
knowledge by others. 
2) noncompliance with requested biomaterials creates a case of 
economic rivalry whereby tangible proof of a given known knowledge is 
rivalrous to the broader scientific community insofar as noncompliance for 
a given critical requested biomaterial – essential for generating tangible 
confirmation of the knowledge – is ongoing.  And  
3) Publication delays, like heightened secrecy, confer among 
university lab researchers a degree of economic rivalry and 
nonexcludability on the knowledge being delayed.  Whereas with 
heightened secrecy the length of the rivalry is at the arbitrary will of the 
university lab researcher, with publication delays the length of the rivalry 
is presumably at the will of the industry sponsor imposing the delay.  
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Hence, certain internal research data generated in the postmodern university 
research lab is both more rivalrous and (for the most part) nonexcludable; i.e., in 
economic terms, a heightened ‘common good’.   
 
Thus, we inhabit a technologizing world in which the synergistic effects of 
various technologies on education – namely, the rise of the postmodern university 
and profound changes to learning in its research labs – are pervasive and profound.  
Now that the central arguments of the dissertation have been summarized, we turn to 
discuss their impact on my professional role as an educator in the postmodern 
university research lab.     
 
 
The contradictory convergence of past and present  
At the heart of most (if not all) of the issues reported in the dissertation that 
pertain to learning in the postmodern university research lab (see Chapter 7) is a 
deeply contradictory convergence.  It is between the lab’s historic and customary 
culture of free and ‘open’ science – i.e., the remnants of research under classical 
liberalism – and the more controlled, or ‘closed’253, research conditions imposed by 
industry that arise under neoliberalism
254
.  Indeed, this contradiction is echoed by 
Amsler (2010: 22) who ‘seek[s] to work within the contradictions which emerge 
between the principles of critical pedagogy [exemplified by learning in the historic 
university research lab under classical liberalism] and the existing political economy 
[neoliberalism] of organised higher education’.  So what can I as a lab educator, and 
‘lab researchers’ collectively, do to reconcile the two competing forces of the 
willingness and freedom to research and publish what one wants (i.e., open science) 
versus the research and publication constraints levied by industry, and the various 
cultural changes that ensue (i.e., closed science)?  In order to answer this, we must 
extract and dissect from the preceding summary a central theme of the dissertation in 
order to get to the root cause of the contradiction: 
                                                 
253
 ‘Closed’ science essentially comprises two phenomena, as outlined in the preceding summary of the 
dissertation: 1) the switch from a basic to an applied research approach (and the related erosion of the lab 
researcher’s critically reflective capacity); and 2) key cultural changes in the postmodern university research lab.  
254
 Contradictory convergence is premised on the notion of the desire of the postmodern university lab 
researcher to conduct open and free scientific research.  Therefore, one would expect it to not be a contradictory 
convergence in the case of the postmodern university lab researcher who is willingly engaged in a controlled 
research collaboration (i.e., one that exemplifies closed science) with industry.   
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First, the culminating theme of the first phase of the dissertation (Chapters 2 
through 5) is the technological triumvirate of university-industry alliances.  Here, the 
university operating in a neoliberal (i.e., a control technology) climate of pervasive 
privatization exploits a knowledge economy (i.e., hard and soft technologies) by 
selling select internal research data to industry; other university entrepreneurial 
ventures blossom.  
Second, the second phase of the dissertation (Chapters 6 and 7) takes the 
concept of the technological triumvirate and shows how it is a key causative force in: 
1) the formation of the postmodern university; and 2) fundamental changes in the 
nature of learning (pertaining to the fundamental research style and certain cultural 
changes) within the postmodern university research lab.  
Third, and finally, the products of the technological triumvirate that are the 
postmodern university and concurrent changes to learning in its research labs arise as 
a result of industry’s alignment of the university’s research agenda with its own; i.e., 
the emergence of closed science.   
Hence, the contradictory convergence of open versus closed science in the 
postmodern university research lab is ultimately caused by the complex collective 
components of the technological triumvirate.  Moreover, these components are 
unequivocally capitalist in nature.  For the ultimate pursuit of the controllers of each 
component – a knowledge economy (born from hard and soft technologies), 
neoliberalism (a control technology), the university (a quasi-corporate institution), 
and industry (a corporation) – is, respectively: profit (or at least financial or 
commercial gain) from the sale of knowledge; the capitalization of society
255
; the 
corporatization of higher education (and profit maximization in the case of the for-
profit university); and perpetual profit maximization.  Crucially, these are all core 
qualities or goals of capitalism
256
.  Since the root cause of the contradictory 
convergence is ultimately attributable to capitalism via the technological triumvirate, 
it would make sense that the natural approach to tackle it is an anti-capitalist one
257
.   
                                                 
255
 For neoliberalism as an obvious embodiment, pervasive implementer, and driver, of capitalism in 
contemporary society, see in-depth discussion in Chapter 4, especially concluding remarks towards the end of this 
chapter.  
256
 Note that each component of the technological triumvirate was inherently capitalist prior to the 
formation of the technological triumvirate.  That is, except for the university, until a knowledge economy and 
neoliberalism caused evolution of the historic university into a quasi-corporate – and in turn capitalist – institution.   
257
 ‘Approach’ is premised on practical action, which is distinct from just ‘critique’, with the former 
often being prompted by the latter.   
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In asking what it means to be ‘anti-capitalist’, Slaughter (2005: 189) writes 
that the foundation for an answer – but ‘not of course the answer itself’ – can be 
found in the writings of Marx and Engels.  Indeed, the historical foundation for an 
anti-capitalist approach was famously outlined by Marx (and Engels [1848] 2008)
258
 
who, in essence, argued that industrial capitalist societies are characterized by an 
ongoing class struggle
259
.  In this struggle, ruling capitalists (‘bourgeoisie’) own the 
bulk of the means of production, and reap the surplus value through exploitation of 
the working class (‘proletariat’) (Duncan, 1989); i.e., a society characterized by the 
inevitable contradiction ‘between the social relations of production and the forces of 
production’ (Young, 1976: 196).  But times have changed since Marx, and so too 
have many facets of capitalism.   
For example, Drucker (1993) argues that contemporary capitalism, or ‘post-
capitalism’ as he calls it, is a relatively egalitarian social system because it is 
characterized by ‘knowledge workers’ who, contrary to the traditional perceived 
capitalist mode of production, own both the ‘means of production’ through their 
pension funds, and the ‘tools of production’ through transferability of their specialist 
knowledge skills.  Moreover, Butler (online resource
260
) believes that the more 
serious woes of capitalism are not the result of the presumed inherent dysfunctions of 
a free market economy, but are rather the result of human doing – or lack thereof:  
 
 the [ensuing global financial] crisis was not caused by capitalism’s being fatally 
flawed.  It was caused by politicians forcing the banks to give out bad loans, 
monetary authorities flooding the West with cheap credit and regulators being asleep 
at the wheel. 
 
Therefore, notwithstanding legitimate social and economic inequality (Webber, 
2012)
261
, contemporary capitalism, or more precisely certain facets of it, need not 
always arouse an ‘anti-capitalist approach’ to it – especially of the radical (or 
‘totalitarian’; Caffentzis, 2011) sort proposed by Marx (2008).  So is anti-capitalist the 
                                                 
258
 Contrary to popular belief, Caffentzis (2011) reports that anti-capitalist movements were present 
prior to Marx, citing academic literature dedicated to the analysis of such movements.   
259
 Marx’s (2008) proposed approach – i.e. practical action – is a revolutionary one called ‘dictatorship 
of the proletariat’.  Here, collapse of the class struggle is accomplished upon violent overthrow by the proletariat of 
the capitalist order with a consequent rise of a classless communist society comprising collective social ownership 
and control of the means of production (Duncan, 1989).   
260
 Available at: http://www.policynetwork.net/development/media/blame-bad-rules-not-bad-capitalism 
(last accessed 7/29/2012).  
261
 For Webber (2012), it is not capitalism per se that is the problem, but rather the way in which it is 
practiced, arguing that the two other popular historical political doctrines of communism and socialism are more 
fatally flawed and corrupt than capitalism.   
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right approach to reconcile the contradictory convergence?  To answer this, we must 
evaluate each causal capitalist component of the technological triumvirate – i.e., a 
knowledge economy, neoliberalism, the university, and industry – as a legitimate 
target of an anti-capitalist approach:   
 
First, the dissertation has shown the numerous positive ways in which a 
knowledge economy – an embodiment of capitalism – has revolutionized learning in 
the university research lab, especially in the context of heightened knowledge 
conveyance (see Chapter 3).  A knowledge economy, then, largely because of its 
monumental contributions to learning in, as well as its critical contributions to the 
economic infrastructure of, contemporary society, is not necessarily an appropriate 
target of an anti-capitalist approach.  But another reason for excluding a knowledge 
economy as a viable target follows.   
 
Second, neoliberalism is an obvious target of an anti-capitalist approach 
because it is a control technology that was an instrumental capitalist force in 
fashioning the university into a postmodern institution.  However, the fact that 
neoliberalism is such a distant cause of the contradictory convergence precludes it 
from being a legitimate target.  In other words, neoliberalism – as with a knowledge 
economy – is an upstream causal capitalist component of the technological 
triumvirate, which in turn makes it a more distant cause of the contradictory 
convergence than, say, the university, which is a more downstream or immediate 
cause of the contradictory convergence.  For this reason, an anti-capitalist approach 
targeting neoliberalism seems unviable
262
.   
 
Third, in the technological triumvirate chain-of-causality, the university itself 
is an immediate cause of the contradictory convergence of open versus closed science 
                                                 
262
 And even if neoliberalism were a target of an anti-capitalist approach, what shape would it take?  
This is difficult to define given that neoliberalism is a political doctrine, the effects of which are ideologically 
omnipresent; many downstream effects of neoliberal policy are felt in the university (e.g., closed science in the 
context of the contradictory convergence) inasmuch as they are felt outside it (e.g., personal financial debt from 
purchasing privatized healthcare).  Therefore, to truly target neoliberalism is to target the source – that being the 
neoliberal political party in power – which (in anti-capitalist fashion or not) amounts to otherthrow, or at least 
social or political challenge, of the party.  For to target the downstream effects of neoliberalism does not target 
neoliberalism per se – but rather an indirect downstream cause of it.  That said, to truly target the source of 
neoliberalism by myself, or even a mass movement of lab educators, is not only preposterous, but unrealistic; 
indeed, Marlowe (2000: 1046) reminds us that ‘the remedy of “overthrowing” [for example] a state government 
seems not only implausible today, but also unrealistic and impractical’.      
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in its research labs precisely because it is host to the problem; i.e., it opens its doors to 
industry.  But I previously argued that this is through no fault of its own; the 
university is merely adapting to the political and economic landscape of neoliberalism 
through, for example, its utilization of a knowledge economy by engaging in 
technology transfer.  This market survival mechanism by the university, I believe, 
renders it too an implausible target of an anti-capitalist approach.   
 
Fourth, and finally, industry – the second immediate cause of the 
contradictory convergence – is, unlike the university, a more proactive player in the 
technological triumvirate.  For the reader will recall from Chapter 6 that industry is an 
exogenous force that proactively seeks the university in order to appropriate its 
intellectual resources for its own commercial leverage, making industry the prime 
candidate for an anti-capitalist approach.  But two points seriously undermine, and as 
a result I believe exempt, industry as a plausible target: 
1) to target industry is to target the university (which I have already made 
exempt, above), given the contemporary university’s exquisite dependence 
on the capitalist activities of industry in the context of the technological 
triumvirate; the university is a de facto supporter of industry, and more 
broadly capitalism.  And, 
2)  with reference to not just my analysis of industry, but to all causal 
capitalist components of the technological triumvirate, my acceptance of 
capitalism as a prominent political, economic, and cultural reality of 
contemporary society calls into question my anti-capitalist approach as 
possibly hypocritical.  And despite the fact that the ongoing global 
financial crisis may mark an end to the way in which capitalism is 




Thus, none of the causal capitalist components of the technological 
triumvirate present viable targets of an anti-capitalist solution to the problems I have 
described and analyzed; however, this does not preclude them from anti-capitalist 
                                                 
263
 This is evident in President Barack Obama’s policies that perpetuate consumerist, and a plethora of 
other forms of, capitalism that were largely inherited, together with the financial crisis, from former President 
George W. Bush’s administration.  Crucially, under the former, capitalism is subject to greater regulation through 
third way policy, whereas under the latter, capitalism was so unregulated through neoliberal policy that it 
precipitated the financial crisis (see Bresser-Pereira, 2010); in both cases, capitalism is very much present – but 
managed differently.  (For the third way and neoliberalism as embodiments of capitalism, see Chapter 4.)  





.  In recognizing industry as an immediate and proactive cause of closed 
science, I instead propose a resistance approach that targets industry in the specific 
context of the contradictory convergence of open versus closed science
265
.  The 
practicalities of my resistance approach I now outline.        
 
 
The ‘technological triumvirate’: freedoms and possibilities  
Rikowski (2004) draws on Marx to outline an anti-capitalist ‘education for the 
future’ (this is one possible example of a ‘critical pedagogy’266; see Amsler, 2010)267.  
Rikowski (2004) emphasizes that his education for the future does not simply have a 
clear start and finish with educational ideals at the end.  Rather, it is a process in 
continual flux with ‘no fixed or end state’ – a ‘kind of becoming’ (Rikowski, 2004: 
566) – consistent with Marx and Engel’s (1976: 57; cited in Rikowski, 2004) notion 
of communism as a ‘state of affairs’.  Being a ‘state of affairs’ suggests that 
communism is a preexisting, albeit repressed, social condition within capitalist society 
that needs awakening – or ‘objective maturation’ (Slaughter, 2005: 191) – through a 
‘transitional epoch’, by the working class (Rikowski, 2004).  According to Rikowski, 
                                                 
264
 A common and recurring anti-capitalist critique of a knowledge economy, for example, is the stark 
disparity in access to digital technology, particularly in developing countries, which has given rise to the so-called 
‘digital divide; see, for example, Gleave (2002). 
265
 My resistance approach is more nuanced than an anti-capitalist approach because, following Marx 
and many scholars, the former does not carry the same connotative radicalism of the latter.  For example, Marxist 
scholar David Harvey (2012: 25) radically states that ‘the ultimate aim of anti-capitalist struggle is, quite simply, 
the abolition of that class relation’.  What is the problem with radicalism?  First, radicalism is a reaction or a 
solution to some radical circumstance or scenario.  But as I argued above, capitalism in and out of the current 
professional context does not, for the most part (and in light of the necessary preservation of industry’s role in the 
postmodern university), create a scenario sufficiently radical to warrant a radical (anti-capitalist or other) reaction.  
Second, radicalism, more so than conservatism, in the process of attaining the best outcomes for humanity, can, 
ironically, create the worst outcomes for humanity (e.g., radical resistance to industry’s presence in the university 
could result in less industry sponsorship of university research, which in turn would impede research).  In short, 
the ultimate goal of my resistance approach is positive change with minimal disruption to research and learning in 
the research lab.          
266
 Critical pedagogy is closely associated with the tool of ‘consciousness-raising’, which may be 
defined (rather simplistically so) as ‘increased awareness about the causes, consequences, and cures for a particular 
problem behavior’ (Prochaska et al 2008: 101).  Consciousness-raising is rooted in radical feminism of the 1960s 
(Sarachild, 1978; Wang & Burris, 1994), but nowadays has become deeply embedded in (but is by no means 
exclusive to; see, e.g., Parker & Fukuyama, 2006) feminist research methodology (Ball, 1992).  Consciousness-
raising has been taken up most notably by Brazilian pedagogue Paulo Freire (see La Belle, 1987) whose 
‘conscientization’ process describes how the learner becomes cognizant of, and undertakes subsequent 
emancipatory action in response to, various societal oppressions (Yep, 1998).    
267
 Building on Marx, Rikowski’s (2005) anti-capitalist approach underscores the belief that the 
paramount ingredient for the production of capital – i.e., labor power, which is the commodity that laborers own 
and sell to capitalists for a wage – is, paradoxically, capital’s ‘weakest link’ because it rests entirely on the will of 
the laborer.  As such, labor power (and, in turn, capital production) is precariously vulnerable to labor disputes – or 
more dramatically, anti-capitalist approaches – on the part of the laborer(s).       
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and in the context of education, this awakening is attainable if schools incorporate 
three ‘moments’268 in order to be truly anti-capitalist:   
First, the educator must engage in a comprehensive critique of all facets of 
capitalist society and education (Rikowski, 2004: 567)
269
.   
Second, critique alone is insufficient; one must strive to ‘meet human needs 
and education’ (Rikowski, 2004: 568)270.   
And third, one must work towards ‘realms of freedom’ because an education 
of the future incorporating just ‘critique’ and ‘addressing human needs’ may, 
according to Rikowski, appear ‘negative’ and ‘self-sacrificial’.  Realms of freedom, 
which is associated with transformative social action, is about resisting the 
institutionalized processes of capitalism and capitalist schooling.  And it is precisely 
this third ‘moment’ of Rikowski that inspired me to explore the realms of freedom 
attainable in my own profession through the practical engagement of my resistance 
approach: 
  
First, and foremost, I am committed to preserving a basic research approach as 
the primary research style in the university research lab.  I previously showed that a 
basic research approach – i.e., the cultural norm of the historic university – is more 
democratic than industry’s preferred applied research approach because the former 
not only empowers the lab researcher with greater intellectual autonomy, but it 
additionally demands, and garners, greater intellectual breadth on the part of the 
university lab researcher.  How does this commitment play out in reality? 
My resistance approach resists the capitalist motives of industry in the 
university research lab, which in this instance is industry’s preference of an applied 
research approach as a means to streamline and economize the research process in 
order to expedite drug discovery, development and, ultimately, commercialization.  
But because applied research actually expedites the discovery of novel drug 
candidates due to its highly targeted approach, perhaps I should propose an 
                                                 
268
 Rikowski’s (2004) three ‘moments’ loosely follow the reflective cycles of ‘research’, ‘experiential 
learning’, and ‘action’, in the context of action research (Boog, 2003: 432).   
269
 This includes a critique of all forms of social inequality – including ‘capitalist patriarchy’ (see 
Ambrose, 2012) – because these are ultimately and inextricably tied to capital accumulation and value production 
(Rikowski, 2004, 2005).    
270
 For Rikowski, critique must be ultimately motivated by ‘human needs’ – not just those of the student, 
but by the community at large – as the desired end goal of critique.   
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enrichment of, rather than an outright resistance to, industry’s applied research 
approach.   
As a university lab educator I am committed to encouraging my students to 
frequent the academic literature in order to seek relevant published papers containing 
basic research that originally informed the applied research which they are 
conducting.  After all, we learned in Chapter 7 that basic research is the theoretical 
basis for applied research.  Reading the academic literature gives one a richer 
understanding – i.e., a broader intellectual breadth – of the applied research they are 
working on.  And in doing so, it carries the potential to spawn new avenues of 
research that may ultimately enrich the long-term goals of their applied research in a 
manner wholly consistent with a culture of open science.  This is especially true if my 
students keep abreast of new publications in their research field that appear in real-
time in the context of online bibliographic databases like PubMed (see Chapter 1).   
 
Second, I am committed to cultivating the critically reflective capacity of my 
students.  I noted in Chapter 1 that as a lab educator I am an educational ‘observer’ (as 
much as an educational ‘doer’) in the sense that I merely guide my students into an 
adult-centered learning experience – hence the occasional reference of my students as 
‘my peers’.  This is my preferred pedagogical approach because it independently 
forces my students to actively deconstruct the theoretical meaning of their own 
current internal research data that, in turn, assists in their next logical steering of the 
research project.  But I earlier warned that the researcher’s critically reflective 
capacity is in danger of becoming redundant if industry controls the research path and 
process.  So how do I execute this commitment? 
Here, my resistance approach resists the capitalist way in which industry 
objectifies the lab researcher by tightly controlling both the methodological execution 
and theoretical direction of the research project in a manner that most efficiently 
meets industry’s market desires.   
As a lab educator I propose that preservation of a basic research approach is, 
in the tradition of true open science, key to cultivating the lab researcher’s critically 
reflective capacity.  For the intellectual autonomy created by the former is in fact an 
expression of the latter; they go hand-in-hand.  But the lab educator can do more to 
cultivate the lab researcher’s critically reflective capacity.  For example, I will 
encourage more frequent attendance at lab meetings as a way for my students to fully 
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grasp the meaning of, as well as to gain from their peers fresh and critical perspectives 
on, their research (the logical integrity of which can all too easy get lost in the context 
of fast paced university-industry research collaborations).  Similarly, establishment of 
a ‘journal club’ (see Esisi, 2007; online resource271) – an informal periodic group 
discussion wherein researchers critically review one chosen peer-reviewed publication 
– provides a means to sharpen the student’s critically reflective capacity through the 
systematic scientific analysis, review, and critique of external research data. 
 
Third, I am committed to discouraging among my students a culture of 
heightened secrecy within my lab, aside from the unavoidable degree of secrecy 
associated with, and expected from, the competitive lab researcher.  A culture of open 
science, on the other hand, is an open-minded team effort (as opposed to a close-
minded personal effort) whereby students collectively brainstorm, troubleshoot, and 
finesse one another’s research projects.  Such team effort expedites learning and, in 
turn, the progress of scientific endeavor because many minds are better than one.  
How do I enact this commitment? 
 Because heightened secrecy is a phenomenon that affects the university lab 
researcher, my resistance approach in this instance involves my commitment to resist 
the capitalist tendencies of the lab researcher – as against those of industry.  However, 
it may not be literal ‘capitalist tendencies’ on the part of the university lab researcher 
that are the issue because it is unlikely to be profit (i.e., a primary monetary motive of 
capitalism) that is motivating the lab researcher to engage in heightened secrecy.  
Instead, the lab researcher’s temptation to heightened secrecy would presumably be 
ultimately motivated by the desire to be the sole recipient of some form of monetary 
reward like patent licensing fees or consultation fees that, nevertheless, were 
conceived by, and occur in, the very capitalist context of the technological 
triumvirate. 
As a lab educator my resistance approach in this instance involves my 
commitment to cultivating and strengthening among my students a culture of open 
science.  Yet again, this is accomplishable by scheduling more frequent lab meetings 
as means to more openly expose my peers’ internal research data to one another.  But 
because heightened secrecy is presumably motivated by possible commercial rewards 
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 Available at: http://careers.bmj.com/careers/advice/view-article.html?id=2631 (last accessed 
7/29/2012).  
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from research, and according to the published empirical data appears to be a culturally 
ingrained, and therefore unavoidable, phenomenon among lab researchers nowadays, 
I can suggest a policy in my lab that encourages my students and peers to share with 
all researchers in the lab any monetary rewards reaped from university-industry 
alliances.      
 
Fourth, I am committed to discouraging among my students a culture of 
noncompliance for requested biomaterials.  The empirical data presented in Chapter 7 
shows noncompliance to occur between different – not within the same – university 
research labs
272
.  But the data does not mean that noncompliance does not occur 
among lab researchers within the same university research lab, including my own.  
This is not unrealistic given the current prevalent culture of competitiveness among 
lab researchers against the backdrop of the technological triumvirate and, more 
broadly, neoliberal policies of privatization.   
Since noncompliance for requested biomaterials is essentially a form of 
secrecy (or withholding) that concerns tangible biomaterials as opposed to intangible 
data and knowledge, my resistance approach to tackle noncompliance within my 
lab
273
 is the same for that for heightened secrecy.   
 
Fifth, and finally, I am committed to minimizing publication delays imposed 
by industry on my lab’s internal research data.  We learned in Chapter 1 that, at the 
point of publication, a lab’s internal research data invariably flows into the global 
external research data pool in the form of a published paper that is archived in online 
bibliographic databases.  Therefore, publication delays impede – at the global level, 
and in real-time – the general progress of scientific research; delays on publications 
containing one lab’s internal research data momentarily deprive other labs in the 
same research field of that data.  Moreover, a given piece of delayed data can 
represent a pivotal piece of the jigsaw puzzle for another lab, causing a momentary 
stall in their research – and, in turn, the entire global research field – as they strive to 
discover that missing piece of the puzzle for subsequent publication.  But publication 
                                                 
272
 Recall, noncompliance for requested biomaterials occurs when a university lab researcher from one 
lab requests, and is subsequently ignored or declined, a research tangible (e.g., reagent, antibody, printed DNA 
sequence) from a lab researcher in a different lab.    
273
 As is in the case of heightened secrecy, I have no control over the capitalist tendencies of lab 
researchers external to my lab who engage in noncompliance for requested biomaterials with my peers.   
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delays not only have an adverse impact on labs conducting research similar to a lab 
with an imposed publication delay; labs in other research fields are adversely affected 
because publications often contain novel experimental methodology that, because of 
its broad and standardized nature, is applicable to many diverse research fields.    
Here, my resistance approach involves resisting the capitalist way in which 
industry delays publication of a paper produced by a collaborating university research 
lab in order to protect the commercial value of the knowledge contained in the paper 
for industry’s own commercial exploitation.   
It seems as if very little can be done to resist publication delays if the 
university research lab enters into a contractual agreement whereby industry enforces 
a delay.  But there are realistic alternatives to this scenario.  For example, one obvious 
solution is for the lab educator to refuse to sign a publication delay agreement, and to 
alternatively negotiate with industry that they, or the university, patent the knowledge 
prior to publication as a means to protect that knowledge from commercialization by 
others.  However, if it is a pending patent application that is the reason for industry 
imposing a publication delay, then I propose that the paper in question can still be 
published in a timely manner and prior to the patent being filed if the most 
commercially lucrative data contained in it is codified.   
For example, instead of using universal scientific nomenclature, such as the 
literal name for a gene, the publishing lab could use a pseudonym in order to disguise 
a particular gene or DNA sequence.  However, I realize that codifying knowledge in 
this manner defeats the purpose of the knowledge, in its explicit and open form, being 
utilized by the global scientific community.  So to address this issue, the publishing 
lab can note in the paper that the codified knowledge contained in it will be available 
to the scientific community in entirely uncodified form upon patent approval of the 
knowledge; i.e., the point at which the knowledge is, technically, legally protected 
from commercial exploitation by others.          
 
Thus, my resistance approach could be a powerful tool to utilize to resist the 
capitalist motivations of industry responsible for closed science in the postmodern 
university research lab
274
, whilst preserving the crucial collaborative relations between 
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 Resistance in this manner towards industry-mediated closed science in the postmodern university 
research lab will, technically, revert the university from a postmodern to a historic institution, because you will 
recall from Chapter 6 that industry’s erosion of the university’s public sphere is a central criterion in the rise of the 
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the two.  The result is a tilting of the balance of the contradictory convergence from 
closed science more towards open science as a means to reclaim the democratic ideals 
of learning in the lab.  As for the wider university, at least in the context of the 
sciences, I believe it is not in ruins; it is merely adapting to contemporary society.  If 
it did not adapt it would be in ruins.  However, if the university adapts too much, by 
granting greater power to industry in its affairs, it will be in ruins.  Hence, this balance 
between adaption and overadaption to contemporary society is crucial to the 
university’s current precarious and future position in society.  As lab educators, if 
impassioned, we have a moral obligation to monitor this delicate balance, which can 
realistically be kept in check with the rational implementation of my resistance 
approach.   
But to be truly effective, lab education must entail teaching science students’ 
awareness of the technological triumvirate in order to prepare them for the potential 
obstacles in the path of their research, and to garner support for collective resistance 
to such obstacles.  Importantly, Crittenden (2007: 10) states that ‘political action 
through education cannot take place in a vacuum’; hence, the lab educator must 
transcend the political confines of their university to mobilize – using broader 
political bases like the AAUP – activism in, and across, the field of higher education 
in order to see real change.  But grave challenges lie ahead.  For the AAUP’s online 
mission proudly (and perhaps ignorantly) proclaims ‘higher education’s contribution 
to the common good’275 – i.e., ‘common good’ in the social sense.  In reality, though, 
as the dissertation has demonstrated, this is far from true given the intrinsic 
commercialization embedded in ‘heightened common good’ – i.e., ‘common good’ in 
the economic sense – to describe internal research data generated in the context of 
the technological triumvirate. 
Indeed, the contemporary commercial exploitation of hard and soft 
technologies to sell university internal research data in the context of a knowledge 
economy and against the backdrop of the control technology of neoliberalism is, as 
the dissertation comes full circle, consistent with Heidegger’s (1977) concept of 
                                                                                                                                            
postmodern university.  But such a reversion, even if enacted by myself and many of my colleagues, would require 
collective university-wide resistance towards closed science.  As this seems unrealistic (at least for the immediate 
time being), given the complexity on which my resistance approach rests, or perhaps because of its inaccessibility, 
I preserve use of the label postmodern university, even when I describe action that somewhat undermines the very 
practical criteria used to coin the label.     
275
 Online resource available at: http://www.aaup.org/AAUP/about/mission/ (last accessed 7/29/2012).  
Stewart Craig; 9610118 
143 
 
‘challenging-forth’276.  In Chapter 2, I alternatively conceived ‘challenging-forth’ as a 
proactive bringing-forth, which is my cue to the apparent capitalist premeditation 
laden in the mind(s) of those involved in the design, creation, and/or implementation 
of a given modern technology.  That the mode of revealing for modern technologies – 
including hard, soft, and control
277
 technologies, which have revolutionized learning 
in the university research lab inasmuch as they have, ironically, undermined it – is 
inextricably tied to capitalist premeditation is not surprising given the global grip of 
capitalism and the associated popularity of state-adopted neoliberal policy.  Such is a 
sign of our postmodern times.  And such is the story of the ‘technological triumvirate 
of university-industry alliances’.    
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 Recall, ‘challenging-forth’ contrasts to (the more passive) ‘bringing-forth’, which is the mode of 
revealing for ancient technologies (Heidegger, 1977).   
277
 However, the notion that control technologies are exclusively modern technologies (or 
‘contemporary’, in order to avoid confusion with the modern era) is contestable given that humans are control 
technologies, whereas hard and soft technologies are not, although these are indeed conceived, manufactured, and 
exploited by humans.  Therefore, presumably control technologies have existed since the advent of humanity; 
indeed, feudalism is a good example of a control technology that predates contemporary times (see Chapter 4).  
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